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Abstract  
The study examines the level of the quantity and quality of Key Performance Indicator 
(KPI) reporting for a sample of FTSE 350 UK listed companies over the period 2006-
2010. Furthermore, it identifies the determinants of KPI reporting and investigates its 
impact upon firm value. Based upon best practice guidance recommended by the 
Accounting Standard Board (2006), the study develops a measure of disclosure quality 
by considering the main qualitative attributes of information which, arguably, make 
KPI information particularly useful to stakeholders. The distinction between disclosure 
quantity and quality in the study enables the researcher to obtain greater insights into 
the drivers and implications of KPI reporting quantity and quality. The study finds a 
variation between UK firms in the number of KPIs disclosed, with a notable low level 
of reporting quality, especially in the case of non-financial KPIs. It also finds that 
corporate governance mechanisms play an important role in improving KPI reporting. 
In particular, it shows that directors’ compensation affects the quantity and quality of 
KPI disclosure. Furthermore, the study provides evidence that the quantity and quality 
of KPI disclosure are not derived from the same factors, and both have a different 
impact on firm value. On the other hand, the study finds a negative association between 
the numbers of KPIs disclosed and firm value, while a non-significant relationship is 
reported between KPI reporting quality and firm valuation. Overall, this study provides 
evidence that disclosure quantity is not a good proxy for disclosure quality.  
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 ِميِح هرلا ِنَمْح هرلا ِ هاللَّ ِمْسِب 
 ا همَأ ٌرْيَخ ُ هلِلَآ ىََفطْصا َنيِذهلا ِهِداَبِع ىَلَع ٌمَلََسَو ِ هِلِلَ ُدْمَْحلا ُِلق( َنوُكِرْشُي95 ْمُكَل َلَزَْنأَو َضْرَْلْاَو ِتاَواَم هسلا َقَلَخ ْن همَأ )
 ِ هاللَّ َعَم ٌهَلِإ َأ اَهَرَجَش اُوِتْبُنت ْنَأ ْمُكَل َناَك اَم ٍةَْجَهب َتاَذ َقِئاَدَح ِهِب اَْنَتْبَنأَف ًءاَم ِءاَم هسلا َنِم( َنُولِْدَُي ٌمَْوق ْمُه َْلب 06 ْن همَأ )
 ََلَُج َم ٌهَلِإ َأ اًزِجاَح ِنْيَرَْحْبلا َنَْيب ََلَُجَو َيِساَوَر اََهل ََلَُجَو اًراَْهَنأ اََهلَلَِخ ََلَُجَو اًراَرَق َضْرَْلْا َلَ ْمُهُرَثْكَأ َْلب ِ هاللَّ َع
( َنوُمَلَُْي06 َلُخ ْمُكُلََُْجيَو َءوُّسلا ُفِشْكَيَو ُهاَعَد اَِذإ هرَطْضُمْلا ُبيُِجي ْن همَأ ) َنوُر هكََذت اَم ًلَِيلَق ِ هاللَّ َعَم ٌهَلِإ َأ ِضْرَْلْا َءاَف
(06 ٌهَلِإ َأ ِهِتَمْحَر ْيََدي َنَْيب اًرْشُب َحاَي ِّرلا ُلِسْرُي ْنَمَو ِرَْحْبلاَو ِّرَْبلا ِتاَمُلُظ ِيف ْمُكيِْدَهي ْن همَأ )  ا همَع ُ هاللَّ ىَلاََُت ِ هاللَّ َعَم
( َنوُكِرْشُي06 ْن همَأ )اَهْرُب اُوتاَه ُْلق ِ هاللَّ َعَم ٌهَلِإ َأ ِضْرَْلْاَو ِءاَم هسلا َنِم ْمُكُقُزْرَي ْنَمَو ُهُدي ُِ ُي همُث َقْلَْخلا ُأَْدَبي ْمُْتنُك ْنِإ ْمُكَن
( َنِيقِداَص06 َنوُرُ ْشَي اَمَو ُ هاللَّ هلَِإ َْبَيغْلا ِضْرَْلْاَو ِتاَواَم هسلا ِيف ْنَم ُمَلَُْي َلَ ُْلق ) ( َنُوَثُُْبي َناهَيأ09)  
In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful.  
‘ (95)  Say: Praise be to Allah and Peace on his servants whom He has chosen (for his 
Message). Who is better? - Allah or the false gods they associate with Him? (06)  Or, 
who has created the heavens and the earth, and who sends you down rain from the sky 
causing the growth of well-planted orchards, full of beauty of delight: it is not in your 
power to cause the growth of the trees in them. Can there be another god besides 
Allah? Indeed, they are a people who swerve from justice. (06)  Or, who has made the 
earth firm to live in; made rivers in its midst; set thereon mountains immovable; and 
made a separating bar between the two bodies of flowing water? Can there be another 
god besides Allah? No, but most of them do not know. (06)  Or, who listens to the (soul) 
distressed when it calls on Him, and Who relieves its suffering, and makes you 
(mankind) inheritors of the earth? Can there be another god besides Allah? Little you 
remember. (06)  Or, who guides you through the depths of darkness on land and sea, 
and who sends the winds as heralds of glad tidings, going before the rain? Can there be 
another god besides Allah? - High is Allah above what they associate with Him! (06)  
Or, who originates creation, then repeats it, and who gives you sustenance from heaven 
and earth? Can there be another god besides Allah? Say, "Bring forth your argument, if 
  
 
A
p
p
en
d
ic
es 
iv 
you are telling the truth!" (09)  Say: None in the heavens or on earth, except Allah, 
knows the unseen nor can they perceive when they shall be raised up for Judgment’(The 
Holy Qur’an, Chapter 27 , Verses 59-65). 
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Chapter 1- Introduction  
1.1 Overview 
In recent years, a sizeable body of literature indicates a major increase in interest in 
narrative reporting (e.g. Solomon et al., 2000, Hussainey et al., 2003; Beattie et al., 
2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Hussainey and Walker, 
2009; Hussainey and Al-Najjar 2011; Wang and Hussainey, 2013). These studies show 
that narrative reporting plays an important role in improving communications with 
shareholders. It explains financial performance and provides a broader analysis of a 
firm’s operating activities, any surrounding risks, objectives, prospects and strategies. 
Thus, it increases the relevance of corporate reporting by complementing the role of 
financial statements.  
In the United Kingdom (UK), firms have been requested to introduce an Operating and 
Financial Review (OFR) statement that includes analyses of the firm’s business position 
and development. However, UK firms provide this statement on a voluntary basis in 
accordance with the financial reporting statement issued by the Accounting Standard 
Board (ASB) in 2006. 
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are crucial measures of performance that are 
disclosed by a firm’s directors in order to help the stakeholders to analyse the firm’s 
performance. These KPIs could be financial (e.g. operating profit, cash flow, and 
earnings per share), or non-financial (e.g. new product launches; emissions; total 
energy).  KPI information is one of the main narrative disclosures that could be useful 
to the users of annual reports.  By analysing KPI information, different users could 
evaluate the financial performance of the firm and assess the current competitive 
position, as well as the extent to which progress is being made in accordance with the 
firm’s strategy.  
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In particular, in the UK, the Companies Act (CA) (2006) in accordance with the 
European Union (EU) Accounts Modernization Directive (2003) requires that all 
companies, with the exception of small firms, should review their business using 
financial KPIs and, where appropriate, using other KPI information with regard to 
environmental and employee aspects. Accordingly, many regulatory bodies (e.g. the 
ASB) require firms to report this information. Furthermore, the ASB provides guidance 
for achieving best practice in terms of KPI disclosure in the OFR (ASB, 2006). 
In general, most research papers to date have examined the determinants and economic 
consequences of either overall disclosure or particular types of disclosure. Numerous 
studies have examined the factors affecting corporate narrative disclosure, suggesting 
that corporate governance (CG) attributes, as well as firm characteristics, are the key 
drivers for corporate disclosure, either as a whole (e.g. Ho and Wong, 2001; Wang et 
al., 2008) or for different types of corporate disclosure such as forward looking 
statements (e.g. Wang and Hussainey, 2013); risk reporting (e.g. Abraham and Cox, 
2007; Elshandidy et al., 2013); online reporting (e.g. Abdelsalam and Street, 2007); and 
intellectual capital disclosure (e.g. Li et al., 2008). The other stream of research has 
shown the usefulness of corporate disclosure on stock market participants’ decisions. 
For instance, several studies tested the effect of corporate disclosure on cost of capital 
(e.g. Welker, 1995; Botosan, 1997; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002); firm value (e.g. Baek 
et al., 2004; Hassan et al., 2009); share price anticipation of earnings (e.g. Hussainey 
and Walker, 2009; Wang and Hussainey, 2013) and analysts’ following, besides 
analysts’ forecast accuracy (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Eng and Teo, 2000; Yu, 
2010). Notably, the majority of previous studies have used disclosure quantity as a 
proxy for disclosure quality, assuming that disclosing larger amounts of information 
leads to a higher level of information quality. However, these studies - especially those 
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conducted outside the US - have not provided evidence on the factors determining 
disclosure quality regardless of quantity. Similarly, there is a lack of evidence on the 
separate influence of each of them on stock market participants.   
Despite the importance of KPI information, it appears that there are a limited number of 
studies which have looked at KPI reporting (e.g. Hussainey and Walker, 2006; Giunta 
et al., 2008; Tauringana and Mangena, 2009; Dorestani and Rezaee, 2011a; Dorestani 
and Rezaee, 2011b). The closest studies to the current research are those of Giunta et al. 
(2008) and Tauringana and Mangena (2009). Giunta et al. (2008) showed the low level 
of quality in terms of financial KPI reporting on the part of Italian firms. Tauringana 
and Mangena (2009) suggested that the introduction of business reviews affects 
positively the amount of KPIs disclosed by the UK media sector.  
To the best of the author’s knowledge, there has been no study that has explored KPI 
reporting quantity and quality and has shown variations among firms in practice. 
Moreover, previous studies have not examined how KPI reporting quality could 
influence a firm’s value. The regulatory environment in the UK offers an interesting 
context in which to conduct this study. The regulations enable corporate directors to 
control KPI reporting. In addition, the stock market in the UK is developed, and there 
should be enough informed financial statement users able to comprehend KPI 
disclosures. Overall, this research will contribute to the disclosure literature and could 
have policy implications for the UK. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 illustrates the nature of this study. 
Section 1.3 outlines the motivations for conducting this study. Research questions are 
presented in section 1.4. The objectives of this research, in addition to its potential 
contribution, are discussed in section 1.5. Finally, details of the organisation of this 
study are provided in section 1.6. 
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1.2 The nature of the study 
In attempting to distinguish between KPI disclosure quantity and disclosure quality, this 
study will add to the narrative disclosure literature. KPI information should be of a high 
quality if this information is to be useful for the users of annual reports. Therefore, the 
starting point of this study has been to assess KPI reporting quality separate from its 
quantity. Using different proxies to measure disclosure quality, such as disclosure 
quantity or earnings quality, fails to reflect accurate changes in disclosure quality 
(Berger, 2011). For instance, stock market liquidity as a proxy of disclosure quality may 
capture any changes that are related to the market rather than financial reporting quality 
(Berger, 2011). Thus, it was argued that disclosure quality measures should be 
comprehensive, and they should consider more than one dimension of disclosure (e.g. 
Beattie et al., 2004). Thus, researchers have attempted to assess disclosure quality using 
self-constructed indices (e.g. Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Boesso and Kumar, 2007). 
However, most of the previous attempts have been criticised due to the lack of a 
convincing theoretical background (Botosan, 2004), which lead to increased 
subjectivity in terms of measurement.   
Beyer et al. (2010) reviewed the previous literature in this area and argued that 
researchers have to build their disclosure measure based on sensible economic 
definitions. Therefore, this study identifies disclosure quality in accordance with the 
principal objective of regulatory bodies’ frameworks which is information usefulness. 
KPI information quality is measured by the extent to which it is of value to 
stakeholders. Consequently, quality scores are produced based upon firms’ alignment 
with the ASB (2006) guidance with regard to KPI reporting.  
A research instrument is then developed to measure the quantity and evaluate the 
quality of KPI disclosure. The quantity of KPI disclosure is measured by counting the 
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number of KPIs disclosed in the annual reports of the FTSE 350 non-financial UK 
companies under consideration. Manual content analysis is employed to quantify KPI 
disclosures for the sample firms. 
The study uses the resultant KPI reporting quantity and quality scores to explore the 
variation among UK firms with regard to KPI disclosure in practice. Then, these scores 
are used to examine the determinants and consequences of KPI reporting. 
Most published papers on the determinants and consequences of narrative disclosure 
have not distinguished between both dimensions of disclosure: quantity and quality 
(e.g. Li et al., 2008; Tauringana and Mangena, 2009; Hassan et al., 2009; Hussainey 
and Al-Najjar, 2011; Wang and Hussainey, 2013). Instead, accounting research usually 
employs disclosure quantity as a proxy for disclosure quality (e.g. Hussainey and 
Mouselli, 2010; Mouselli et al., 2012).  According to this approach, it is assumed that 
the quantity of disclosure is the same as its quality, and both are derived from the same 
factors and have identical consequences.  
The distinction between quantity and quality of disclosure allows the present study to 
participate actively in the development of empirical disclosure studies. More 
specifically, it enables the researcher to investigate the factors affecting each 
dimension. In turn, the study tests the separate influence of KPI reporting quantity and 
quality on firm value.    
1.3  Motivations 
Regulators usually ask for an enhancement in the level and quality of information 
disclosed by companies. Edward Davey, Minister for Employment Relations, Consumer 
and Postal Affairs in the UK stated that:  
‘Our goal must be to ensure that our companies are clear-sighted and focused on the 
issues which matter to their long term success and therefore to their members. 
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Disclosing good quality and relevant information on these issues in company narrative 
reporting is necessary if shareholders are to make well informed decisions in their role 
as company owners’  (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills , 2010: p.5).  
Therefore, from the policy makers’ perspectives, there is a need to be aware of 
companies’ current practices with regard to the extent of the information disclosed, and 
its quality. In spite of the richness of KPI disclosure content, there is no study that 
provides a full picture of KPI reporting practices on the part of UK firms. The closest 
studies to this research either look only at the level of one type of KPI disclosure (i.e. 
Giunta et al.’s study of financial KPI in Italy (2008)), or focus only on the quantity of 
KPI disclosure for one sector and its determinants (i.e. Tauringana and Mangena’s 
study of KPI in the UK media sector (2009)).  Therefore, the first motivation for 
conducting this study is to address this research gap by looking at the characteristics of 
KPI reporting. Rather than studying KPI reporting quantity in one sector (Tauringana 
and Mangena, 2009), the study shows how UK firms vary in terms of the quantity and 
quality of KPI reporting and its subcategories (both financial and non-financial KPIs). 
Arguably, this also highlights some areas that could improve in terms of the 
communication between companies and information users. 
To measure KPI reporting quality, the study has to respond to the call of many scholars 
to search for a comprehensive and sensible measure of disclosure in accounting studies 
(e.g. Beattie et al., 2004; Beyer et al., 2010). Previous studies use measures of 
disclosure quality which have been criticised with regard to their capability to capture 
disclosure quality accurately.1 This study addresses this issue by identifying 
information quality as a function of meeting the main qualitative attributes that should 
                                                 
1
 See section  2.2.2  for more details about measuring disclosure quality in previous literature. 
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make this information useful to the users, according to the regulators. The measure 
applied in this study is derived from the ASB’s (2006) guidance for best practice in 
terms of KPI reporting.  
The second motivation is that the UK offers an interesting context in which to examine 
the determinants of corporate KPI reporting. CA (2006) provisions imply that KPI 
reporting is likely to be voluntary for several reasons: (1) there is no definite set of KPIs 
to be disclosed by each firm stating what is a financial KPI and what is not, (2) firms’ 
directors can control KPI disclosure by identifying ‘the extent necessary’ of financial 
and non-financial KPIs for understanding a firm’s performance and its progress, (3) 
firms’ directors who are deciding what is ‘appropriate’, when analysing firm 
performance and development, may use other KPIs related to environmental and 
employee aspects, and (4) firms’ directors can limit the number KPIs disclosed for 
competition reasons in accordance with section 417 of CA (2006). Previous research 
has examined the determinants of voluntary disclosure (e.g. Li et al., 2008; Hussainey 
and Al-Najjar 2011; Wang and Hussainey, 2013). 
 A limited number of studies have examined the determinants of KPI reporting.  The 
closest studies to this study have either limited their analyses to KPI disclosure quantity, 
e.g. Tauringana and Mangena (2009) - a study of KPI reporting in the UK media sector 
- or have ignored the majority of CG variables, e.g.  Boesso and Kumar (2007) - a study 
for voluntary disclosure practices on the part of US and Italian companies.  
This study addresses this gap in the literature by testing the effect of numerous CG 
mechanisms, as well as other firm characteristics on KPI reporting. In this regard, the 
UK context would have other effects on the analyses, since firms are not required to 
apply a specific structure of CG mechanisms in accordance with the ‘comply or 
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explain’ rule. Finally, these analyses would provide evidence on whether the quantity 
and quality of such narrative reporting are derived from the same factors. 
The third motivation for this study arises from the need to examine to what extent KPI 
reporting quantity and quality could affect stock market participants.  More specifically, 
the study investigates whether reporting quantity and its quality have different effects 
on firms’ value. As mentioned above, KPI information involves different categories of 
information that might be attractive to annual report users. It incorporates important 
information that refers to current and future firm performance linked with firm strategy. 
Consequently, such information could be valuable when it comes to assessing current 
performance, as well as a firm’s ability to pursue its strategic objectives successfully. 
Although, previous research has shown the impact of different types of narrative 
reporting in different contexts (e.g. Schleicher et al., 2007; Hussainey and Walker, 
2009; Hassan et al., 2009; Sievers et al., 2013; Dorestani and Rezaee, 2011a), these 
studies have not provided strong evidence on the potential impact. One of the main 
explanations for the mixed results in previous research is the lack of a comprehensive 
and objective measure of disclosure quality (Beattie et al., 2004). Given the unique 
characteristics of the KPI information illustrated above, it is of interest to use the 
generated quality scores in order to examine the effects of KPI reporting. This would 
add to the literature, especially in the UK, as there is no study that examines the value 
relevance of KPI reporting in terms of quantity and quality. 
 
1.4 Research questions 
This thesis examines the following research questions: 
Q1. What are the main features of KPI reporting in the UK? 
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To provide an answer to this question, previous literature with regard to disclosure 
measurement is reviewed. Then, an instrument is developed in order to measure KPI 
reporting quantity and quality in annual reports. Manual content analysis is employed to 
code the text and to classify the KPIs disclosed into financial KPIs and non-financial 
KPIs. Quantity and quality scores for a sample of FTSE 350 non-financial UK firms, is 
analysed. Descriptive statistics are used to explore the main features of KPI reporting in 
the case of UK firms in terms of KPI reporting, including its subcategories. In addition, 
descriptive results are used to show changes in KPI reporting across different industries, 
and to illustrate these changes across the period (2006-2010). 
Q2. What are the factors affecting the level of quantity and quality of KPI reporting in 
the UK? 
To provide an answer to this question, the study reviews relevant theories that explain 
directors’ incentives to control corporate disclosure. Then, drawing on these theories, 
the determinants of KPI reporting in terms of quantity and quality are proposed.  In 
addition to firm characteristics variables, the proposed explanatory variables are 
grouped into five subcategories: 1) Directors’ compensation, 2) Board characteristics, 
3) Audit committee characteristics, 4) Ownership structure variables, and 5) Capital 
need variables. Panel data regressions are conducted to assess the significance of the 
association between those variables and KPI reporting in terms of quantity and quality 
scores.  
Q3. What is the impact of KPI reporting in terms of quantity and quality on firm value? 
To provide an answer to this question, the relevant literature is reviewed to explain how 
- in theory - KPI reporting could affect firm value. Following previous studies, the 
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study controls for firm characteristics as well as growth opportunities. Additionally, the 
explanatory variables included in the analyses are: 1) KPI reporting in terms of quantity 
and quality scores, 2) Directors’ compensation, 3) Board characteristics, 4) Audit 
committee characteristics, 5) Ownership structure variables. Tobin’s Q ratio is used in 
the main, and further analyses are used as a measure of firm value. Moreover, tests are 
re-estimated using market-to-book ratio as a proxy for firm value to check the 
robustness of the results. Panel data regressions are also conducted to test the 
hypotheses of this study.  
Q4. Can KPI reporting quantity be used as a proxy for KPI reporting quality? 
The results of the above three studies are integrated to provide an answer to this 
question. The distinction between disclosure quantity and its quality is reached through 
the design of the research instrument. Descriptive statistics are used to obtain an 
indication of the relationship between KPI reporting in terms of quantity and quality.  
Regression results in the second study are employed to show whether each of quantity 
and quality in terms of KPI reporting is identically derived from the same factors. 
Finally, the findings of the third study are used in order to examine whether quantity 
and quality in terms of KPI reporting have different effects on firm valuation. 
1.5 Research objectives and contributions 
This section illustrates the objectives of this research based upon the above research 
questions. Then, the resulting possible contribution to the literature is presented.  
1.5.1 Research objectives 
Complementary research objectives are set to provide answers to the above research 
questions. This research aims to make a contribution to the extant literature. 
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Accordingly, this research focuses on UK firms’ practices with respect to an important 
type of narrative disclosure (i.e. KPI information). Research findings would inform 
academics in depth whether or not the quantity and quality of disclosure are derived 
from the same factors. Moreover, the findings would indicate whether or not KPI 
reporting has an influence on market participants.  
By achieving the following research objectives, the findings of the research would be of 
interest to regulators, firms and shareholders.  
1. To provide a proper measure for KPI reporting in terms of quality and quantity. 
2. To explore the main features of KPI reporting in the UK. 
3. To identify the determinants of KPI reporting in terms of quantity and quality. 
4. To investigate the impact of KPI reporting in terms of quantity and quality upon 
firm value. 
5. To examine the extent to which KPI reporting in terms of quantity can operate 
as a proxy for KPI reporting in terms of quality. 
1.5.2 Research contributions 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no recent academic study that has looked 
at the level of quantity or quality in terms of KPI reporting among a sample of UK 
listed companies. Additionally, there is no study that has examined either the 
determinants or economic consequences of KPI reporting in the UK, distinguishing 
between disclosure quantity and quality.  
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Several novel contributions to the literature are made by this study. The first substantial 
contribution is that the study attempts to explicitly differentiate between the amount of 
KPI disclosure and its quality. This provides the opportunity to study each dimension in 
practice. Subsequently, this distinction helps to obtain greater insights into the drivers 
and implications of KPI reporting. 
 Hence, the study develops a valid and reliable measure of disclosure quality. This 
measure builds on the view that narrative reporting should provide useful information to 
different users. As mentioned above, the disclosure quality measure is based upon the 
ASB guidance for best practice.  
Arguably, this measure of disclosure quality offers many advantages: (1) the measure is 
based upon a framework of a well-recognised regulatory body (i.e. ASB, 2006) that 
aims at information usefulness, (2) the study maintains consistency in evaluating the 
quality of KPI reporting for UK firms, since it uses the KPI disclosure guidance that is 
recommended to be followed by UK firms, (3) the measure focuses on the qualitative 
attributes of the information disclosed, so it would be relevant to measure the quality of 
any type of narrative disclosure (e.g. risk reporting) which would provide insights into 
disclosure studies in the future, (4) since the dimensions used as a basis for evaluating 
disclosure quality are clear, the measure does not require a wide degree of subjective 
judgment on the part of the coder. Hence, the disclosure quality measure does not suffer 
from high subjectivity which is a common weakness of self-constructed indices 
employed in previous research, (5) the ability to ensure the reliability and validity of the 
measure is due to the use of many procedures, and (6) having distinct disclosure quality 
and quantity scores helps to examine whether or not the two dimensions can operate as 
substitutes. 
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The second major contribution of the study lies in exploring KPI reporting practices for 
a sample of UK companies. If compared with Tauringana and Mangena (2009), the 
study presents a holistic view in terms of the overall level of KPI, including financial 
KPI and non-financial KPI as disclosed by UK listed companies from different sectors 
over a five year period. Furthermore, it is the first academic study - to the best of the 
author’s knowledge - that examines whether or not UK firms are keen to introduce high 
quality KPIs in their annual reports. The study also shows to what extent KPI reporting 
quantity and quality varies across different industries over the sample period (2006-
2010). In particular, the results are expected to be of interest to UK regulators. They 
should offer clear guidance for each industry that identifies a minimum and specific 
number of KPIs to be issued. The guidance should provide the definitions and the 
assumptions used to drive each of these KPIs. This avoids the lack of comparability that 
might exist between firms in the same sector.   
The third contribution of this study is that the thesis explores the factors affecting KPI 
reporting in terms of quantity and quality. Drawing on agency theory, signalling theory, 
capital need theory, political need theory, stakeholder theory and information cost 
theory, this study highlights the role played by CG mechanisms in affecting the quantity 
and quality of KPI reporting. In particular, the study contributes to the literature about 
the association between directors’ compensation and corporate disclosure. Moreover, 
this study provides evidence that the quantity and quality of KPI disclosures are not 
identically determined by the same factors. These findings are of interest to regulators 
who are working on enhancing KPI reporting in particular and narrative disclosure in 
general.  
Another contribution is made to the literature by examining the value relevance of KPI 
reporting.  To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to test whether 
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or not KPI reporting in terms of quantity and quality have any and different impact on 
firm value. The study findings show that the quantity and quality of disclosure have 
different influences on firm value. Because of its potential negative effect on firm 
value; the results of the study alert firms to the consequences of excessive KPI 
disclosure. However, the study finds that disclosure quality has no significant 
association with the value of UK firms. Researchers need to consider this finding if they 
are going to examine narrative disclosure (or certain types of disclosure) in terms of its 
impact on stock market participants. On the other hand, the findings indicate that UK 
investors do not enhance the valuation of firms as a result of most CG mechanisms. 
This could be of interest to regulators, suggesting that imposing a certain CG structure 
on UK firms might not be justified with regard to valuation considerations.  
Finally, this research explores the question as to whether or not the quantity of 
disclosure can be used as a measure of its quality. As discussed above, the study makes 
a distinction between each dimension. The study findings suggest that disclosure 
quantity and disclosure quality should not be used as substitutes in accounting research. 
Each of them could be derived from different determinants, and might lead to different 
consequences. Consequently, researchers should consider this finding with regard to 
related studies in the future. This could also contribute to the literature by generating 
more research opportunities that could validate previous research findings in many 
areas (e.g. factors affecting disclosure levels, the impact of financial reporting). 
1.6 Organisation of the study 
The structure of this thesis indicates that there are three chapters which deal with three 
main studies with regard to KPI reporting. Each of these chapters contains a review of 
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the relevant literature. Hence, there is no need for an additional chapter for a literature 
review or relating to theory or methodology. Thus the thesis is organised as follows: 
Chapter (2) provides an answer to research question 1. It introduces a measure for KPI 
reporting quality based upon the ASB (2006) framework. Then, quantity and quality 
scores are analysed in order to explain the main features of KPI reporting practices in 
the UK. Furthermore, descriptive analyses explain the change in KPI reporting over 
time and across industries.  
Chapter (3) examines the factors affecting the level of quantity and quality of KPI 
reporting in the UK, and hence provides an answer to research question 2. The chapter 
includes the theoretical basis for explaining the managerial incentives to control 
corporate disclosure, as well as identifying factors affecting such disclosure. The 
findings of the analyses also help to assess the validity of using quantity of disclosure as 
a proxy for quality in accounting studies, and hence provide an answer to question 4.  
Chapter (4) provides an answer to research question 3. It investigates whether or not the 
quantity and quality of KPI reporting have any or a different influence on firm 
valuation. Furthermore, analyses show how financial and non-financial KPI reporting 
could have a different impact on firm value. Finally, this chapter links the findings to 
question the validity of using quantity of disclosure as a proxy for quality in previous 
research, and hence provides an answer to research question 4.  
Chapter (5) provides the concluding remarks of this thesis. It provides a summary of the 
research objectives, questions, and the approach followed. In addition, it presents a 
summary of the key findings of the research and discusses their implications. The 
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remaining part of the chapter shows a summary of the limitations of this research, and 
highlights several avenues for future research.  
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Chapter 2 - KPI reporting in the UK: Descriptive statistics 
2.1  Overview 
The main objective of this chapter is to provide an answer to the first research question 
(Q1). It explores the main features of KPI reporting in the UK. The present study is 
distinguished by exploring the level of quantity as well as of quality in terms of KPI 
reporting for a sample of UK listed companies from different sectors over a five year 
period.  
The quantity of KPI disclosure is measured by counting the number of KPIs disclosed 
in the annual reports. On the other hand, the study builds on, and contributes to, the 
literature that focused on the qualitative attributes of the information disclosed (e.g. 
Beattie et al., 2004; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Giunta et al., 2008; Beest and Braam, 
2011). Thus, the study introduces a measure for KPI reporting in terms of quality, based 
upon the well-recognised regulatory framework in the UK. Hence, KPI reporting in 
terms of quality scores for firms are identified, based upon the sample firms’ 
compliance with the ASB (2006) guidance for disclosing high quality KPI information. 
It is expected that the soft regulations could lead to reporting of KPIs on a voluntary 
basis. For instance, directors could take advantage of allowing them to report on KPIs if 
they consider them as necessary and appropriate to the analysis of the firm’s 
performance. They also could avoid reporting on KPIs when they consider such 
disclosure harmful or against the competitive position. Thus, one can expect that 
companies would vary in terms of the quantity of the KPIs disclosed or their quality.  
Quantity and quality scores are analysed with the use of descriptive statistics in order to 
explain the main characteristics of KPI reporting in the UK. Furthermore, descriptive 
analyses explain the changes in KPI reporting over time and across industries. The 
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analyses are extended to show the corresponding descriptive results for the quantity and 
quality of financial and non-financial KPI reporting. 
Measuring KPI reporting is essential in order to proceed with answering the remaining 
research questions. Based upon these measures, the following chapters investigate the 
determinants and consequences of KPI reporting, distinguishing between disclosure 
quantity and quality. Consequently, it becomes feasible to examine whether or not 
reporting quantity can be used as a proxy for its quality.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: section 2.2 discusses the 
regulatory framework of KPI reporting in the UK, and reviews previous research. 
Section 2.3 illustrates the methods used in this study. It shows the steps followed to 
construct a measure for KPI reporting. In addition, it presents a pilot study conducted 
before starting the main analysis. Pilot study results help to ensure the reliability of the 
research instrument. Section 2.4 shows the sample selection process, and introduces the 
variables in the remaining chapters of the study. Section 2.5 displays the results of the 
study with respect to overall KPI reporting, as well as its subcategories. The findings 
provide a full picture of KPI reporting on the part of UK firms. They show how 
quantity and quality of KPI disclosures and its subcategories varies across firms in 
different industries. In particular, the findings also highlight the low level of quantity 
and quality of non-financial KPI reporting provided by the sample firms. Finally, the 
discussion and overall conclusion of this study is provided in section 2.6. 
2.2 Regulatory framework & literature review 
2.2.1  Regulatory framework & previous studies 
Neely et al. (1995) demonstrated that performance measurement is a process that 
requires measures to quantify the efficiency and effectiveness of actions. Accordingly, 
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each organisation needs a set of performance indicators to measure and analyse its 
overall performance. As a result, every company has to identify the primary 
performance indicators that have a significant impact upon its current and future 
success. These key performance indicators (KPIs) could increase a firm’s performance 
dramatically, by affecting more than one of the critical success factors as they apply to 
the firm (Parmenter, 2010). 
Section 417 of the Companies Act (CA) defines KPIs as: “…factors by reference to 
which the development, performance or position of the business of the company can be 
measured effectively” (CA, 2006, p.8). Whereas it was argued that KPIs inclusively 
represent a set of non-financial measures (Parmenter, 2010), others consider that 
financial KPIs is the principal category of firms’ KPIs (Giunta et al., 2008; CA, 2006). 
 Broadly speaking, a KPI refers to a critical perspective in terms of business 
performance (Parmenter, 2010). Based upon the content of each KPI, KPIs can be 
classified as financial or non-financial, quantitative or qualitative, historical or forward 
looking, and an indicator which contains either good news or bad news (Hussainey and 
Walker, 2006; Boesso and Kumar, 2007). 
Reporting on KPIs is regarded as the core of the business reporting system (Bray, 
2010). It is expected that KPI reporting would be a valuable source of information for 
user groups. KPI information contains relevant information related to the strategy of the 
company, board objectives, and value creation activities. Arguably, KPI reporting is an 
effective means to improving both the transparency and relevance of public financial 
information (Dorestani and Rezaee, 2011a). Firms might use this type of disclosure to 
support their communications with stakeholders. Hence, KPI reporting could improve 
the users’ ability to evaluate a firm’s performance, to assess its position comparing with 
that of its competitors, and to offer a broad overview of the firm’s ability to achieve a 
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sustainable competitive advantage. 
In its report to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Advisory 
Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting (ACIFR, 2008) stated that KPI 
reporting might lead to an increase in the usefulness of information for investors. This 
increase is expected because KPI disclosures display important aspects of companies’ 
activities that might not be reflected clearly in the financial statements. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that sophisticated users show a higher reliance on quantitative forecasts 
of both financial and non-financial KPIs, in the evaluation of the current and future 
performance of the business (Pratt and Beattie, 2002). 
The importance of KPI reporting encourages many regulatory bodies to require firms to 
publish this critical information. For example, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Scotland (ICAS) (1999) proposed that improved business reporting should provide 
additional information which might be captured by management information system, 
such as performance indicators and intellectual capital (Beattie, 1999). The EU 
Accounts Modernisation Directive (2003) required that entity’s reporting should 
include a business review. This review must contain analysis using KPIs. This 
requirement has been adopted by the UK Companies Act (CA) of 2006 (section 417). 
Additionally, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued the IFRS 
Practice Statement ‘Management Commentary’ (MC) in December 2010 (IASB, 2010). 
This statement presents a broad framework for the preparation and presentation of a 
management commentary. The statement stated that such a management commentary 
should include information that helps to understand the critical performance indicators 
used by management to evaluate the performance against the objectives of the entity. It 
seems that this statement responded to the call to make MC matter to the investment 
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community by illustrating the value creation structures of the company through a set of 
KPIs (Nielsen, 2010). 
Regarding KPI reporting in the UK, the directors of quoted companies were first asked 
to prepare operating and financial review (OFR). According to Schedule (7ZA) of the 
CA (1985), the OFR should include a comprehensive analysis of: 2  
(a) The development and performance of the business of the company during the 
financial year, and the position of the company at the end of the year,  
(b) The main trends and factors underlying the development, performance and position 
of the business of the company during the financial year.  
(c) The main trends and factors which are likely to affect the company’s future 
development, performance and position. 
As mentioned earlier, reporting on KPIs is restated in section 417 of the CA (2006) 
asking the directors of all companies - except small ones - to analyse the company 
performance using KPIs in a business review. The KPIs used in the review should meet 
the need of stakeholders when it comes to understanding the position and the 
development of the business.  
Furthermore, the Accounting Standard Board (ASB) issued the OFR reporting 
statement which highlights the role of KPIs as a tool for analysing business 
performance through the board of directors. KPI information is required to help in 
assessing the firm’s progress in achieving its business strategies (ASB, 2006). 
Consequently, OFR (2006) contains guidance concerning the content of KPI disclosure 
in such a way as to achieve the best level of usefulness for the users (ASB, 2006).  
It is stated that KPIs could be financial or, if appropriate, non-financial to cover 
environmental and employee matters (ASB, 2006; CA, 2006). Furthermore, it is 
                                                 
2
 Extracted from Department for Business, Innovation and Skills  (2010). Available at: 
http://w w w .bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law /docs/n/10-1057-future-narrative-reporting-consultation.pdf 
 
CHAPTER TWO: KPI REPORTING IN THE UK: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
 22 
recommended that KPIs should be widely used within the industry or the sector for 
comparability purposes.  
With respect to professional bodies, many surveys have been conducted in order to 
explore companies’ reporting practices after the introduction of the business review 
(Deloitte, 2006; PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 2006; Deloitte, 2009. For example, Deloitte 
(2006) reviewed the annual reports of 100 listed firms which were published in the 
period from 1 August 2005 to 31 July 2006. It was found that 45% of companies 
presented KPIs. The average number of KPIs was six, with the average number of non-
financial KPIs being two. 
In November 2006, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) analysed 128 annual reports. The 
results showed that companies responded to the OFR guidance regarding KPIs. An 
increasing number of companies used KPIs as a tool to assess performance (32% at 
March 2005 year-end compared with 75% of companies as of March 2006 year-end). 
However, the majority of reported KPIs were financial.  
The ASB (2007) conducted a review of companies’ narrative reporting practices. The 
main conclusion of this review was that the lack of non-financial KPIs might be due to 
the difficulty of disclosure on this category for companies. Tauringana and Mangena 
(2009) explained that by the companies’ tendency to take advantage of exemption 
provisions 10 and 11 in section 417 under the CA (2006). These provisions allow some 
UK firms not to disclose this type of information for confidentiality reasons. Hence, 
these companies considered the release of KPI information to be seriously prejudicial to 
the company’s interests.  
In 2009, Deloitte examined the narrative sections contained within the annual reports of 
130 listed companies, including 30 investment trusts. It was reported that 84% of 
companies (77% in 2008) clearly identified their KPIs. The average number of KPIs per 
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company was eight, of which five were financial in nature and three were non-financial. 
However, companies’ performance in explaining the KPIs selected, and their link with 
strategy, was relatively poor. Many companies did not provide sufficient information 
for the reader to understand the reasons for selecting certain KPIs. Finally, the study by 
Deloitte indicated that the top three most common KPIs disclosed were profitability, 
shareholder return and employee-related measures. 
More recently, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) reviewed the narrative reporting 
on the part of UK listed companies in 2008/2009 (ASB, 2009). This review indicated 
that some companies might not consider KPI disclosure necessary or appropriate for 
understanding the development and performance of the business. However, companies 
have started to improve KPI communication by using graphical illustrations and tables. 
On the other hand, there are a limited number of academic studies that have 
investigated KPI reporting in annual reports. Hussainey and Walker (2006) explored 
analysts’ reports to investigate whether or not they rely on KPI disclosure. While their 
study gave a good indication of analysts’ usage of different KPIs among high and low 
growth companies, it did not investigate the characteristics of KPI reporting in the UK. 
In addition, the study used a small sample of analysts’ reports that were concerned with 
two types of UK companies (high and low growth companies).  
Tauringana and Mangena (2009) examined the extent of KPI reporting and the factors 
affecting its level, before and after the introduction of the business review. They 
employed content analysis on the annual reports of 32 media sector companies listed on 
the London Stock Exchange over a four year period (2004-2007). Their findings 
suggested that the introduction of the business review had a significant impact upon 
KPI reporting in the media sector. In addition, the authors showed that as late as 2007, 
25% of companies were still not reporting any KPIs. Besides that, they highlighted the 
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association between the extent of KPI reporting in media companies and the proportion 
of Non-Executive Directors (NED), company size, profitability and gearing. 
Tauringana and Mangena (2009) provided evidence on the change in KPI practices in 
UK media sector firms. It also indicated several factors that might affect the level of 
KPIs disclosed. However, the study focused on media companies exclusively, with a 
small sample size, which makes generalisation of their findings difficult. Furthermore, 
the study did not investigate the quality of KPI disclosure.  
Looking at KPI reporting studies outside the UK, Giunta et al. (2008) explored the 
quantity and quality of KPI reporting in the Italian context. Their study focused on 
Italian companies’ practices regarding financial KPIs published in the annual reports 
over the period 2004-2006. While they measured KPI quantity based upon the number 
of financial KPIs published, disclosure quality was measured based on the presence/ 
absence of 10 qualitative aspects. Then, these aspects were grouped according to the 
four general dimensions introduced by the IASB (2005); relevance, understandability, 
reliability and comparability. Then, quality scores were derived by calculating the mean 
among the four dimensions. The study results showed the low level of financial KPIs in 
terms of extent and quality in Italy, supporting their call for a regulation with regard to 
narrative disclosure in MC in general, and in KPI reporting in particular. 
While Giunta et al.’s (2008) study was the first to look at the quality dimension of KPI 
disclosure, the study relies on a relatively small sample comprising medium size 
companies in the Italian setting. Moreover, the analyses are limited to one type of KPI 
reporting in the form of financial KPI reporting.  
Finally, other studies raised questions about the impact of KPI reporting. Dorestani and 
Rezaee (2011a) examined the association between non-financial KPI disclosure and the 
accuracy of analysts’ forecasts for a sample of US firms for the two-year period 
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between 2006 and 2007. Their results suggested that the change in KPI quantity 
(measured by the ratio of the total number of KPI keywords disclosed to total words 
included in the management discussion and analysis) does not have strong impact on 
the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts.  
Using the same definition of the extent of KPI reporting, Dorestani and Rezaee (2011b) 
examined whether or not investors’ perceptions about the quality of earnings are 
associated with the quantity of non-financial KPIs disclosed by US firms across the 
period 2006-2007. They found a positive relationship between the extent of non-
financial KPIs disclosed and earning quality (measured by a factor that captures the 
association between current accruals and cash flows). Yet, Dorestani and Rezaee’s 
studies laid stress on investigating the impact of non-financial KPI reporting. They 
neither included time series analyses of KPI reporting nor explored the practices with 
regard to KPI reporting in terms of quantity and quality. Moreover, Dorestani and 
Rezaee (2011a; 2011b) did not consider financial KPI reporting in their analyses.  
On the other hand, Booker et al. (2011) highlighted the impact of non-financial 
performance indicator narratives upon users’ perceptions. The results provided evidence 
that non-financial KPI information could influence individuals’ actions, and could 
increase their perceptions of the predictive content of these KPIs. However, their 
experimental study is one which has limited power to enable generalisation if compared 
with empirical studies. 
To conclude, despite reporting on KPIs is required in the UK in accordance with the CA 
(2006), it is not clear what should be presented as a KPI, or how to distinguish between 
KPIs and other performance results. Additionally, there is no identical set of KPIs to be 
reported on for all companies. 
Arguably, the nature of the requirements implies that company directors have a wide 
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area of discretion when it comes to controlling KPI reporting in several ways: 
a) They can determine the ‘the extent necessary’ with regard to financial and non-
financial KPIs when it comes to understanding the development, performance or 
position of the business of the company.  
b) They can determine what is ‘appropriate’ when undertaking analysis using other 
financial key performance indicators, including those related to environmental and 
employee aspects, and  
c) They can take the advantage of exemption provisions 10 and 11 in section 417 of CA 
(2006) to control the extent of KPI information for confidentiality reasons.  
In addition to this interesting setting, it is apparent that previous surveys placed 
particular stress on exploring the quantity of KPI reporting for small samples of UK 
companies, and covered a short period of time. They did not explore KPI reporting in 
terms of quality, or provide a systematic guidance to measuring it.  
In summary, only a small number of studies have examined the characteristics of KPI 
disclosures in general, and in the UK in particular. The current study investigates KPI 
reporting on the part of UK firms across different sectors. In addition, this study 
addresses not only the quantity but also the quality dimension of KPI reporting. 
However, measuring KPI reporting quality is one of the key challenges in the current 
study. Before introducing the measure adopted by the study to evaluate KPI reporting 
quality in annual reports, the next section will start by reviewing the disclosure 
literature that has focused on measuring reporting quality. Consequently, section  2.3 
shows all procedures followed to develop a reliable and valid instrument used to 
measure KPI reporting quality.     
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2.2.2 Measuring KPI reporting quality 
In the first phase of their recent joint framework, the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the 
U.S. emphasised that the main objective of financial reporting is to provide existing and 
potential users with useful accounting information (IASB, 2010). Thus, providing 
information of a high quality is important for those users to help them in decision 
making. However, there is a great debate about the definition and measurement of 
disclosure quality (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Botosan, 1997; Beest and Braam, 2011; 
Anis et al., 2012).  
Beyer et al. (2010) reviewed the disclosure literature and concluded that the authors 
have missed the economic definition of disclosure quality. Hence, there is a lack of a 
measure that is directly derived from this definition. Botosan (2004) stated that the 
conceptual frameworks of accounting bodies provide the guidance to set out generally 
accepted notions of information quality. In line with this suggestion, the current study 
uses the main qualitative characteristics of the information disclosed as the foundation 
for the concept of disclosure quality.3  
Thus, KPI disclosure quality represents the extent to which KPI information can 
provide useful information to different stakeholders. This information should be 
relevant, comparable, reliable and understandable so as to help them in making 
decisions. Accordingly, KPI information that is characterised with such attributes would 
lead to a better understanding of the development and performance of the business 
during the financial year, an evaluation of the current position of the company with 
                                                 
3
 It is worth mentioning that Giunta et al. (2008) used the ASB (2006) framework - the same as is used in 
the current study - to develop their disclosure quality measure. However, they added two other attributes 
suggested in the OFR (2006). However, adding these attributes is not justified as they are not based upon 
ASB guidance or even on the IASB framework.  One can argue that this could affect th e validity of their 
disclosure measure. 
CHAPTER TWO: KPI REPORTING IN THE UK: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
 28 
regard to its competitors, and an assessment of  the progress of the board in achieving 
business strategies. This the definition of KPI reporting quality explicitly reflects the 
principal objective of the major accountancy and regulatory bodies such as the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and the ASB (AICPA, 
2006; ASB, 2006).4 Furthermore, the above definition highlights the characteristics that 
are essential, when it comes to developing a measure to assess the quality of KPI 
disclosure in particular. 
With respect to difficulty in measuring disclosure quality, there are many approaches 
that have been followed in previous studies (see Healy and Palepu, 2001; Hussainey, 
2004; Hassan and Marston, 2010; Beyer et al., 2010). Numerous studies used the 
quantity of disclosure as a proxy for its quality (Hail, 2002). For instance, Hussainey 
and Mouselli (2010) used the number of future-oriented earning statements as a proxy 
for disclosure quality. However, providing more disclosure is not an indication of the 
quality of the information disclosed. In addition, high reporting quantity that belongs to 
a specific type of disclosure (e.g. forward looking earning statements) might not 
necessarily indicate high or low reporting quality for the other types of information 
disclosed (Anis et al., 2012).  
Some studies have considered earnings or accruals quality as measures of disclosure 
quality. For example, Dechow and Dichev (2002) modelled the relationship between 
working capital accruals and operating cash flows in order to evaluate earning quality. 
Hence, financial reporting quality should include the quality of both financial 
information and non-financial information (Beest and Braam, 2011).  In their review of 
the literature, Beyer et al. (2010) illustrated that future studies should take into account 
that earning or accruals quality might not be a valid measure that captures the variation 
                                                 
4
 It is argued that the OFR issued draws upon the Jenkins framework issued by the AICPA in 1994 
(Beattie et al., 2004). 
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in accounting information quality. 
Assuming that auditors usually ask for higher fees from firms with lower reporting 
quality, Hirbar et al. (2010) found that unexplained audit fees could work as a proxy for 
disclosure quality. They found that this proxy is more powerful in predicting fraud and 
restatement, and hence offers a better measure of the quality of earnings or accruals. 
Since it could capture the extent of auditor’s independence rather than earnings’ quality 
(Berger, 2011), this proxy is still imprecise when it comes to explaining the variation in 
disclosure quality.  
Rogers (2008) presented a different proxy for disclosure quality. He depended on the 
underlying positive association between disclosure quality and market liquidity, to 
justify using the change in market liquidity as a proxy for disclosure quality. However, 
this proxy - like other proxies that follow the same approach - suffers from a limitation: 
changes in market liquidity (or any proxy that relies on market measures) might be 
influenced by other factors rather than by disclosure quality (Berger, 2011).    
Healy and Palepu (2001) referred to three other common proxies used to measure 
disclosure quality in previous studies: management forecasts, subjective ratings, and 
self-constructed indices.  
Management forecasts consist of forward-looking information voluntarily provided by 
management. Management forecasts are usually used by U.S. researchers thanks to their 
availability in the First Call database and in the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service 
(Hassan and Marston, 2010). Management earnings forecasts can be verified through 
actual earnings realisations (Hassan and Marston, 2010). However, these forecasts are 
only one component of managers’ voluntary disclosure package, and hence, it is not 
sensible to use this type of information only as a proxy for the overall level of corporate 
disclosure quality (Hussainey, 2004). 
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As far as subjective ratings are concerned, these ratings are comprehensive measures of 
the overall level of corporate disclosure quality.5 The most common example are the 
surveys conducted by the Financial Analysts Federation (FAF) / the Association for 
Investment Management and Research (AIMR) which have been used as proxies for 
disclosure quantity and quality in several previous studies (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 
1996; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002).  
The FAF and AIMR reflect the ratings given by leading financial analysts for 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure made by companies. Although disclosure quality is 
assessed comprehensively through the use of experienced experts, the ratings could 
suffer from some limitations (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Hussainey, 2004). In particular, 
analysts show - to some extent - subjectivity and bias by just including large US firms 
in the ratings (Healy and Palepu, 2001), or by giving higher ratings to firms with better 
current and expected operating results (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). In addition, AIMR-
FAF ratings cannot be used any longer as they were discontinued in 1997, with the last 
year of the disclosure scores being 1995.  
Hussainey (2004) showed some other subjective ratings that have been used in previous 
studies as proxies for the quality of corporate disclosures. These ratings include 
Financial Post ratings; Australian Stock Exchange ratings; SEC ratings; Society of 
Management Accountants of Canada (SMAC) ratings and the Center for International 
Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) ratings. However, these ratings basically 
depend on analysts’ and accountants’ opinions with regard to firm’s disclosures 
(Hussainey, 2004). Therefore, the inherent subjectivity in these ratings does not allow 
using them widely in accounting studies. 
                                                 
5
 For more detail see: Healy and Palepu (2001); Hussainey (2004); Hassan and Marston (2010); and 
Beyer et al. (2010). 
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As indicated above, using a proxy that indirectly reflects reporting quality levels is 
problematic. Therefore, self-constructed disclosure indices have been introduced by 
researchers to measure disclosure quality. In particular, their attempts have been aimed 
at developing a measure that captures the qualitative characteristics of information 
which could improve its usefulness. This multi-dimension approach - to assess 
disclosure quality – has been adopted in several studies (e.g. Beattie et al., 2004; Beretta 
and Bozzolan, 2004; Beest and Braam, 2011; Anis et al., 2012). For example, Beattie et 
al. (2004) take into account three types of information attributes: financial/non-
financial, quantitative/ qualitative, and historical/forward looking. According to this 
approach, the researcher searches the text and produces a disclosure score determined 
by the presence or absence of qualitative attributes in the disclosed information. Finally, 
total scores are derived as a result of aggregating the individual score for each piece of 
information. In some cases, weighted scores are produced to highlight the importance of 
some dimensions. 
However, the studies which have adopted this approach exhibit different 
problemsBeattie et al. (2004), as well as Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), used measures of 
quality that relied – to some extent - on disclosure quantity. Additionally, the measures 
introduced did not define disclosure quality or its dimensions in accordance with any of 
the regulatory frameworks. Regulatory frameworks present the qualitative 
characteristics needed to make financial reporting more useful (Botosan, 2004). Thus, it 
could be argued that it is better to assess firms’ reporting qualities in accordance with 
the frameworks of regulatory bodies. 
On the other hand, other studies which have considered the regulators’ perspective with 
regard to quality definition have revealed different limitations. For example, when 
Beest and Braam (2011) constructed their index, they considered the qualitative 
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attributes of information illustrated in the IASB (2008) exposure draft. Their 
comprehensive measure gave the opportunity to make subjective interpretations on the 
part of the coders which affected the reliability of the measure. Moreover, the authors 
acknowledged that they could not ensure the validity of the measure. Anis et al. (2012) 
defined and developed their measure of reporting quality in accordance with the OFR 
guidance (2006) framework. Despite using software to code the text over a relatively 
large sample6, Anis et al.’s (2012) measure is unclear, and might suffer from double 
counting. For instance, they used the quantity of forward-looking information to reflect 
on three of the eight dimensions that are aggregated to measure disclosure quality (i.e. 
the forward-looking orientation, verifiability, and relevance dimensions). Moreover, their 
measure is too general to reflect reporting quality over the whole annual report. For 
example, they used the presence of the quantitative KPI section to assign a 
comparability dimension score. Whereas it might be considered as an indication of KPI 
reporting quality in the report, it cannot be generalised to the whole report. A firm can 
provide a quantitative KPI section and ignore the comparability dimension in all other 
types of disclosure throughout the report.  
 
Despite the limited number of studies that analysed KPI reporting, two studies used a 
self-constructed index to measure the quality of KPI disclosures (i.e. Boesso and 
Kumar, 2007; Giunta et al., 2008). Boesso and Kumar (2007) compared the drivers of 
voluntary disclosure in terms of KPI information in the US and in Italy. Based on the 
previous literature, they employed an aggregated index in which KPI reporting in terms 
of quality is a function of the following dimensions: the outlook of the KPIs disclosed 
(historical or forward-looking); the type of KPIs reported (quantitative or qualitative); 
                                                 
6
 It is worth mentioning that using automated analysis has many limitations if compared with manual 
content analysis.  
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and the nature of the KPIs (financial or non financial). They gave double weight to 
forward-looking, quantitative, and non-financial KPIs in contrast to historical, 
qualitative and financial ones. However, Boesso and Kumar (2007) measure implicitly 
mixed between the quantity of disclosure and its quality. Therefore, it can not be used 
to assess disclosure quality regardless of its quantity. Furthermore, this quality measure 
lacks a clear theoretical foundation that explains the definition of disclosure quality, and 
hence does not justify either the different dimensions used or the weights allocated to 
different types of KPI disclosure. Nevertheless, it can be argued that other dimensions 
should be included in order to assess the reliability and understandability of the KPIs 
disclosed. The weights are to a great extent subjective; it will be problematic if a 
researcher seeks to compare quality scores for different KPI categories (e.g. financial 
KPIs and non- financial KPIs). 
Giunta et al. (2008) addressed these issues when they used a self-constructed index to 
assess the quality of financial KPIs for a sample of Italian firms. They constructed their 
measure in accordance with the common objectives of the main regulatory bodies (i.e. 
IASB, Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) and the ASB). They 
identified ten qualitative attributes to be included in their index. Then, these attributes 
were grouped following the four general dimensions presented by IASB (2005), which 
include relevance, understandability, reliability and comparability. Finally, quality 
scores were derived by calculating the mean among the four dimensions. Giunta et al.’s 
(2008) measure of quality showed a better linkage between the dimensions they used to 
assess disclosure quality, and the key qualitative attributes of information. However, it 
is implied that Giunta et al. (2008) used the ASB (2006) - as with the current study - but 
added two other attributes. First, there was the presence of graphs and tables. This could 
create confusion for the coder because it is too close to another attribute (i.e. data 
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trend). Consequently, the authors did not justify the reason behind using binary 
calculation for all the attributes except for the data trend. Second, they added a 
benchmarking dimension which refers to the presence of comparable peer data or sector 
data. Thus, adding this attribute was not based on ASB guidance or even on the IASB 
framework. As a result, the validity of their disclosure measures could be affected. 
The present study uses a disclosure quality measure which is based upon ASB (2006) 
guidance for best practice with regard to KPI reporting. Hence, the measure employed 
evaluates the reporting quality taking into consideration the qualitative attributes that 
make this information useful. Arguably, using the same attributes as indicated in the 
ASB (2006) guidance to generate quality scores is more objective. The measure avoids 
any subjectivity that may be caused by adding more attributes and, in turn, increasing 
coder bias when it comes to scoring. 
Overall, the present study contributes to the literature by being the first to investigate 
the characteristics of KPI reporting in a UK setting. Unlike Tauringana and Mangena 
(2009) who focused on one sector, the current study investigates KPI reporting by 
considering non-financial firms from different sectors. This enables the researcher to 
observe the variation among firms in different industries with regard to KPI reporting. 
Furthermore, compared with the Giunta et al. (2008) study in an Italian setting, the 
present study is the first to explore the quality levels of KPI reporting including 
financial and non-financial KPI disclosures. The size of the study sample is relatively 
large compared with the most similar studies with a longer time series.7 Therefore, the 
study results could be generalised, which could have different implications for users 
and interested regulatory bodies. The study also provides many research opportunities 
                                                 
7
 However, one common limitation of labour intensive studies is the relatively small sample size. Given 
that manual content analysis is employed to code the text, and the majority of CG variables data is hand - 
collected by the researcher, sample size is - to some extent - restricted due to time and effort 
considerations.   
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based upon that distinction between the quantity and quality in terms of KPI reporting. 
For example, researchers could empirically investigate whether or not reporting 
quantity and quality are derived from the same factors.  
2.3 Methods 
There is neither a general definition for KPIs nor a certain set of KPIs to be disclosed 
by all UK firms. Therefore it is suggested that manual content analysis could be a more 
relevant approach to quantifying KPI disclosures for each firm. This traditional 
technique has been used in previous studies (e.g. Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Beretta 
and Bozzolan, 2008; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007). It helps to 
avoid many of the drawbacks of automated content analysis. These drawbacks include 
misleading results due to using inappropriate/insufficient key words or using the words 
in isolation of the whole meaning of the sentence, in addition to the limitations related 
to the software used to perform the analysis (Hassan and Marston, 2010).   
KPI reporting in terms of quantity refers to the amount of KPI information in the annual 
report. It is measured by the number of KPIs that are published by a firm. KPI 
information in the current study is classified into financial and non-financial KPIs. 
Financial KPI disclosure includes all information about the key factors that affect the 
financial performance of the firm and its development. These KPI could usually be 
driven using financial statement items such as cash flow, operating profit, return on 
capital employed, research and development expenditure, earnings per share…etc. 
Financial KPIs could be helpful to annual report users in terms of evaluating the firm’s 
financial performance, and assessing its current competitive position. On the other 
hand, non-financial KPI disclosures include all non-financial information about the key 
factors that affect the performance of the firm and its development. These KPIs could 
cover operational, environmental or employee aspects. Non-financial KPIs are not 
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driven directly by financial statements such as new product launches, emissions, 
number of employees, staff attrition rate….etc. Rather than financial KPIs, non-
financial KPIs are concerned with other perspectives of a firm’s performance. 
Arguably, financial, together with non-financial KPI information, could enable different 
stakeholders to have a full picture about the critical factors that affect the current and 
future performance of the firm.  
Having distinct disclosure quality and quantity scores helps to examine whether or not 
the two dimensions can operate as substitutes. Thus, to measure KPI reporting in terms 
of quantity in the study, an un-weighted approach is employed to code and measure KPI 
disclosures throughout the annual reports. Therefore, ‘1’ is given for each KPI disclosed 
in the annual report. Ahmed and Courtis (1999) claimed that un-weighted scores are to 
be preferred due to subjectivity concerns. The current study follows an un-weighted 
approach to measure KPI reporting in terms of quantity since there is no theoretical 
basis for weighting either financial or non-financial KPIs. Marston and Shrives (1991) 
acknowledged the fact that weightings are usually achieved by conducting surveys 
among relevant user groups. However, they questioned the rationale behind supposing 
that rating an item as a four indicates that this item is four times as important as an item 
rated as a one. Moreover, this study is not focusing on one particular user group. Cooke 
(1989) argued that weighting would be useless when research is not focused on a 
particular user group. He claimed that each group would attach different weightings, 
which would result in them eliminating each other’s effects. In consistency with this 
view, Firth (1980) observed that weighted and un-weighted scores lead to similar 
results. 
Overall, each company has been given a score in terms of quantity, which represents the 
total number of reported KPIs. These KPIs include both financial KPIs and non-
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financial ones. For example, looking at Greggs Plc. with regard to its annual reports and 
accounts 2010, the company disclosed the following KPIs - financial KPIs: like for like 
sales growth, total sales growth, capital expenditure, diluted earnings per share, 
operating profit, operating margin. In addition, growth in net shop numbers was 
reported as a non-financial KPI. Thus, the quantity of financial (non-financial) KPIs 
reporting is six (one). Subsequently, KPI reporting in terms of a quantity score for this 
company in 2010 was seven (the total number of KPIs disclosed). 
In accordance with the definition of KPI reporting in terms of quality introduced earlier, 
the presence of qualitative attributes for each KPI disclosure would enhance the 
usefulness of KPI reporting in general. The main advantage of this approach is that of 
evaluating reporting quality in a straightforward way by looking at the qualitative 
attributes in the disclosed information, rather than inferring disclosure quality by using 
a proxy that may not capture changes in quality. Therefore, the study draws upon the 
OFR (2006) best practice guidance regarding each KPI’s content. For each KPI, the 
guidance states that the following qualitative characteristics need to be considered 
(ASB, 2006, p.23, and pp. 29-38): 
1- Provision of the definition of the KPI and explanation of its calculation method (e.g. 
the average revenue per user ARPU; the number of subscribers, the percentage of 
revenue from new products, products in the development pipeline, and customer churn). 
2- Explanation of the purpose of adopting a particular KPI (e.g. to assess how the 
company is performing in its market; because it is one of the key drivers for future 
revenue growth in the industry; to measure and manage the company’s objectives to 
increase shareholder value; to reduce churn rate in order to improve revenue). 
3- Disclosure of the source of the data (e.g. GAAP financial statements figures; internal 
estimates; internal company data). 
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4- Quantify the targets for each KPI (e.g. to achieve a market share of % within X 
number of years; to have an economic profit target of £X million). 
5- Quantify the data (e.g. disclosure of the corresponding amount for the previous year; 
five year trend data; a table of the number and the percentage increase in a KPI from 
year to year; a graph showing comparatives and the percentage change year by year). 
6- Provision of a commentary on future targets (e.g. the company plans to achieve X 
market share in Y segment by the introduction of SS which is a new product or sale 
channel). 
7- Disclosure of the adjustment for any financial statement information used (e.g. 
operating results used for calculating return on capital employed = operating results as 
in the financial statements + interest from sales financing). 
8- Explanation and disclosure of any changes or of no changes to KPIs (e.g. changes 
have been made to the data or calculation methods used).  
Arguably, considering these dimensions could result in producing KPIs that possess the 
main qualitative characteristics of information as recommended by ASB (2006). It was 
recommended that the information provided should be comprehensive and 
understandable. Given that KPI information covers many aspects of firm performance, 
it should be presented in a way that enables users - with a minimum knowledge of 
accounting as well as business activities - to understand this information. Arguably, this 
could be achieved if the management presents the definition of each KPI, mentions how 
the KPI is calculated, and discloses any changes made to KPIs, explains the purpose of 
adopting the KPI by the management, show the trends with regard to each KPI, and 
provides a management commentary on the targeted KPI. Furthermore, ASB (2006) 
recommended that KPI information should be verifiable. This might be achieved by 
disclosing the source of the data used to calculate each KPI, and explaining the 
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assumptions used in calculations, showing any adjustments for any of the financial 
statement information used. Moreover, ASB (2006) recommended that the information 
disclosed should have forward-looking orientation, so as to assist the user in evaluating 
the prospects of the business, as well as management’s plans for achieving its business 
strategies. With respect to KPI information, the managers could provide the targets in 
for KPIs, and comment on these targets by informing the users how these targets could 
be achieved within the stated time frame.  
Relevance is an important characteristic of information recommended by the ASB 
(2006). Thus, KPI information should be relevant to the users in order to help them to 
evaluate a firm’s performance. This could be retained by explaining the purpose of 
adopting such a KPI, and indicating that these KPIs could measure the firm’s 
performance relative to the firm’s objectives. In addition, a management commentary 
on the KPI targets could illustrate to which extent these targets are relevant to managing 
future performance. KPI information should also be balanced and neutral. This could be 
achieved by quantifying KPI data in such a way as to avoid any bias in the information 
disclosed. Hence, users would be informed with regard to the trend in KPI results 
showing the change in these results - year by year - regardless of what this change could 
mean to the business (i.e. good or bad news). In this regard, comparability is another 
important characteristic of information. Users should be enabled to compare KPI 
information across different firms, year by year. This could be considered by 
quantifying KPI data, explaining the assumptions used in calculating each KPI, and 
showing any adjustments for any financial statement information used. Finally, ASB 
(2006) stated that disclosed information should be complementary and supplementary 
to the financial statements. In accordance with ASB (2006) guidance, KPI information 
could provide the user with additional information or explanations of the information 
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included in the financial statements. Thus, one might argue that firms’ intent to explain 
or complement information already reported in the financial statement, could lead to the 
use of this information to calculate different KPIs. Hence, disclosing whether or not any 
adjustments made for financial statement items in order to provide KPI information 
would signal the action to complement and supplement financial statement information. 
To conclude, firm’s directors should provide KPI information that is relevant, has a 
forward-looking orientation, is comprehensive and understandable, is balanced and 
neutral, contains complementary and supplementary financial statement, and is 
verifiable and comparable over time.  In short, it is argued that applying ASB’s would 
result in providing KPI information of a high quality.8 
 Table 1 links the proposed dimensions of KPI reporting in terms of quality with the 
main principles introduced by ASB (2006).  
Table 1 Overview of the dimensions used to measure KPI reporting quality in 
relation to the qualitative characteristics of information 
OFR (2006) guidance Linkage to the main 
qualitative characteristics 
of information 
recommended by ASB 
(2006) 
1- Provision of the definition of the KPI and 
explanation of its calculation method. 
-Comprehensiveness and 
understandability 
- Verifiability 
2- Explanation of the purpose of adopting 
the KPI 
-Comprehensiveness and 
understandability 
- Relevance 
3- Disclosure of the source of the data -Verifiability 
4- Quantify the targets for each KPI -Forward looking 
                                                 
8
 One might argue that the current study avoids disclosure in terms of quantity to be reflected in 
evaluating disclosure quality. Therefore, KPI reporting quality measure looks at the extent to which the 
mentioned dimensions are maintained by each company.  In other words, the study aims at ranking 
companies in terms of their compliance with the ASB (2006) guidance. It is observed that companies 
vary with respect to the number of KPIs provided. Therefore, using the absolute quality scores would 
allow KPI quantity scores to affect quality scores.  Thus , the study employs simple averages in order to 
produce quality scores. Arguably, this procedure would eliminate the influence of quantity score 
differences, and hence, quality scores will not be affected by these differences. Furthermore, the quality 
measure does not consider the extent of information with regard to each dimension. This also would 
avoid any effect of the quantity of information provided in terms of having an impact on quality scores. 
However, it can be claimed that the resultant quality scores might suffer from a limitation. In particular, 
quality scores will not take into account the depth of KPI information provided.   
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orientation. 
-Relevance 
5- Quantify the data -Balance and neutrality 
-Comprehensiveness and 
understandability 
--Comparability 
6- Provision of a commentary on future 
targets 
Forward looking orientation. 
Relevance 
Comprehensiveness and 
understandability 
7- Disclosure of the adjustment for any 
financial statement information used 
-Comparability 
-Complementary and 
supplementary to financial 
statements. 
- Verifiability 
8- Explanation and disclosure of any 
changes or no changes to KPI 
-Comparability 
-Comprehensiveness and 
understandability 
 
It can be argued that the approach used in this study to measure KPI reporting quality 
has many advantages. First, the index is based upon a framework of a well recognised 
regulatory body (ASB, 2006) that aims at ensuring information usefulness. Second, the 
study maintains consistency in designing, coding and measurement processes. The 
index employed uses the KPI disclosure guidance which is recommended to be 
followed by UK firms. Consequently, this index is specifically used to assess KPI 
reporting quality, and hence, it is more convenient when it comes to this type of 
information. The index focus is on assessing the quality of information unit, which 
makes it valid for being applied to different types of narrative disclosure. For instance, 
the index can be applied to measure the quality of risk information disclosed in the 
annual report. Finally, the index covers the qualitative attributes of information without 
requiring a great deal of subjective judgment. These qualitative attributes are clear 
enough to be tracked. Moreover, the binary scoring helps to obtain reporting scores 
without the need to make substantial judgments on the part of the coder. This adds to 
the reliability of the measure, which has been additionally been assured by other 
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techniques.  
To obtain the score of KPI reporting in terms of quality for each company, an approach 
to scoring has to be determined in terms of either weighted or un-weighted approaches. 
According to the weighted disclosure approach, the researcher has to allocate weights to 
the disclosure items based on each item’s importance.  For example, Botosan (1997) 
gave more weight to quantitative disclosures as she considered that quantitative 
information is more important than qualitative information. Similarly, Boesso and 
Kumar (2007) assigned more weight to forward-looking, quantitative, and non-financial 
KPIs. 
The main drawback of this approach is the subjective judgement involved in allocating 
weights to the disclosed items in that it is likely that different coders may give different 
assessments in terms of the items’ perceived importance.  
The un-weighted approach avoids this key drawback of the weighted approach. Hence, 
equal weights are attached to all disclosed items within the checklist. Therefore, if the 
item is disclosed in the annual report, it is allocated "1" and “0” otherwise. Although 
this approach is known as the ‘dichotomous’ method, Cooke (1991) demonstrates that it 
is not strictly ‘dichotomous’ because some items may not be applicable to a firm. If this 
is the case, these items are scored as ‘not applicable’ (NA).  
The suggested ASB dimensions to capture the quality of KPI reporting are considered 
to be integrated. Thus, there is no need to use the weighting approach with respect to 
the proposed dimensions or the type of KPI information (i.e. financial or non-financial). 
Hence, the qualitative characteristics of information are treated as equivalent with 
regard to their importance. As discussed earlier when measuring KPI reporting quantity, 
it is shown that there is no theoretical basis to weight either financial or non-financial 
KPIs. Therefore, an un-weighted approach is also preferred to avoid subjectivity and 
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bias in measuring disclosure quality. Moreover, the current study is not focusing on one 
particular user group. Finally, the current study agrees with the argument of Cooke 
(1989) that weighting would be useless when research – such as the current research - is 
not focusing on a particular user group. The approach adopted in the current study is 
also supported by similar results reported for weighted and un-weighted scores in 
previous studies (e.g. Firth, 1980).  
On the other hand, the dichotomous scoring approach is applied to measure 
KPI reporting quality. Therefore, ‘1’ was given if an item meets the quality 
dimension and ‘0’ otherwise. The quality score for each KPI is calculated as a 
ratio of the total items disclosed to ‘8’ (the maximum score for each KPI). 
However, for non-financial KPIs, it is noted that it might not be applicable to 
show any adjustments to any financial statement information used. Following 
previous disclosure studies (e.g. Cooke, 1992; Tauringana and Mangena, 2009; 
Tsalavoutas et al., 2010), this issue has been taken into consideration. Hence, 
the quality score for a non-financial KPI is produced as a ratio of the total 
items disclosed to ‘7’ instead of ‘8’ (the maximum number of applicable 
disclosure items for each KPI). Then, the quality score for each company has 
been derived as an average of its KPI quality score. 
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Table 2  An example of using the research instrument to assign quantity and quality to KPI reporting 
 
Definitions of financial KPIs as provided in the annual report of Unilever PLC are: Sales growth: the percentage increase in turnover, adjusted for the impact of 
acquisitions and disposals and exchange rate fluctuations. Underlying volume growth: underlying sales growth after eliminating the impact of price changes. Operating 
margins: operating margin before the impact of restructuring costs, business disposals and other one-off items. Free cash flow: the cash flow from operating activities .  
Return on invested capital (ROIC): The profit after tax (excluding finance and net impairment charges) divided  by the average invested capital. Total shareholder return: 
the returns received by a shareholder, capturing both the increase in share price and the value of dividend income (assuming dividends are re-invested). 
Note: Non-financial KPIs are defined in the table.
Unilever PLC KPIs disclosed Quantity scoreThe definition The purpose Source of data Quantified targetCommentary Quantified datashowing adjustmentsDisclose changes Quality score for each KPI
Financial KPIs   
2009 sales growth 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.625
Underlying volume growth 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.625
operating margin 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.250
Operating margin before 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.625
 free cash flow 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.625
Return on invested capital 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.625
Total shareholder return 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.375
Financial KPIs reporting   quantity 7 Financial KPIs reporting   quality 0.536
Non financial KPIs
Total  accident frequency rate 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 N/A 1 0.571
CO2 from energy per tonne of production (kg)1 1 1 0 1 1 1 N/A 0 0.714
Water per tonne of production (m3) 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 N/A 0 0.429
Total waste per tonne of production 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 N/A 0 0.429
Non-financial KPIs reporting   quantity 4 Non-financial KPIs reporting   quality 0.536
Total KPIs reporting   quantity score 11 Total KPIs reporting   quality score 0.536
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2.3.1 Designing the research instrument & ensuring its validity 
To design the initial research instrument, many considerations were taken into account.  
First, the research instrument should be relevant to measuring both types of KPI 
reporting in terms of quality and quantity for each company. Second, the eight KPI 
reporting quality dimensions should be included within the initial checklist. Third, each 
KPI coded is categorised into financial and non-financial in order to serve the purposes 
of the analysis.  
Validity is defined as the extent to which any instrument measures what it is intended to 
measure (Marston and Shrives, 1991). Following previous disclosure studies (Hope, 
2003; Tsalavoutas et al., 2010; Hassan and Marston, 2010), validity is ensured through 
the assessment of content validity. Hence, it is achieved by relying on the literature 
while constructing the instrument, so as to make sure that the instrument contains 
relevant and adequate items with regard to measuring KPI disclosures. 
Following previous studies (e.g. Tsalavoutas et al., 2010), after designing the initial 
checklist, it was reviewed independently by both the principal and the second 
supervisor in order to achieve instrument validity. All suggestions and comments were 
discussed and considered in order to improve the validity of the instrument. Table 2 
shows an example of using the research instrument to drive quantity and quality scores 
of KPI reporting for Unilever Plc. in 2009. 
2.3.2 Assessing the reliability of the research instrument: pilot study  
Reliability is the extent to which the instrument produces the same results on repeated 
trials (Hassan and Marston, 2010). Thus, the disclosure measure has to be subjected to 
reliability tests in order to obtain useful inferences with regard to using the instrument 
in a research situation (Beattie et al., 2004). Inter-rater reliability is the most frequently 
reported measure when it comes to assessing reliability (Beattie et al., 2004). By 
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comparing the results produced by more than one coder, the greater the extent to which 
the results are related, the more the reliable is the instrument. For instance, Linsley and 
Shrives (2006) achieved reliability through coding an initial sample of seven annual 
reports. The authors - in addition to the researcher who coded the whole sample of 79 
annual reports - independently coded the initial sample. As the agreement level 
exceeded 0.75, they considered this as a satisfactory level of inter-rater reliability.  
To assess the reliability of the research instrument, a pilot study was conducted. It also 
aimed to check the variation between firms in terms of KPI reporting using the research 
instrument. The pilot study was conducted on a sample of ten annual reports for the 
years 2009-2010. This sample was randomly selected from different sectors to measure 
the quality and quantity of KPI reporting. Thus, the researcher was able to get an initial 
idea about the variation between firms in different industries with respect to KPI 
reporting. 
Following the previous literature (e.g. Linsley and Shrives, 2006), decision rules were 
produced and used as a coding reference to improve the reliability. Then, each of the 
researcher and the two supervisors coded the annual reports of the pilot study sample 
independently. This procedure aimed to ensure consistency in applying the decision 
rules. Finally, the results obtained were checked, and found to be close. 
Furthermore, parametric and non-parametric tests were performed to compare quality 
and quantity scores given by the researchers who coded the same text9. Table 3 
indicates that both the ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis tests gave additional evidence of 
the reliability of the research instrument10. The results in Table 3 show that there is no 
                                                 
9
 At this point, it is difficult to decide whether the sample data came from a population with a Gaussian 
(normal) distribution. In practice, the size of the sample was relatively small. 
10 
As having one independent variable with three groups (the researchers who coded the text) and one 
dependent variable (quantity/quality scores), one way between groups analysis of variance, ANOVA was 
employed (as a parametric test), and its equivalent non- parametric test (Kruskal-Wallis Test) was also 
performed.  
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significant difference between the mean scores in terms of quality and quantity for the 
main researcher and his supervisors. 
Table 3 ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis tests of differences among quantity and 
quality scores in the pilot study 
Researcher N Quantity 
scores  
mean 
Quality 
scores 
mean 
Quantity 
scores 
mean 
rank 
Quality 
scores 
mean 
rank 
The main  researcher 10 12.9 0.498 15.45 14.50 
1st supervisor 10 13.7 0.495 16.50 14.40 
2nd supervisor 10 12.2 0.577 14.55 17.60 
Total 30 12.93 0.524   
ANOVA test: 
 F value 
  
0.118 
 
0.463 
  
Kruskal-Wallis test: 
Chi-Square 
    
0.247 
 
0.857 
Significance levels  0.889 0.634 
 
0.884 0.651 
 
Finally, the discrepancies between the coders’ scores were analysed. Any issues that led 
to differences were resolved. Actually, there were few differences which were mainly 
related to KPI classification issues. For instance, a disagreement came from particular 
KPIs such as order book\ orders received \revenue; or sales per employee\ average 
room rate\ licenses signed\ growth in passenger journeys\miles\ unique active 
players\market share. Thus a rule is set in order to consider such a KPI as a financial 
KPI, because they are related and\or can be derived directly from financial statements. 
Ensuring that the disclosure measure is reliable and valid is an essential procedure 
before applying the research instrument to the main study sample. 
2.4  Data 
The current study focuses on analysing KPI reporting for a sample of FTSE 350 non-
financial UK firms. Panel (A) in Table 4 shows the sample selection process that starts 
from focusing on the top 350 UK firms. Hence, the Financial Times ranking for 2011 is 
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used to define these companies based upon their market capitalisation value. Then, 
financial firms are excluded in order to identify the sample, following previous studies 
(e.g. Beretta and Bozzolan (2004); Abraham and Cox (2007)), because these firms have 
specific characteristics as well as a different framework for disclosure practices 
applicable to them. Following Elshandidy et al. (2013), firms with missing financial or 
corporate governance data are removed. Considering the time and effort needed in 
coding each annual report, this procedure is used in order to retain firms with a 
complete time series of data. Hence, the number of observations would not significantly 
drop in the next stage of the analysis because of the problem of missing data. Thus, the 
rule used to remove firms at this stage is: a firm should be excluded when it has one 
type of financial data which is missing for more than one year; or if more than one type 
of this data is missing for one year. Moving from the resultant firms (190 firms); sample 
firms are randomly selected from all possible sectors. Every sector is represented in the 
sample according to the following equation:  
     
   
  
     
Where; 
    : represents the number of firms that have to be chosen from the sector  . 
   : represents the total number of firms included sector  .  
   : represents the total number of firms identified for all sectors (i.e., 190 firms). 
Moving on from this, systematic sampling is used to select sample firms from each 
sector. Given that firms are initially ordered according to market capitalisation, the first 
firm in each sector is considered as the starting point, and then the process is continued 
by selecting the third, the fifth and so on. Following this procedure, 103 firms are 
identified (515 firm-year observations over the five year period 2006-2010). 
Subsequently, various observations are excluded for the reasons illustrated in Panel (A) 
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in Table 4, to end up with 503 observations as the final sample. Panel (B) in the same 
table provides a disaggregation of the sample across industries.  
Firms’ annual reports are collected from the company homepages and from the 
Thomson One Banker database. Data on firms’ financial characteristics are collected 
from Datastream. The developed research instrument is employed to quantify KPI 
reporting, and to assign quality scores based upon ASB guidance for best practice. 
Table 5 illustrates the definition and measurement for each variable of the present 
study. 
Table 4 Sample Selection and its disaggregation across industries 
PANEL A – SAMPLE SELECTION PROCESS 
Starting point: Top 350 UK firms based on market capitalisation, according to the 2011 
Financial Times ranking. Financial firms are then excluded. Subsequently, 103 firms 
are selected randomly following two criteria: 1) each sector is represented in the same 
proportion as in the starting sample; 2) as firms are arranged according to market 
capitalisation; systematic sampling is used by choosing the first company in every 
sector as a starting point. Then, selection is continued by selecting the third, the fifth 
and so on. This process results in 515 observations [103 * 5 years (2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, and 2010)]. Thereafter, the following exclusions take place: 
n observations 
excluded 
thereafter 
Reason for exclusion 
2 KPI regulation not applicable in 2006 11  
4 Missing data on directors’ compensation  
6 Missing CG data  
12 total number of observations excluded 
503 final sample 
PANEL B – SAMPLE CONSTITUENTS BY INDUSTRY  
Industry Frequency Percentage 
Basic Materials 40 8.0 
Consumer Goods 65 12.9 
Consumer Services 107  21.3 
Health Care 24 4.7 
Industrials 143 28.4 
Oil & Gas 54 10.7 
                                                 
11
 Two observations have been excluded as these companies’ financial year started before 1-4-2005 (the 
date at which the requirement to include a business review in annual reports in the UK became 
applicable). 
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Technology 40 8.0 
Telecommunications 10 2.0 
Utilities 20 4.0 
TOTAL 503 100 
 
Table 5 Study variables: definitions & measurement 
Panel (A) KPI reporting quantity 
Variable Definition  Measurement 
QNFKS Quantity of 
financial KPI 
reporting 
The number of financial KPIs 
disclosed in KPI section. 
QNNFKSEC  Quantity of non- 
financial KPI 
reporting 
The number of non-financial KPIs 
disclosed in the KPI section. 
QNNFKREP Quantity of total 
non- financial KPI 
reporting 
The number of non-financial KPIs 
disclosed in the whole report. 
QNTKSEC Quantity of KPI 
reporting  
The total number of financial and 
non-financial KPIs disclosed in the 
KPI section.  
QNTKREP  Quantity of total 
KPI reporting 
The total number of financial and 
non-financial KPIs disclosed in the 
whole report. 
Panel (B) KPI reporting quality 
Variable Definition  Measurement 
QLFKS Quality of financial 
KPIs reported 
The aggregated quality score of financial 
KPIs that are disclosed in the KPI 
section. 
QLNFKSEC Quality of non-
financial KPIs 
reported 
The aggregated quality score of non-
financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI 
section 
QLNFKREP  Quality of total non-
financial KPIs 
reported 
The aggregated quality score of non-
financial KPIs that are disclosed in the 
whole report 
QLTKSEC Quality of KPIs 
reported 
The aggregated quality score of financial 
and non-financial KPIs that are disclosed 
in the KPI section. 
QLTKREP Quality of total KPIs 
reported 
The aggregated quality score of financial 
and non-financial KPIs that are disclosed 
in the whole report 
Panel (C) Firm characteristics 
Variable Definition  Measurement 
SIZE Firm size The natural logarithm of market capitalisation 
(WC08001) 
PROFITAB Profitability The profitability measured by return on equity 
((WC01651) / (WC03501)) 
LEVERAGE Leverage The ratio of total debt to total capital 
(WC08221) 
LIQUIDITY Liquidity The current assets (WC02201) / current 
liabilities (WC03101) 
DIVYIELD Dividend yield Dividends per share / share price  
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((WC05376)/(WC08001)) 
CROSSLIST Cross listing Dummy variable equals to 1 if the firm’s shares 
are traded on foreign financial markets and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Table 6 gives a full picture of the characteristics of the sample firms. Panel (A) reports 
the descriptive analysis for the continuous variables. It shows that the natural logarithm 
of market capitalisation for these firms varies from a minimum of 8.00 (£16,506,000) to 
a maximum of 11.019 (£130.16 billion) with standard deviation of 0.685 (£17.8 
billion). This significant variation is expected, as the sample firms are drawn from 
FTSE 350 which includes the largest UK firms. It shows that firm size should be 
considered as it might have effects on KPI reporting in practice. However, the large 
variation may refer also to the existence of outliers which will be identified and 
addressed later in chapter three. These firms’ profitability mean measured by ROE is 
0.08 which refers, in general, to firms’ ability to generate profits from shareholders’ 
equity. However, the value of the ROE ratio should exceed the cost of equity capital in 
order to add value to shareholders. The liquidity ratio median is 1.64 times which 
indicates that firms in the sample do not suffer from financial problems in short run. It 
shows that firms are able to cover their short term liabilities through their current assets. 
These companies are not highly leveraged, with a mean debt to total capital of 0.364. 
However, the minimum of zero and maximum of 1.42 for the leverage ratio indicates 
that these firms are varied to some extent in their reliance on debt to finance their 
investments.12 Finally, the sample firms have a percentage of dividends to share price 
with median of 2.4%. As companies display a good ability to secure current liabilities, 
it may be implied that these firms may prefer to retain profits in order to finance their 
growth.  
                                                 
12
 Checking the annual reports showed that some companies have a leverage ratio of zero (e.g. Premier 
Oil, 2006). It seems that these companies do not rely on debt at all, which can be explained by their 
strong cash position. On the other hand, other companies display a very high leverage ratio (e.g. Severn 
Trent, 2009) due to the huge losses they made.  
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Panel (B) points out the analysis of cross listing as a categorical variable. It indicates 
that the majority of sample firms (90.29 %) are traded on foreign financial markets.  
Table 6 Descriptive statistics of continuous variables 
Panel (A) Descriptive statistics for the continuous variables 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
SIZE 11.019 8.000 9.195 9.067 0.685 503 
PROFITAB 0.524 -0.172 0.080 0.067 0.087 503 
LIQUIDITY 8.574 0.268 1.644 1.329 1.320 503 
LEVERAGE 1.420 0.000 0.364 0.337 0.279 503 
DIVYIELD 0.219 0.000 0.029 0.024 0.032 503 
Panel (B) Descriptive statistics for the categorical variable 
Variable Proportion N 
CROSSLIST 90.29 503 
Panel A displays descriptive statistics of continuous variables used in the present study as proxies for 
firm characteristics: SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalization; PROFITAB is the 
profitability measured by return on equity (the ratio of net income to book value of equity); LIQUDITY 
is measured by the current ratio; LEVERAGE is calculated as the ratio of total debt to total capital; 
DIVYIELD is a proxy for dividend policy (dividends per share / share price). 
Panel (B) displays the descriptive statistics for the categorical variable: CROSSLIST is a dummy 
variable equals to1 if the firm’s shares are traded on foreign financial markets and 0 otherwise. 
After getting this idea about the characteristics of the sample firms, their KPI reporting 
is analysed. Accordingly, the main features of KPI reporting in UK firms could be 
observed, and hence, Q1 will be addressed. 
2.5 Findings of the analysis  
This section aims to provide answers to research question 1. Descriptive statistics 
illustrate the main features of KPI reporting in terms of quantity and quality on the part 
of UK firms. It offers insights into KPI reporting in terms of quantity and quality in the 
sample firms. In general, descriptive results are used to show KPI reporting in practice 
through giving examples from the firms’ annual reports, analysing KPI disclosures and 
its subcategories to study the development over the period 2006-2010, and exploring 
any changes in KPI reporting in terms of quantity and quality across industries.   
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2.5.1 Companies’ disclosures 
This section aims to answer the first research question. It provides some direct quotes 
from companies’ annual reports to illustrate the attitude of these companies regarding 
KPI reporting.  
In general, there are many examples of practice which indicate that KPI reporting is 
most likely to be voluntary. For instance, 49 companies did not provide any information 
regarding their KPIs in their annual reports. One of the commentaries on this practice 
was:  
‘The group is a pure exploration group with no production or proven reserves, the 
standard KPIs are not relevant. The management therefore focuses on the 
achievement of work programmes and protection of licences. Throughout the year, 
the management has exceeded minimum work programme requirements, and 
licences have therefore been protected’ (Rockhopper Exploration, 2009, p. 13).
       
Despite that, most companies were keen to provide financial KPIs. This type of KPI had 
not been reported in 56 year observations. On the other hand, it is apparent that 
companies did not show the same concern with regard to disclosing non-financial KPIs. 
It is found that the disclosure of non-financial KPIs was absent in 196 year-
observations. From these observations, 23 companies did not provide any non-financial 
KPI-related information for the period examined (2006-2010). One of these companies 
gave the following justification:  
‘In addition to financial KPIs, the board considers non-financial factors such as 
the group compliance with corporate governance standards and environmental 
considerations relevant to some of the group’s mining interests. These factors 
cannot be efficiently measured, so do not form part of the group’s KPIs’ (Anglo 
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Pacific Group, 2008, p. 10). 
Additionally, the majority of companies did not separate KPIs in terms of financial and 
non-financial KPIs. Furthermore, there is no general rule to classify what can be 
considered as financial or non-financial KPI. Thus, many classification differences 
existed in practice, as each company relied on its own rule to categorise the disclosed 
KPIs. For example, Research and Development is considered as a financial KPI by the 
majority of companies. However, Cookson Group reported it as a non-financial KPI 
(Cookson Group, 2008). 
In contrast, a number of companies showed good practice regarding KPI reporting, For 
example, when one of its KPIs was replaced; Hikma Pharmaceuticals Plc. stated:  
‘We are no longer including R&D costs as a percentage of revenue as a KPI as 
this is no longer the best way to measure our investment in our pipeline, given the 
increase in spending on product acquisitions. This year, however, we have added 
new product launches as a non-financial KPI’ (Hikma Pharmaceuticals Plc., 
Annual Reports and Accounts 2007, p. 16). 
Similarly, Pace Plc. presented a new KPI by indicating the reason behind abandoning 
the previous KPI: 
 ‘Going forwards we are introducing return on sales (ROS) as a new performance 
indicator after concentrating on gross margin for the last few years. Now as our 
product mix changes, as we target high and low-end opportunities and start to 
rollout infrastructure products from our Networks group, margin is no longer the 
best overall measure of success. Refocusing our business around ROS is helping 
to establish a new mind-set, as we take Pace to the next level’ (Pace Plc, Annual 
Reports and Accounts 2008, p. 5).  
What is worth noting is the fact that all companies with the exception of small ones, are 
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asked to publish financial and non-financial KPIs. However, the above examples give 
another view on the nature of KPI reporting. It reveals that companies are controlling 
KPI disclosures in practice. That leads to an expectation, which is that KPI reporting 
scores might vary across the sample firms. That variation can be observed by analysing 
the quality and quantity scores of KPI reporting. To start the analysis, it is noted that the 
majority of firms allocate specific section for KPIs or refer to pages that contain KPI 
information, while other firms do not. To highlight this practice, the study distinguishes 
between KPI disclosures in the KPI section (which also includes KPI disclosures within 
the section(s)/ page(s) that are mentioned by the firm in the report), and KPI disclosures 
in the whole report (which include the KPIs disclosed in the KPI section as well as KPIs 
disclosed elsewhere). Accordingly, the aggregated scores - either for quantity of KPI 
reporting or for its quality - are disaggregated based upon these two categories 
(financial and non-financial KPIs). The next subsection starts with analysing KPI 
reporting with regard to its quantity. 
2.5.2 Descriptive statistics for the quantity of KPI reporting 
Table 7 provides a descriptive analysis for KPI quantity scores. It indicates that the 
number of KPIs disclosed in the KPI section (QNTKSEC) by the sample firms ranges 
from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 24 KPIs. The median of QNTKSEC is 7 
KPIs. It seems that most of the KPIs disclosed are financial KPIs. The median of 
financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section (QNFKS) is 5 KPIs, while the median of the 
non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section (QNNFKSEC) is only one KPI. After 
considering the KPIs disclosed outside the KPI section, the median of non-financial 
KPIs disclosed in the whole report (QNNFKREP) is found to be 2 KPIs. It appears that 
KPIs disclosed outside the KPI section are more likely to be one non-financial KPI. 
This conclusion is confirmed when comparing the mean of QNTKSEC - 7.48 KPIs - 
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with the mean of the QNTKREP 8.18 KPIs. Generally, the high standard deviation 
values show the high variation in KPI reporting quantity among the sample firms.  
Table 7 Descriptive statistics for KPI quantity scores 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QNTKSEC 24.00 0.00 7.48 7.00 5.03 503 
QNFKS 19.00 0.00 5.34 5.00 3.44 503 
QNNFKSEC 15.00 0.00 2.17 1.00 2.91 503 
QNNFKREP 16.00 0.00 2.87 2.00 3.40 503 
QNTKREP 24.00 0.00 8.18 7.00 5.36 503 
QNTKSEC is the total number of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in KPI’ section; QNFKS is 
financial KPIs disclosed in KPI’ section; QNNFKSEC is non-financial KPIs disclosed in KPI’ section; 
QNNFKREP is non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report; QNTKREP is the total number of 
financial and non-financial KPIs that disclosed in the whole report. 
2.5.2.1 The frequency of the disclosed KPIs 
 
Table 8 shows the KPIs disclosed most frequently by the sample firms. Panel (A) 
illustrates that the highest financial KPI disclosed is revenues.  This is reported in 32% 
of the year-observations, followed by underlying earnings per share (25%), free cash 
flow (22%), basic earnings per share (22%), and return on capital employed (ROCE) 
(21%).  
Panel (B) show that the most frequently reported non-financial KPI is accident incident 
rate (AIR) – which is disclosed 146 times over 503 observations. Other non-financial 
KPIs that are widely disclosed are employee turnover\retention (13%), accident 
numbers (11%), energy consumption (10%), and carbon dioxide emissions (10%).   
 
 Table 8  The frequency of KPIs disclosed by the sample firms  
Panel (A) The frequently reported financial KPIs  
KPI Frequency Percentage 
Revenues 161 32% 
Underlying earnings per share 126 25% 
Free cash flow 111 22% 
Basic earnings per share 110 22% 
Return On Capital Employed (ROCE) 106 21% 
Total sales growth 91 18% 
Operating profit margin  86 17% 
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Organic revenue growth 75 15% 
 
Panel (B) The frequently reported non-financial KPIs  
KPI Frequency Percentage 
Accident Incident Rate (AIR) 146 29% 
Employee turnover\ retention 65 13% 
Accident numbers 55 11% 
Energy consumption 51 10% 
Carbon Dioxide emitted   50 10% 
Waste to landfill 50 10% 
Water consumption 40 8% 
Average Headcount 25 5% 
2.5.2.2 Quantity of KPI reporting across the sample period  
The trend in the quantity of KPI reporting is analysed by following the descriptive 
statistics from 2006 to 2010. In Table 9, it is observed that the quantity of KPI 
reporting, as well as its subcategories, have been increasing across the sample period 
(2006-2010). 
It is documented that the mean (median) of QNTKSEC was 5.52 (5.0) KPIs in 2006. It 
then shows a steady increase across the sample period to reach a mean (median) of 8.6 
(7.5) KPIs in 2010. Similarly, the mean (median) of QNFKS has increased from 4.15 
(4.0) KPIs in 2006 to reach a mean (median) of 5.98 (6) KPIs in 2010. The results 
illustrate that the number of financial KPIs disclosed is always greater than non- 
financial ones. However, the mean (median) of QNNFKSEC has increased from 1.42 
(0) KPIs in 2006 to reach a mean (median) of 2.61 (2) KPIs in 2010. Thus, it is shown 
that firms pay particular attention to disclosing more KPIs in general and non-financial 
ones in particular. This can be observed also when considering non-financial KPIs 
disclosed outside the KPI section, which have increased during the same period. The 
mean (median) of QNNFKREP has increased from 1.76 (1) KPIs in 2006 to reach a 
mean (median) of 3.90 (3) KPIs in 2010. As a result, KPIs reported in the whole report 
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have increased from a mean (median) of 5.83 (5.0) KPIs in 2006 to a mean (median) of 
9.89 (9) KPIs in 2010.  
Table 9 Quantity of KPI reporting across years  
2006 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QNTKSEC 24.00 0.00 5.52 5.00 4.79 96 
QNFKS 15.00 0.00 4.15 4.00 3.38 96 
QNNFKSEC 13.00 0.00 1.42 0.00 2.50 96 
QNNFKREP 16.00 0.00 1.76 1.00 2.88 96 
QNTKREP 24.00 0.00 5.83 5.00 4.90 96 
2007 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QNTKSEC 24.00 0.00 7.03 6.00 5.18 101 
QNFKS 19.00 0.00 5.18 5.00 3.58 101 
QNNFKSEC 15.00 0.00 1.93 1.00 3.01 101 
QNNFKREP 16.00 0.00 2.30 1.00 3.20 101 
QNTKREP 24.00 0.00 7.40 6.00 5.29 101 
2008 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QNTKSEC 24.00 0.00 7.88 7.00 5.15 102 
QNFKS 19.00 0.00 5.59 5.00 3.38 102 
QNNFKSEC 15.00 0.00 2.31 1.00 3.10 102 
QNNFKREP 16.00 0.00 2.89 2.00 3.39 102 
QNTKREP 24.00 0.00 8.45 7.00 5.42 102 
2009 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QNTKSEC 24.00 0.00 8.26 7.00 4.82 102 
QNFKS 19.00 0.00 5.75 5.50 3.25 102 
QNNFKSEC 15.00 0.00 2.51 2.00 2.93 102 
QNNFKREP 15.00 0.00 3.41 3.00 3.41 102 
QNTKREP 24.00 0.00 9.17 8.00 5.12 102 
2010 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QNTKSEC 24.00 0.00 8.60 7.50 4.68 102 
QNFKS 19.00 0.00 5.98 6.00 3.37 102 
QNNFKSEC 15.00 0.00 2.61 2.00 2.84 102 
QNNFKREP 16.00 0.00 3.90 3.00 3.66 102 
QNTKREP 24.00 0.00 9.89 9.00 5.21 102 
QNTKSEC is the total number of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; 
QNFKS is financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; QNNFKSEC is non-financial KPIs disclosed in 
the KPI section; QNNFKREP is non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report; QNTKREP is the 
total number of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report. 
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As mentioned above, it seems that there is a variation in the quantity of KPIs reported 
during the sample period.13 However, the study compares KPI reporting quantity across 
the sample period to test whether or not the differences between these scores are 
significant. Table 10 indicates that an F value of 8.62 is significant, suggesting that the 
means are not all equal. Furthermore, a Bonferroni test is carried out to identify where 
the differences in the quantity scores are. The test makes multiple comparisons in order 
to examine the differences between each pair of quantity score means. The results 
reported in Table 10 illustrate that there is an increasing trend in the quantity of KPIs 
reported between 2006 and 2010. However, there are significant differences between 
the quantity scores’ mean of 2006 and the quantity scores’ means of 2008, 2009, and 
2010 at a significance level of 5%. Moreover, the results show a statistically significant 
difference between the quantity scores’ mean of 2007 and the quantity scores’ mean of 
2010, but at the 10% level. Thus, Table 44 in Appendix (1) indicates that the latter 
difference becomes significant at a level of 5%, if the non-financial KPIs disclosed - 
outside the KPI section - are considered. With respect to the quantity of financial and 
non-financial KPI reporting, Table 41 and Table 42 in Appendix (1) confirm that 
significant differences exist only between the quantity scores’ mean of 2006 and the 
quantity scores’ means of 2008, 2009, and 2010 at a level of 5%. These results suggest 
that, despite the significant differences between quantity scores in general, those 
differences are mainly in correspondence with the quantity scores of 2006. 
Interestingly, these tests do not provide evidence suggesting that the financial crisis in 
2008 influenced KPI reporting in terms of quantity. For instance, it appears that there 
are no significant differences between the quantity scores’ means of 2009 and 2010, and 
those of 2007. This might indicate that companies did not use KPI reporting as a tool to 
                                                 
13
 That trend is also tested using Cuzick test - developed by Cuzick (1985) - to test for trends across 
ordered groups. The results of that non-parametric test documents a statistically significant trend in all 
proxies of KPI reporting in terms of quantity at a level of 1% (results are not tabulated). 
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communicate with annual report users with respect to the consequences of the financial 
crisis.   
Table 10 Anova test to compare KPI reporting quantity across the sample period 
 
 
QNTKSEC is the total number of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section. 
2.5.2.3 Quantity of KPI reporting across industries 
The quantity of KPI reporting disclosed across industries is analysed, in order to shed 
light on any possible variations between industries in practice. Table 11 shows that 
industries are - to some extent - varied in terms of KPI reporting quantity. The highest 
number of KPIs is provided by Utilities firms, either when considering KPIs disclosed 
outside the KPI section or not. The mean number of QNTKSEC in Utilities firms is 
15.25 KPI, while the mean of QNTKREP is 15.8 KPIs. Accordingly, the highest 
                0.000      0.057      1.000      1.000
    2010      .799779    .423377    .186328    .085113
          
                0.000      0.270      1.000
    2009      .714667    .338264    .101216
          
                0.001      1.000
    2008      .613451    .237049
          
                0.154
    2007      .376402
                                                      
Col Mean         2006       2007       2008       2009
Row Mean- 
                                (Bonferroni)
                        Comparison of QNTKSEC by year
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(4) =  14.4918  Prob>chi2 = 0.006
    Total           628.344774    502   1.25168282
                                                                        
 Within groups      587.647379    498   1.18001482
Between groups      40.6973947      4   10.1743487      8.62     0.0000
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
      Total     2.4966587   1.1187863         503
                                                 
       2010     2.7893563    .9083085         102
       2009     2.7042436   .98009983         102
       2008      2.603028   1.0568603         102
       2007     2.3659792   1.2023142         101
       2006     1.9895769   1.2562748          96
                                                 
       year          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                      Summary of QNTKSEC
CHAPTER TWO- KPI REPOTING IN UK: DESCRIPTIVE STUDY 
 
 
 61 
number of financial and non-financial KPIs is disclosed by Utilities firms. The mean of 
QNFKS is 6.95 KPIs; the mean of QNNFKSEC is 8.9 KPIs, while after considering 
KPIs disclosed outside the KPI section, the mean of QNNFKREP is 9.6 KPIs. It is 
worth mentioning that, Utilities is the only industry which disclosed more non-financial 
KPIs than financial ones.  
In contrast, Table 11 indicates that the lowest number of KPIs disclosed is shown in the 
case of Healthcare firms. The mean number of QNTKSEC in these firms is 3.67 KPIs, 
while it becomes 5.67 (the mean of QNTKREP) if KPIs disclosed outside the KPI 
section are considered. Moreover, Healthcare firms show the lowest numbers of 
financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed among the sample industries. The median of 
QNFKS is 3 KPIs, whereas the median of QNNFKSEC is zero, and the median of 
QNNFKREP is 2 KPIs.  
Table 11 Quantity of KPI reporting across industries 
Basic Materials 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QNTKSEC 24.00 0.00 7.75 6.00 5.31 40 
QNFKS 11.00 0.00 4.53 5.00 2.59 40 
QNNFKSEC 15.00 0.00 3.28 2.00 4.01 40 
QNNFKREP 16.00 0.00 3.55 2.00 4.13 40 
QNTKREP 24.00 0.00 8.00 6.00 5.46 40 
Consumer Goods 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QNTKSEC 14.00 0.00 7.31 7.00 3.55 65 
QNFKS 12.00 0.00 5.94 7.00 2.78 65 
QNNFKSEC 5.00 0.00 1.37 1.00 1.77 65 
QNNFKREP 8.00 0.00 2.03 1.00 2.54 65 
QNTKREP 20.00 0.00 7.97 7.00 4.32 65 
Consumer Services 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QNTKSEC 24.00 0.00 7.99 7.00 5.60 107 
QNFKS 19.00 0.00 5.88 6.00 4.31 107 
QNNFKSEC 10.00 0.00 2.09 1.00 2.50 107 
QNNFKREP 12.00 0.00 2.57 2.00 2.84 107 
QNTKREP 24.00 0.00 8.47 7.00 5.81 107 
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Healthcare 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QNTKSEC 6.00 0.00 3.67 4.00 1.88 24 
QNFKS 6.00 0.00 2.83 3.00 1.63 24 
QNNFKSEC 4.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 1.27 24 
QNNFKREP 10.00 0.00 2.83 2.00 3.36 24 
QNTKREP 15.00 0.00 5.67 4.50 4.29 24 
Industrials 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QNTKSEC 19.00 0.00 7.39 6.00 4.48 143 
QNFKS 13.00 0.00 5.37 5.00 3.31 143 
QNNFKSEC 10.00 0.00 2.02 2.00 2.23 143 
QNNFKREP 16.00 0.00 2.77 2.00 2.81 143 
QNTKREP 20.00 0.00 8.14 7.00 4.50 143 
Oil & Gas 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QNTKSEC 18.00 0.00 6.52 6.00 5.15 54 
QNFKS 9.00 0.00 4.39 4.50 3.22 54 
QNNFKSEC 10.00 0.00 2.13 2.00 2.43 54 
QNNFKREP 10.00 0.00 2.30 2.00 2.65 54 
QNTKREP 18.00 0.00 6.69 6.00 5.31 54 
Technology 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QNTKSEC 14.00 0.00 6.13 5.50 3.05 40 
QNFKS 11.00 0.00 5.48 5.50 2.83 40 
QNNFKSEC 5.00 0.00 0.65 0.00 1.25 40 
QNNFKREP 9.00 0.00 1.68 0.00 2.49 40 
QNTKREP 18.00 0.00 7.15 6.00 4.50 40 
Telecommunications 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QNTKSEC 15.00 0.00 7.70 7.50 4.88 10 
QNFKS 12.00 0.00 6.00 5.50 3.46 10 
QNNFKSEC 4.00 0.00 1.70 2.00 1.64 10 
QNNFKREP 14.00 0.00 4.60 2.00 5.97 10 
QNTKREP 23.00 0.00 10.60 8.50 8.49 10 
Utilities 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QNTKSEC 24.00 0.00 15.25 17.00 6.58 20 
QNFKS 17.00 0.00 6.95 5.50 3.93 20 
QNNFKSEC 15.00 0.00 8.90 9.00 5.01 20 
QNNFKREP 16.00 2.00 9.60 10.00 4.91 20 
QNTKREP 24.00 4.00 15.80 17.00 6.12 20 
QNTKSEC is the total number of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; QNFKS 
is financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; QNNFKSEC is  non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI 
section; QNNFKREP is non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report; QNTKREP is the total number 
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of financial and non-financial KPIs that are disclosed in the whole report. 
 
Furthermore, the study compares KPI reporting quantity scores across industries to test 
whether the differences between industries in quantity scores are significant.  
Table 52 in Appendix (1) shows that the means are not all equal as F value is 
significant. A Bonferroni test conducts multiple comparisons between each pair of 
quantity scores. Generally, the results reported in  
Table 52  show that Utilities firms report a number of KPIs which is statistically 
significant and higher than the rest of the industries. Rather, in spite of disclosing a 
higher number of KPIs than other industries,  
Table 52 reports that the differences between the quantity scores of Basic Material 
firms and those of other industries are not significant. In contrast,  
Table 52 shows that Healthcare firms present a number of KPIs which is lower than that 
of other industries. Hence, the differences between quantity scores of Healthcare firms 
and those of Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Industrials, and Utilities firms are 
statistically significant. Yet, as indicated in Table 53 in Appendix (1), these differences 
turned to be insignificant (except those with regard to Utilities firms) when non-
financial KPIs disclosed - outside the KPI section - are considered. Concerning, the 
quantity of financial KPI reporting, Table 49 in Appendix (1) illustrates that most of the 
differences between quantity scores among the sample industries are not significant. On 
the other hand, Table 50 indicates that Utilities firms report a higher number of non-
financial KPIs than other industries. In contrast, Technology firms provides a 
statistically significant and lower number of non-financial KPIs than firms in Basic 
Materials, Consumer Services, Industrials, Oil & Gas, and Utilities industries. 
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2.5.3 Descriptive statistics for quality of KPI reporting 
Table 12 shows the general statistics with regard to KPI reporting quality scores. It 
seems that companies are widely varied in terms of KPI disclosure quality. For 
instance, the quality level for KPIs -disclosed in the KPI section- range from 0 to 0.688. 
Yet, it is obvious that all quality means and medians record a remarkably low level.  
For those KPIs disclosed in the KPI section, the mean (median) of financial KPI 
reporting quality (QLFKS) is 0.347 (0.375). The level of non-financial KPI reporting 
quality (QLNFKSEC) is lower with a mean (median) of 0.268 (0.286). As a result, the 
mean (median) of KPI reporting quality (QLTKSEC) is 0.363 (0.375). However, it 
seems that a high quality of KPI reporting outside the KPI section has driven the total 
quality of KPI reporting QLTKREP to be slightly higher than the corresponding 
QLTKSEC, with a mean (median) of 0.371 (0.390). 
Table 12 Descriptive statistics for KPI quality scores 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QLTKSEC 0.688 0.00 0.363 0.375 0.174 503 
QLFKS 0.691 0.00 0.347 0.375 0.176 503 
QLNFKSEC 0.786 0.00 0.268 0.286 0.250 503 
QLNFKREP 0.818 0.00 0.309 0.333 0.252 503 
QLTKREP 0.665 0.00 0.371 0.390 0.170 503 
QLTKSEC is the aggregated quality of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; 
QLFKS is the quality of financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; QLNFKSEC is the quality of non- 
financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; QLNFKREP is the quality of non-financial KPIs disclosed 
in the whole report; QLTKREP is the aggregated quality of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed 
in the whole report. 
As quality scores are identified as being based upon the ASB guidelines, it would be 
useful to explore companies’ practices with respect to the eight dimensions used to 
evaluate KPI quality. 
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2.5.3.1 KPI reporting quality: qualitative attributes in practice 
Table 13 displays the individual averages with regard to the 8 qualitative attributes 
recommended by the ASB (2006). It is indicated that the majority of firms display their 
information by considering two recommendations. It is shown that firms provide the 
definition for 86.9% of the KPIs disclosed in the KPI section and 87.4% of the KPIs 
disclosed in the whole report. Additionally, firms quantify KPI data for 79.6 % of the 
KPIs disclosed in the KPI section and 79.7% of the KPIs disclosed in the whole report. 
On the other hand, companies show a modest tendency to explain the purpose of 
presenting each KPI. The purpose is explained in 48.8% of KPIs disclosed in the KPI 
section, and 51.1% of the KPIs disclosed in the whole report. In contrast, firms show a 
very weak reporting practice with regard to other attributes of KPI reporting quality.  
In line with the arguments discussed earlier in this chapter, it worth noting that the 
qualitative attributes is integrated to produce useful KPI information for the reader. 
Thus, it can be claimed that annual report users might find this information irrelevant in 
terms of their decision making.14 On the other hand, these results confirm and explain 
the above conclusion about the low level of KPI reporting in general. The results also 
suggest that reporting quality is higher as long as KPIs disclosed outside the KPI 
section are included in the analysis. However, these findings raise questions about the 
need to introduce clear guidelines and benchmarks concerning KPI disclosure, and the 
mechanisms required in order to make firms more compliant. 
Table 13 KPI reporting quality: descriptive statistics of individual dimensions 
Dimensions suggested by OFR (2006) KPI section The whole report 
Provision of the definition 0.869 0.874 
Explanation of the purpose 0.488 0.511 
                                                 
14
 This could limit the conclusions made about the implications of KPI reporting quality in particular.  
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Disclosure of the source 0.294 0.301 
Quantify the targets 0.098 0.104 
Commentary on future targets 0.053 0.059 
Quantify the data 0.796 0.797 
Disclosing F.S  data adjusted 0.183 0.182 
Disclosure of any changes 0.041 0.044 
The following subsections shed more light on the quality of KPI reporting by analysing 
quality scores throughout the sample period, as well as studying it across industries. 
2.5.3.2 Quality of KPI reporting across the sample period 
Table 14 illustrates the statistics with regard to KPI reporting quality for the full sample 
across the period under consideration. It is shown that KPI reporting quality has 
increasing during the period 2006-2010. The mean (median) of QLTKSEC starts with 
0.285 (0.295) in 2006, then increases across the sample period to reach a mean 
(median) of 0.414 (0.423) in 2010. It seems that the quality of non-financial KPI 
reporting outside the KPI section is usually higher than the corresponding figure with 
regard to QLNFKSEC. As a result, QLNFKREP leads QLTKREP in term of being 
always higher than the level of QLTKSEC throughout the sample period. QLTKREP 
has increased from a mean (median) of 0.288 (0.301) in 2006 to reach its maximum in 
2010 with a mean (median) of 0.426 (0.436). 
Looking at the trend with regard to financial and non-financial KPI reporting, Table 14 
shows that the quality levels show a steady increase over the sample period.  Yet, the 
figures indicate that QLFKS is always higher than QLNFKSEC as well as QLNFKREP. 
For instance, the mean (median) of QLFKS in 2006 was 0.264 (0.282), whereas the 
mean (median) of QLNFKSEC and QLNFKREP in the same year were 0.191 (0.000) 
and 0.215 (0.136) respectively. The improvement in quality levels is shown in the 
corresponding statistics for the next years covered. For example, the mean (median) of 
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QLFKS in 2010 becomes 0.402 (0.404), whereas the mean (median) of QLNFKSEC 
and QLNFKREP in the same year reaches a level of 0.320 (0.346) and 0.380 (0.429) 
respectively. These results suggest that the low level of non-financial KPI reporting in 
terms of quality causes the overall level of KPI reporting in terms of quality to be 
lower.  
Table 14 Quality of KPI reporting across the years 
2006 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QLTKSEC 0.688 0.00 0.285 0.295 0.194 96 
QLFKS 0.691 0.00 0.264 0.282 0.192 96 
QLNFKSEC 0.786 0.00 0.191 0.000 0.237 96 
QLNFKREP 0.818 0.00 0.215 0.136 0.241 96 
QLTKREP 0.665 0.00 0.288 0.301 0.190 96 
2007 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QLTKSEC 0.688 0.00 0.342 0.357 0.180 101 
QLFKS 0.691 0.00 0.326 0.357 0.176 101 
QLNFKSEC 0.786 0.00 0.252 0.286 0.249 101 
QLNFKREP 0.818 0.00 0.284 0.286 0.250 101 
QLTKREP 0.625 0.00 0.348 0.360 0.176 101 
2008 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QLTKSEC 0.688 0.00 0.379 0.391 0.163 102 
QLFKS 0.691 0.00 0.362 0.375 0.165 102 
QLNFKSEC 0.786 0.00 0.279 0.286 0.251 102 
QLNFKREP 0.786 0.00 0.318 0.357 0.251 102 
QLTKREP 0.665 0.00 0.387 0.399 0.157 102 
2009 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QLTKSEC 0.680 0.00 0.392 0.394 0.157 102 
QLFKS 0.691 0.00 0.374 0.385 0.166 102 
QLNFKSEC 0.786 0.00 0.292 0.295 0.248 102 
QLNFKREP 0.818 0.00 0.345 0.429 0.249 102 
QLTKREP 0.665 0.00 0.400 0.418 0.154 102 
2010 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QLTKSEC 0.688 0.00 0.414 0.423 0.144 102 
QLFKS 0.691 0.00 0.402 0.404 0.148 102 
QLNFKSEC 0.786 0.00 0.320 0.346 0.249 102 
QLNFKREP 0.818 0.00 0.380 0.429 0.243 102 
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QLTKREP 0.666 0.00 0.426 0.436 0.141 102 
QLTKSEC the aggregated quality of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; 
QLFKS is the quality of financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; QLNFKSEC the quality of non- 
financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; QLNFKREP the quality of non-financial KPIs disclosed in 
the whole report; QLTKREP the aggregated quality of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the 
whole report. 
Furthermore, the study compares KPI reporting quality scores across the sample period 
to test whether the differences between these scores are significant.  Table 15 indicates 
that the means are not all equal, as the F value is 9.30. The multiple comparisons 
between quality scores explore the differences between each pair of quality score 
means. The findings presented in Table 15 show that there is an increasing trend in the 
quality of KPI reporting between 2006 and 2010. However, there are significant 
differences between the quality scores’ mean of 2006 and the quality scores’ means of 
2008, 2009, and 2010, at a level of 5%. In addition, the results show a statistically 
significant difference between the quality scores’ mean of 2007 and the quality scores’ 
mean of 2010. Thus, Table 48 Appendix (1) indicates that these findings are not 
changed when non-financial KPIs disclosed - outside the KPI section - are considered. 
Furthermore, Table 45 in Appendix (1) confirms the same results with respect to the 
quality of financial KPI reporting. In addition, it shows that the difference between the 
quality scores of 2006 and those of 2007 is significant at the 10% level.  
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Table 15 Anova test to compare KPI reporting quality across the sample period 
 
QLTKSEC the aggregated quality of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section. 
On the other hand, Table 46 in Appendix (1) shows that significant differences exist 
only between non-financial KPI reporting quality scores of 2006 and those of 2009, and 
2010. Likewise the results discussed with regard to KPI reporting quantity differences, 
quality score differences are mainly in relation to the quality scores of 2006. Thus, these 
tests do not provide evidence that UK firms significantly extended KPI reporting 
                0.000      0.023      1.000      1.000
    2010      .164002     .09124    .040377    .024489
          
                0.000      0.252      1.000
    2009      .139513    .066751    .015888
          
                0.000      0.877
    2008      .123626    .050863
          
                0.163
    2007      .072762
                                                      
Col Mean         2006       2007       2008       2009
Row Mean- 
                                (Bonferroni)
                        Comparison of QLTKSEC by year
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(4) =  38.2462  Prob>chi2 = 0.000
    Total           24.0038219    502   .047816378
                                                                        
 Within groups       22.335639    498   .044850681
Between groups      1.66818294      4   .417045735      9.30     0.0000
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
      Total     .56171643   .21866956         503
                                                 
       2010     .62449125   .15650629         102
       2009     .60000241   .17932706         102
       2008     .58411464   .19614196         102
       2007      .5332513   .24024106         101
       2006     .46048894   .27060419          96
                                                 
       year          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                      Summary of QLTKSEC
CHAPTER TWO- KPI REPOTING IN UK: DESCRIPTIVE STUDY 
 
 
 70 
quality after the financial crisis in 2008. As concluded earlier, this might reflect firms’ 
focus on other disclosure types in this time period.    
2.5.3.3 Quality of KPI reporting across industries  
The study explores the variation in practice with respect to the quality of KPIs disclosed 
across industries. Similar to the picture of KPI reporting in terms of quantity, it appears 
that industries vary in the quality of KPI reporting. Table 16 indicates that the highest 
level of KPI reporting in terms of quality is provided by the Basic Materials industry 
either when considering KPIs disclosed outside the KPI section or not. The mean 
(median) of QLTKSEC in Basic Materials firms is 0.459 (0.475), while the mean 
(median) of QLTKREP is 0.461 (0.483). The same industry presents the highest quality 
of financial KPI reporting with a mean (median) of 0.434 (0.471). However, the highest 
quality of non-financial KPI reporting is shown in the Utilities industry with a mean 
(median) of 0.436 (0.476) in the KPI section, and 0.461 (0.476) in the whole report.  
On the other hand, firms in the Oil & Gas industry come at the bottom with regard to 
KPI reporting quality even if  KPIs disclosed outside the KPI section are considered or 
not. Table 16 indicates that the mean (median) of QLTKSEC in this industry is 0.291 
(0.321), while the mean (median) of QLTKREP is 0.294 (0.321). Oil & Gas firms also 
provided the lowest level of financial KPI reporting in terms of quality with a mean 
(median) of 0.289 (0.323). In turn, Healthcare firms show the lowest level of non-
financial KPI reporting in terms of quality among the sample industries with a mean 
(median) of 0.122 (0.000).  
It is worth mentioning that the statistics of the Oil & Gas and Utilities industries are 
unique, as the levels of non-financial KPI reporting quality in these industries exceed 
the corresponding figures for financial KPIs. In contrast to other industries, the high 
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levels of non-financial KPI reporting quality in the Oil & Gas and Utilities industries 
result in an upwards trend in the total level of KPI reporting in terms of quality.  
Table 16 Quality of KPI reporting across industries 
Basic Materials 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QLTKSEC 0.688 0.00 0.459 0.475 0.184 40 
QLFKS 0.686 0.00 0.434 0.471 0.176 40 
QLNFKSEC 0.786 0.00 0.355 0.429 0.321 40 
QLNFKREP 0.818 0.00 0.374 0.443 0.323 40 
QLTKREP 0.665 0.00 0.461 0.483 0.184 40 
Consumer Goods 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QLTKSEC 0.688 0.00 0.373 0.386 0.176 65 
QLFKS 0.691 0.00 0.362 0.386 0.172 65 
QLNFKSEC 0.714 0.00 0.227 0.143 0.247 65 
QLNFKREP 0.714 0.00 0.272 0.286 0.254 65 
QLTKREP 0.665 0.00 0.369 0.386 0.170 65 
Consumer Services 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QLTKSEC 0.582 0.00 0.328 0.353 0.158 107 
QLFKS 0.583 0.00 0.320 0.339 0.161 107 
QLNFKSEC 0.720 0.00 0.271 0.286 0.226 107 
QLNFKREP 0.720 0.00 0.311 0.333 0.222 107 
QLTKREP 0.582 0.00 0.343 0.357 0.155 107 
Health Care 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QLTKSEC 0.604 0.00 0.359 0.393 0.198 24 
QLFKS 0.604 0.00 0.360 0.422 0.204 24 
QLNFKSEC 0.429 0.00 0.122 0.000 0.166 24 
QLNFKREP 0.492 0.00 0.218 0.286 0.199 24 
QLTKREP 0.534 0.00 0.342 0.393 0.180 24 
Industrials 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QLTKSEC 0.658 0.00 0.384 0.408 0.148 143 
QLFKS 0.632 0.00 0.355 0.375 0.158 143 
QLNFKSEC 0.786 0.00 0.292 0.333 0.258 143 
QLNFKREP 0.818 0.00 0.337 0.429 0.259 143 
QLTKREP 0.665 0.00 0.397 0.417 0.146 143 
Oil & Gas 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QLTKSEC 0.612 0.00 0.291 0.321 0.215 54 
QLFKS 0.627 0.00 0.289 0.323 0.217 54 
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QLNFKSEC 0.714 0.00 0.296 0.286 0.225 54 
QLNFKREP 0.714 0.00 0.299 0.286 0.227 54 
QLTKREP 0.612 0.00 0.294 0.321 0.216 54 
Technology 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QLTKSEC 0.582 0.00 0.342 0.324 0.144 40 
QLFKS 0.593 0.00 0.320 0.300 0.163 40 
QLNFKSEC 0.714 0.00 0.114 0.000 0.188 40 
QLNFKREP 0.810 0.00 0.205 0.000 0.263 40 
QLTKREP 0.633 0.00 0.356 0.373 0.150 40 
Telecommunications 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
QLTKSEC 0.675 0.00 0.392 0.391 0.24 10 
QLFKS 0.691 0.00 0.399 0.389 0.247 10 
QLNFKSEC 0.571 0.00 0.260 0.229 0.276 10 
QLNFKREP 0.671 0.00 0.280 0.254 0.298 10 
QLTKREP 0.614 0.00 0.384 0.391 0.228 10 
Utilities 
Variable Max Min Mean Median SD N 
QLTKSEC 0.608 0.00 0.407 0.406 0.163 20 
QLFKS 0.575 0.00 0.370 0.375 0.144 20 
QLNFKSEC 0.657 0.00 0.436 0.476 0.176 20 
QLNFKREP 0.657 0.00 0.461 0.476 0.142 20 
QLTKREP 0.608 0.00 0.427 0.406 0.133 20 
QLTKSEC the aggregated quality of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; 
QLFKS is the quality of financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; QLNFKSEC the quality of non- 
financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; QLNFKREP the quality of non-financial KPIs disclosed in 
the whole report; QLTKREP the aggregated quality of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the 
whole report. 
To test whether the differences between industries in terms of quality scores are 
significant,  
Table 52 in Appendix (1) shows that the means are not all equal as the F value is 
significant. A Bonferroni test conducts multiple comparisons between each pair of 
quality scores. The results reported in Table 57 in Appendix (1) indicate that Basic 
Material firms provide higher levels of disclosure quality, but the differences in terms 
of quality scores with other industries are not significant. In contrast, it seems that Oil 
& Gas provide KPI reporting at a lower level compared with other industries. However, 
significant differences exist between scores in terms of quality in the case of Oil & Gas 
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firms and those of Basic Materials as well as Industrials. Table 58 in Appendix (1); 
reports that these findings hold if KPIs disclosed outside the KPI section are considered. 
With respect to the quality of financial KPI reporting, Table 54 in Appendix (1) reports 
that Basic Materials firms show a higher scores in terms of quality compared with other 
industries. However, all the differences are not significant, except those in the case of 
Oil & Gas firms. Rather, Table 55 in Appendix (1) illustrates that Utilities’ firms report 
higher levels of non-financial KPI reporting in terms of quality than other industries. 
The differences are statistically significant compared with firms in the Consumer 
Goods, Healthcare, and Basic Materials industries. In contrast, Technology firms 
provide statistically significant and lower levels of non-financial KPI reporting in terms 
of quality than other firms. The differences are mainly significant in respect to firms in 
the Basic Materials, Consumer Services, Industrials, Oil & Gas, and Utilities industries. 
2.5.4 Correlation between KPI reporting quantity and its quality  
Descriptive statistics show that, to some extent, sample firms vary in terms of the 
quantity and quality of KPI reporting. Thus, the current study also seeks to get an initial 
indication on whether each dimension is to some extent related. Table 17 illustrates 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients between KPI reporting quantity and quality proxies. It 
appears that the correlation is positive and statistically significant between proxies that 
are used to measure KPI reporting quantity or quality separately. This shows the 
consistency among each group of measures in capturing the required information.  
Table 17 Pearson correlation matrix 
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*Significance at the 5% level or above. 
QNTKSEC: the quantity of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; QLTKSEC: 
the aggregated quality of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; QNFKS: the 
quantity of financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; QLFKS: the aggregated quality score of financial 
KPIs disclosed in KPI section; QNNFKSEC: the quantity of non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI 
section; QLNFKSEC: the aggregated quality score of non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; 
QNNFKREP: the quantity of non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report; QLNFKREP: the 
aggregated quality score of non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report; ; QNTKREP: quantity of 
financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report; QLTKREP: the aggregated quality score 
of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report.  All variables are defined in Table 5. 
In addition, a positive and statistically significant relationship is found between the 
number of KPIs disclosed in the KPI section and their quality (ρ = 0.76). Hence, this 
initial evidence might confirm the assumption of several empirical studies that use 
quantity of information disclosed as a proxy for disclosure quality (e.g. Berretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004; Mouselli and Hussainey, 2010). However, it is not possible to obtain 
strong evidence with regard to this research question (Q4) at this early stage of the 
analysis. Further investigation is needed to test this assumption in the next hypothesis.  
2.6 Discussion and overall conclusion 
The main objective of the current study is to explore the main features of KPI reporting 
by UK firms. Therefore, a research instrument is first developed to measure the quantity 
and to evaluate the quality of KPI disclosure. The quantity of KPI disclosure is 
measured by counting the number of KPIs disclosed in the annual reports. The study 
approach to measure KPI reporting quality is based upon a framework of a well 
recognised regulatory body (the ASB, 2006), that aims at information usefulness. 
Dependent Variables QNTKSEC QLTKSEC QNFKS QNNFKSEC QNNFKREP QNTKREP QLFKS QLNFKSEC QLNFKREP QLTKREP
QNTKSEC 1
QLTKSEC 0.7645* 1
QNFKS 0.8915* 0.7041* 1
QNNFKSEC 0.6945* 0.4302* 0.3399* 1
QNNFKREP 0.6321* 0.4659* 0.3575* 0.7972* 1
QNTKREP 0.9499* 0.7658* 0.8655* 0.6192* 0.7458* 1
QLFKS 0.7328* 0.9190* 0.7840* 0.3270* 0.3820* 0.7410* 1
QLNFKSEC 0.5963* 0.5292* 0.3545* 0.8348* 0.6443* 0.5286* 0.4220* 1
QLNFKREP 0.5697* 0.5494* 0.3835* 0.6840* 0.8160* 0.6407* 0.4531* 0.8354* 1
QLTKREP 0.7291* 0.9614* 0.6740* 0.4040* 0.4944* 0.7701* 0.8838* 0.5052* 0.5959* 1
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Arguably, firms with a high alignment to this guidance would provide KPI information 
that is relevant, has a forward-looking orientation, is comprehensive and 
understandable, is balanced and neutral, complements and supplements financial 
statements, is verifiable and comparable over time. As the index focus is on assessing 
the quality of the information unit, it would be relevant to measure the quality of 
different types of information disclosed (e.g. risk reporting). The approach followed 
aimed at measuring disclosure quality does not allow a high degree of subjective 
judgment. This adds to the reliability of the measure, which has been assured by 
conducting a pilot study.  
The study focuses on exploring KPI reporting practices in FTSE 350 non-financial UK 
firms. The study sample is identified as 103 firms with 515 annual reports published 
between 2006 and 2010. A research instrument is used to quantify KPI reporting and to 
assign quality scores to the sample firms.  
The analysis of firms’ practices indicates that the majority of UK firms specify a section 
of the business review in order to present KPIs, or at least they make a reference to the 
part in which they discuss KPI information. However, the nature of the regulations 
regarding KPI reporting appears to give the directors a large degree of discretion when 
it comes to controlling such disclosures. Some firms are unconcerned with providing 
any KPI disclosures, especially those related to non-financial KPI information, while 
others provide more KPIs in their annual reports, with a continuous increase in 
reporting quality across the sample period (2006-2010).  
Whereas, the most popular financial KPIs disclosed by the sample firms are revenues 
followed by underlying earnings per share and  free cash flow, the most common non-
financial KPIs disclosed are accident incident rate, employee turnover\ retention, 
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accident numbers. Descriptive analyses show that firms gradually increased the number 
of KPIs disclosed across the period (2006-2010). The significant differences between 
the quantity scores’ mean of 2006 and the quantity scores’ means of 2008, 2009, and 
2010 might reflect the normal effect of a learning curve with regard to KPI reporting in 
practice. 
Although the median number of non-financial KPIs has increased from 0 in 2006 to 2 in 
2010, it is observed that the level of these KPIs is relatively low. This result is in line 
with the ASB (2007) review of companies’ narrative reporting practices. Hence, the 
number of non-financial KPIs disclosed could not cover all the different aspects of 
performance. 
With respect to KPI reporting quality, a remarkably low level of KPI reporting quality 
is observed. That level is slightly improved if the KPIs disclosed outside the KPI 
section are considered. Similar to the picture of reporting quantity, the analysis 
indicates the increasing trend in quality levels across the sample period. The level of 
financial KPI disclosure quality is always larger than the corresponding figure for non-
financial KPIs during the period 2006-2010.  
Generally, the low level of reporting quality could be explained by firms’ weak 
performance with regard to most of the individual attributes that have been suggested 
by the ASB (2006) guidance in order to achieve KPI reporting quality. Firms place 
emphasis only on providing appropriate definitions and in quantifying KPI data. In 
contrast, they do not pay a great deal of attention to the other attributes of KPI reporting 
quality. This raises the question about the need to introduce clear guidelines and 
benchmarks concerning KPI disclosures. Furthermore, additional mechanisms might be 
required from regulators to make UK firms more compliant.  
The findings show that there are no significant differences between KPI reporting 
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scores before and after the financial crisis of 2008. Hence, the results do not provide 
evidence suggesting that the financial crisis affected either KPI reporting quantity or its 
quality. It appears that companies did not use KPI reporting to communicate with 
annual reports users with respect to the impact of the financial crisis on the business 
during this period.   
The analyses provide a full picture with regard to the variation between UK industries 
in terms of KPI reporting. It is believed that KPI reporting is influenced by different 
types of businesses that have different and unique value creation activities. This is in 
line with different disclosure theories. For instance, signalling theory suggests that 
companies in the same industry would follow the same disclosure practices to show that 
they are not hiding any bad news (Craven and Marston, 1999; Oyelere et al., 2003). On 
the other hand, different industries are subject to different political costs, which result in 
different disclosure practices across different industries (Ball and Foster, 1982).  
For instance, Utilities sector companies such as electric, gas and water providers usually 
rely on significant investments and debts. These firms also place stress on non-financial 
KPI reporting which could be explained by their aim to demonstrate their ability to 
achieve sustained growth. Therefore, Utilities firms disclose the largest amount of KPIs 
to show their ability to meet the different needs of their stakeholders (e.g. creditors, 
employees, customers, suppliers, and government authorities). This is in line with 
stakeholder theory; Utilities companies try to use KPI information as a vehicle to ensure 
that these stakeholders are informed, even if they do not use this information (Deegan 
and Unerman, 2006). 
On the other hand, Healthcare firms present the lowest number of KPIs in general. 
Furthermore, Technology firms provide the lowest number of non-financial KPIs, with 
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a significantly lower degree of reporting quality. Arguably, these industries should 
increase their focus on KPI reporting.  Previous research has documented that these 
industries are characterised as having intensive intangibles. Therefore, they should rely 
on non-financial information, as investors find the financial information disclosed in the 
financial statement irrelevant (Amir and Lev, 1996). 
Likewise, Oil & Gas firms provide low level of KPI reporting quality. The activities of 
these companies have different impacts on the environment. This could also affect their 
current and future financial performance. Shareholders might overestimate the potential 
effects of such activities. Thus, it appears that Oil & Gas companies avoid the negative 
consequences of high quality KPI disclosure. In turn, in accordance with political cost 
theory, it can also be argued that these companies involved in vulnerable activities are 
under the public eye, and hence they control their disclosures to alleviate political costs 
related to their activities (Oyelere et al., 2003).  
These findings indicate that industries vary in terms of KPI reporting. Therefore, one 
might argue that the industry could affect reporting quantity and quality, and hence, 
should be considered while examining the factors that drive KPI reporting. In addition, 
the variation between firms in terms of KPI reporting could be a good motive to study 
the economic impact of KPI reporting. 
This study is the first part of an integrated research project that aims to identify factors 
affecting KPI reporting, as well as investigating the impact on firm value. In general, 
there is limited empirical evidence on firms’ practices with regard to KPI reporting in 
the UK. The current study contributes to the existing literature by its comprehensive 
analysis of KPI disclosures in the UK setting.  It provides an answer to the first research 
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question (Q1) with regard to exploring the main characteristics of KPI reporting on the 
part of UK firms. 
 Finally, the research approach is to make a distinction between disclosure quantity and 
its quality. This distinction helps to answer Q4 of the research questions about the 
validity of using quantity of disclosure as a proxy for its quality in accounting studies. 
Descriptive results suggest a significant and positive relationship between KPI reporting 
quantity and its quality (ρ = 0.76). On the other hand, the comparison between 
industries in terms of KPI reporting illustrates that the industries with the highest 
quantity of KPI disclosure do not appear to be the best in terms of KPI disclosure 
quality. Thus, Utilities firms were the highest in terms of KPI reporting quantity, but 
they just show the highest level of non-financial KPI reporting quality. In contrast, the 
highest level of KPI reporting quality is provided by the Basic Materials industry. 
Furthermore, Healthcare firms provide the lowest level of KPI reporting quantity, but 
Oil & Gas and Technology firms provide the lowest level of total KPI reporting quality.   
Nevertheless, that is not enough to provide evidence of the relationship between 
quantity and quality of KPI reporting in this early stage of analysis. Thus, these initial 
findings represent a good motive to conduct further analyses. These analyses could 
provide empirical evidence on whether the quantity and the quality of KPIs might be 
used interchangeably.  
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Chapter 3 - The determinants of KPI reporting in the UK 
3.1 Overview 
As mentioned earlier, the UK Company Act (CA) of 2006, in accordance with the 
European Union (EU) Accounts Modernisation Directive (2003), requires all 
companies – with the exception of small ones - to publish key performance indicators 
(KPIs). However, these regulations allow company directors to report on KPIs which 
can be considered as necessary and appropriate when it comes to analysing their 
companies’ performance. Thus, it can be argued that the KPI reporting extent would be 
derived from directors’ motivation to voluntarily disclose more information on KPIs. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide answers to research questions Q2 and Q4. It 
explores which factors affect the level of quantity and quality of KPI reporting in the 
UK (Q2). It also links the findings to question the validity of using quantity of 
disclosure as a proxy for its quality in accounting studies (Q4). The study provides 
evidence on the CG mechanisms that influence the quantity and quality of KPI 
reporting. In particular, it contributes to the existing but limited studies on the 
association between directors’ compensation and corporate disclosure. Moreover, this 
study shows that that the quantity and the quality of KPI disclosure are not identically 
derived from the same factors. 
 The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: section 3.2 provides a theoretical 
basis for explaining the managerial incentives to control corporate disclosure, and 
identifies factors affecting this disclosure. Section 3.3 presents the potential 
determinants of KPI reporting according to the previous literature. Section 3.4 develops 
the hypotheses of the study. Section 3.5 illustrates the data, provides the descriptive 
results, and introduces the regression models. Section 3.6 contains the main analysis; it 
includes the basic procedures to ensure a high degree of confidence in the results. In 
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addition, it reports the empirical findings with regard to the determinants with regard to 
reporting on KPIs sub-categories. Section 3.7 provides a discussion of the empirical 
results. Section 3.8 includes further analyses that consider KPIs reported outside the 
KPI section to show their effect on the main findings. Finally, a conclusion of the 
current study is provided in section 3.8.  
3.2 Theories that explain KPI reporting 
Generally, the literature presents many theories in order to explain the variation 
between entities in terms of their level of disclosure.15 Various theories have been 
developed to explain managers’ incentives for disclosure. However, there is no general 
or comprehensive disclosure theory that can be applied (Verrecchia, 2001). Apparently, 
each theory explains different aspects of corporate disclosure, or it looks at this 
phenomenon from different perspectives (Al-Htaybat, 2005). Therefore, it was argued 
that several theories could be used in an integrated framework to provide an 
explanation for managerial incentives which affect corporate disclosure (Al-Htaybat, 
2005). The objective of this section is to present the main theories that provide a 
fundamental background with regard to the determinants of voluntary disclosure. These 
theories include: agency theory, signalling theory, capital need theory, political cost 
theory, stakeholder theory, and information costs theory. 
3.2.1 Agency theory 
Agency theory is widely used to explain managers’ incentives for providing voluntary 
disclosure. Jensen and Meckling (1976) pointed to the agency relationship that arises 
from the separation of ownership and control of public companies. Based on this 
situation, a contractual relationship is established between owners (the principals) and 
managers (the agents) in order for the latter to perform some services on the owners’ 
                                                 
15
  See for example: Spence (1973); Jensen and Meckling (1976); Hughes (1986); Watts and Zimmerman 
(1990); Cooke (1992); Healy and Palepu (2001); Al-Htaybat (2005). 
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behalf. According to agency theory, a conflict of interests can exist when the agent 
(managers) acts in his own interest. 
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) identified three types of agency costs which are associated 
with the agency problem. First: monitoring costs that are incurred by giving certain 
incentives to the agent which motivates him to act in the principal’s interests. Second: 
bonding costs which occur when the agent uses additional resources to make sure that 
his actions will not be against the principal’s interests. Third: the residual loss that 
results from the reduction in the principal’s welfare. 16 
On the other hand, another conflict could exist between corporate managers and their 
lenders, as the managers can take actions that transfer wealth from the debt-holders.  
Healy and Palepu (2001) argued that an information asymmetry problem usually exists 
as managers have corporate information which is not available to the various 
stakeholders. Voluntary disclosure is a means used by insiders to reduce information 
asymmetry through disseminating the information they have to outsiders (Lakhal, 
2005). Thus, incentives schemes and contracts are used to encourage managers to 
provide adequate information (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
Consistent with this conjecture, corporate directors voluntarily extend the limit of 
information disclosed to reduce agency problems. Hence, they present information that 
proves that they are acting in the interests of the shareholders and the debt holders. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the provision of KPI information by the management 
(the insider who has this kind of information) to the investors and debt-holders (the 
                                                 
16
 Managers display a tendency towards maximizing their own wealth and, hence, this is more likely to 
lead to a reduction in shareholder value in the long run. For instance, they supplement their salaries with 
many perquisites (Solomon, 2010). Schleifer and Vishny (1997) showed that managers benefit from this 
by building their own empires, enjoying perks, insider trading, inappropriate investments and 
management entrenchment. 
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outsiders who usually do not have this information) would reduce the information 
asymmetry problem. 
 Agency theory provides a framework for explaining disclosure practices on the part of 
different firms. It was claimed that agency theory predicts that agency costs are 
associated with different corporate characteristics such as size, leverage and listing 
status (Watson et al., 2002). Furthermore, corporate governance (CG) mechanisms are 
introduced by shareholders in order to ensure that managers’ actions are aligned with 
shareholder’s interests. As a result, many empirical studies use firm characteristics and 
CG mechanisms as determinants of corporate disclosure; in accordance with agency 
theory assumptions (e.g. Cooke, 1992; Lang and Lundholm, 1993, Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006; Ho and Wong, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ajinkya et al., 2005; 
Tauringana and Mangena, 2009; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2011). 
3.2.2 Signalling theory 
Signalling theory was developed by Akerlof (1970) to explain the impact of the 
interaction of quality differences and uncertainty on the institution of the labour market 
in the U.S. This theory explains the impact on market equilibrium in the event of 
information asymmetry in the market. Despite the fact that this model has been used in 
the employment market where a job seeker signals his/her quality to a prospective 
employer, Spence (1973) argued that this model can be generalised to other settings. 
Basically, signalling theory can be applied in the event of information asymmetry, and 
hence this problem may be reduced when the party who has more information signals it 
to other interested parties (Morris, 1987). Therefore, this theory was used to explain 
managers’ incentives to disclose more information in financial reports (e.g. Hughes, 
1986; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Managers have to disclose adequate information in 
the financial statements in order to convey specific signals to potential users.  
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According to signalling theory, good performance will motivate the managers to 
disclose more information in order to distinguish themselves from others with lower 
quality performance (Morris, 1987). On the other hand, investors do not appreciate 
being surprised by bad news, and financial analysts may choose not to follow stocks of 
firms whose managers have a reputation for withholding bad news (Skinner, 1994). 
Signalling theory can be used to explain managers’ incentives to improve KPI reporting 
in order to convey particular signals to the stakeholders.17 One can expect that they will 
report more good news through KPI disclosures, in order to signal themselves as high 
quality managers in the work market. This is of particular relevance in the present 
study. For instance, it leads to the assumption of a relationship between directors’ 
compensation and KPI reporting. Moreover, directors attempt to send good signals to 
the investors and debt holders. Sending these signals to debt-holders may enable the 
company to avoid any additional restrictive covenants in debt contracts. Therefore, it is 
expected that the intent to obtain finance would affect KPI reporting. For investors, this 
kind of communication is credible, because managers sending fraudulent signals will be 
penalised (Hughes, 1986). On the other hand, managers could send bad news via KPI 
reporting in order to avoid the consequences of having a reputation for withholding bad 
news (Skinner, 1994).  
3.2.3 Capital need theory 
Capital need theory assumes a relationship between corporate disclosure and the 
entrance into the local / international capital market. Corporate managers have to 
respond to the demand for information in order to obtain funds or to raise capital as 
cheaply as possible (Choi, 1973). Cooke (1993) provided another reason which 
supports the capital-need hypothesis. He argued that listed and multiple listed 
                                                 
17
  It is argued that signalling theory would support the disclosure of certain types of ratios (some of them 
are considered as KPIs such as investment, profitability and efficiency ratios) by those companies 
wishing to highlight favourable aspects of their performance (Watson et al., 2002). 
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companies’ aim to achieve overseas countries’ acceptance. Therefore, they may 
increase social responsibility disclosures to show that their business acts in a 
responsible manner. 
A high level of corporate disclosure would result in a clearer understanding of business 
strategies. Thus, managers will be able to mitigate information asymmetry through 
voluntary disclosure (Cooke, 1993; Healy and Palepu, 2001). Accordingly, one can 
argue that managers could use reporting on financial and non-financial KPIs in order to 
provide investors with a complete picture regarding corporate strategy and 
performance. Consequently, this would reduce perceived uncertainties which, in turn, 
could help firms raise capital as cheaply as possible, either from local or international 
markets.  
3.2.4  Political cost theory 
Besso and Kumar (2007) stated that companies direct their reporting towards key 
stakeholders who affect the activity of the company. Political cost theory was driven by 
Watts and Zimmerman’s (1978) research into positive accounting theory to explain the 
determinants of managers’ choices in an accounting practice context. They argued that 
politicians’ decisions could affect corporate wealth through certain restrictions or 
regulations (e.g. tax laws). Hence, if a company is subject to potential wealth transfers, 
its management will be motivated to adopt several accounting procedures in order to 
reduce the reported earnings (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978).  
Disclosure studies usually use this theory to investigate the influence of corporate size 
and profitability (e.g. Wong, 1988). Large or highly profitable companies attract 
political scrutiny, and therefore their managers are motivated to reduce the political cost 
by extending the extent of voluntary disclosure (Al-Htaybat, 2005). Similarly, Gazali 
(2004) claimed that the industry variable could be associated with political cost levels. 
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For instance, oil and gas companies have more incentives than others to disclose more 
information to avoid future regulatory costs.  
In this context, KPI reporting could be used as a tool to avoid political costs, especially 
for companies in the public eye. For instance, managers will be motivated to provide 
more KPIs related to corporate social responsibility in order to alleviate political 
pressure. 
Moreover, it is most likely that big and / or highly profitable companies would stay 
away from political costs through presenting more KPIs. Those KPIs would focus on 
other aspects of its performance rather than concentrating only on earnings’ figures. 
3.2.5  Stakeholder theory 
Clarkson (1995, p. 106) defines stakeholders as ‘Persons or groups that have, or claim, 
ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation and its activities, past, present, or 
future. Such claimed rights or interests are the result of transactions with, or actions 
taken by, the corporation, and may be legal or moral, individual or collective.’ 
The idea behind stakeholder theory is that the organisation is a part of a broader social 
system, and it affects and is impacted on by other groups within society (Deegan et al., 
2002). All stakeholders have the right to be informed about the organisation’s influence 
on them, even if they choose not to use the information, and even if they have no direct 
impact on the organisation’s survival (Deegan and Unerman, 2006). Therefore, 
managers should take into consideration the need to report to other groups who have a 
stake in the company (e.g. creditors, employees, customers, suppliers, government 
authorities).  
Taking into consideration the conflict of interest between stakeholders, organizations 
tend to develop and improve their financial reporting. It is important for them to have 
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stakeholder dialogue in order to build and manage effective stakeholder relationships 
(Boesso and Kumar, 2009). However, the organisation most often gives the priority to 
the demands of stakeholder(s) that are considered to be powerful (Deegan and 
Unerman, 2006).18  
Successful managers have to arrive at a balance when satisfying the needs of different 
powerful stakeholders (Deegan and Unerman, 2006). Corporate reporting could 
highlight corporate social responsibility activities to avoid accountability concerns. In 
addition, voluntary disclosure could be employed to satisfy stakeholders’ expectations 
about corporate performance with regard to financial, social, and environmental 
aspects. 
Ulmann (1985) argued that firms use social disclosures in order to manage its 
relationships with their stakeholders. He suggested that social disclosure is a function of 
three dimensions: stakeholders’ power, strategic posture and economic performance. 
These dimensions are found to be related to both social disclosure levels (Robert, 1992) 
and environmental disclosures (Chan and Kent, 2003). 
Given that non-financial KPI reporting covers social and environmental perspectives of 
corporate performance, managers are expected to increase the quantity and quality of 
KPI disclosures to manage and achieve better communications with various 
stakeholders. In line with stakeholder theory, it is expected that some firm’s 
characteristics could affect KPI reporting. For instance, highly leveraged firms would 
provide more financial KPIs to meet the demands of debt-holders. On the other hand, 
firms with a concentrated ownership will not be motivated to disclose more KPIs in 
general or non-financial KPIs in particular.  
                                                 
18
 It was argued that whenever stakeholders have a conflict of interests, corporations will prefer to 
provide information to those stakeholders deemed to be more critical for their survival (Neu et al., 1998). 
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3.2.6 Information costs theory 
Managers’ decisions to provide voluntary information will be based on cost-benefit 
analysis. It was argued that corporate disclosure will be made as long as its benefits 
exceed its costs (e.g. collection, supervision, legal fees and auditing costs) (Cooke, 
1992; Heitzman et al., 2010). However, it is not obvious if all benefits and costs - either 
neutrally or by weighting - are taken into account when it comes to determining 
disclosure levels (Beattie and Smith, 2012).  
In general, financial disclosure costs can be classified into direct and indirect costs 
(Foster, 1986 cited by Al-Htaybat, 2005): 
- Direct costs include costs related to collecting, preparing, processing and 
auditing financial information. 
- Indirect costs include competitive disadvantage costs arising from the use of 
disclosed information by competitors, litigation costs when users claim for 
using incorrect financial information, and political costs like taxes required by 
the government. 
Accordingly, additional KPI disclosures will be provided after considering its costs and 
benefits. However, there is no study that discusses the benefits of KPI reporting. 
Regarding costs, performance indicators are used to assess changes in performance, and 
hence most KPI information is already available without any incremental costs. 
Additionally, UK companies can avoid competitive disadvantage costs by considering 
disclosure of some KPIs that are seriously harmful to company’s interests.    
3.2.7   Summary of relevant theories 
In summary, section 3.2 reviews the relevant theories which explain managers’ 
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incentives to voluntarily provide a wide range of information. Managers may have 
many motives to control disclosure levels, and thus variations between companies with 
regard to disclosure level will exist. Each theory looks at the disclosure phenomenon 
from a different perspective. In this context, Gray et al. (1995) stated that different 
theoretical perspectives need to be seen as sources of explanation of different factors, at 
different levels of resolution, not as competitors for explanation. In line with this 
conclusion, Beattie and Smith (2012) documented that adopting more than economic 
and managerial theories will enable us to explain manager’s incentives to voluntarily 
disclose information. This range of theories helps us to focus on different aspects of 
corporate behaviour. 
KPI reporting incorporates financial and non-financial information which cover 
operating, social, and environmental issues. Previous research has found that, in such a 
setting, the incentives behind each type of disclosure and its importance would vary 
between disclosure topics or within its content (Kothari et al., 2009; Beattie and Smith, 
2012). Therefore, it will not be appropriate to use a specific theory, on its own, as a 
logical base for KPI reporting in practice. Incentive theories for KPI reporting could 
include agency theory, signalling theory, in addition to capital need theory. For 
instance, in accordance with agency theory, managers will be motivated to present 
particular performance indicators that prove that they are acting in the interests of the 
shareholders. On the other hand, one can argue that this is driven by their need to signal 
themselves as high quality managers (signalling theory). In this regard, Morris (1987) 
argued that there is a consistency between both agency theory and signalling theory. He 
suggested that a combination of them would provide a better prediction of accounting 
choices. The same approach was also adopted by Watson et al. (2002) to get greater 
insight into managers’ motives to voluntarily disclose accounting ratios in the UK. 
Hence, it is proposed that we consider agency theory and signalling theory as being 
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complementary. Additionally it will be acceptable to explain KPI reporting in terms of 
managers’ response to investors’ demand for information, which would be helpful with 
regard to raising capital at the lowest possible cost (capital need and stakeholder 
theories). Arguably, this approach will be relevant as there is a variety of variables that 
are suggested in the literature as explanatory factors for corporate disclosure. These 
variables that represent determinants of disclosure can be explained by more than one 
theory to obtain greater insights into the motivations for controlling the quantity and 
quality of KPI disclosures.  
3.3 Previous literature 
This section highlights the findings of previous researchers who have examined the 
determinants of corporate disclosure in general, and KPI reporting in particular. As 
mentioned before, KPI reporting is more likely to be voluntary in nature. Previous 
research provides evidence of the relationship between corporate disclosure and firm 
characteristics which have been used as proxies for a variety of theories discussed in 
the previous section (e.g. Cooke, 1989; Wallace et al., 1994; Ahmed and Courtis, 
1999). In addition, many studies have investigated the impact of corporate governance 
(CG) attributes on corporate voluntary disclosure (CVD) as a whole (e.g. Ho and 
Wong, 2001; Wang et al., 2008). Furthermore, CG effect on CVD subcategories has 
been examined in the previous literature, such as forward-looking information (e.g. 
Wang and Hussainey, 2013; Hussainey and Al-Najjar 2011), online reporting (e.g. 
Abdelsalam and Street, 2007; Aly et al., 2010), and intellectual capital disclosure (e.g. 
Li et al., 2008).  
In particular, there have been a limited number of studies that have investigated the 
determinants of KPI disclosure in annual reports. Boesso and Kumar (2007) examined 
the factors driving voluntary disclosure practices. They employed content analysis to 
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measure the quantity and quality of KPIs provided in the Management Discussion & 
Analysis (MD&A) sections of the annual reports of 72 US and Italian companies during 
2002. A list of 42 KPIs was determined with regard to their importance to stakeholder’s 
communication needs. The quantity score was calculated based on the number of 
sentences which contained any information concerning these KPIs. The quality score 
was derived by giving a higher weight to KPI sentences which included quantitative, 
non-financial and forward-looking information about KPIs. This study found that size, 
and to some extent the industry concerned, have an impact on the quantity and quality 
of KPI disclosures. Business complexity, instability and volatility were found to have 
an influence on KPI reporting quantity rather than on its quality. However, the study 
found that KPI reporting is not derived from CG or from intangibles. This study is a 
good attempt to consider both quantity and quality of KPI reporting in the US and Italy. 
However, the study suffers from several limitations. It is based on a small number of 
observations across two different countries in one year. Moreover, the quality index 
does not consider other qualitative characteristics of KPI information (e.g. the ability to 
understand its content and to compare results across years). Furthermore, the study does 
not control for many factors affecting CVD (e.g. CG mechanisms19 and ownership 
structure). 
Giunta et al. (2008) examined the quantity and quality of financial KPI reporting in the 
period 2004-2006 on the part of 49 medium sized Italian companies. They employed 
content analysis to capture the number of indicators published by each firm within the 
period, and then they classified these KPIs in terms of their role in assessing the 
development, profitability, and solvency of the firm. They measured KPI quality based 
on the presence/absence of 10 qualitative aspects. These aspects were then grouped in 
accordance with the four general dimensions presented by IASB (2005), which are 
                                                 
19
 The study only used the percentage of independent directors in the board as a proxy for CG structure in 
the company. 
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relevance, understandability, reliability, and comparability. The quality scores were 
derived by calculating the mean among the four dimensions. Their results showed the 
low quantity and quality of financial KPI reporting. These results support the call for 
regulating narrative disclosure in MC in general, and KPI reporting specifically. 
Nonetheless, the main limitation of this paper is its reliance on a relatively small sample 
comprising medium sized companies in an Italian setting. It also focused on only one 
type of KPI (financial KPIs).   
Tauringana and Mangena (2009) examined the extent of KPI reporting and the factors 
affecting its level before and after the introduction of a business review. The results 
suggested that the introduction of the business review had a significant impact upon 
KPI reporting in the media sector. Additionally, the study showed that proportion of 
Non-Executive Directors (NED), company size, profitability and gearing are associated 
with the extent of KPI reporting in those companies. Although this study is the first to 
explore the determinants of KPI reporting in UK, its results could not be generalised 
because of its focus on media companies with only 32 companies as a sample. 
Furthermore, the study neither analysed the quality of KPIs disclosed, nor examined its 
determinants in this sector.  
The UK Government seeks to improve communication between companies and the 
users of information. Despite the variety of information provided within KPI 
disclosures, previous studies have not provided empirical evidence showing what drives 
UK companies to control the amount of KPI disclosed and its reporting quality. The 
present study addresses this gap left by disclosure studies. Arguably, the study can help 
to improve the dialogue between companies and shareholders, taking into consideration 
the actual KPI reporting practices in the UK.  
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3.4 Research hypotheses  
Exploring the determinants of KPI reporting quantity apart from its quality is the main 
objective of the analyses in this study. Hence, it would provide answers to research 
question (Q2). In addition, it helps to examine whether the quantity and quality of KPI 
disclosure are derived from the same determinants. Hence, it would provide answers to 
research question (Q4).  
In fact, CG mechanisms are introduced - based on the agency theory framework - to 
mitigate managers’ opportunistic behaviours and reduce information asymmetry. CG 
mechanisms should facilitate corporate monitoring as they lead to an improvement in 
companies’ internal control, and consequently extend disclosure levels (Leftwich et al., 
1981; Welker, 1995; Ho and Wong, 2001). Accordingly, it could be predicted that CG 
mechanisms could improve KPI reporting.  
 Thus, this study takes into consideration most of the CG mechanisms as potential 
determinants of KPI reporting. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) indicated that corporate governance involves a set of 
relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders. It provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are 
set, and the means by which attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined (OECD, 2004).  Ensuring timely and accurate disclosure regarding the 
financial situation, performance, ownership and governance of the company is 
considered as one of the main principles of corporate governance (OECD, 2004). 
Schleifer and Vishny (1997) stated that providing a degree of confidence to the 
suppliers of finance is the aim of CG. However, CG involves not only this objective but 
also has effects on other stakeholders. The Cadbury Report (1992) in the UK refers to 
the wider interests of corporate governance that intend to achieve a balance between 
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economic and social goals, and between individual and communal goals. The presence 
of an effective CG system for each individual company across an economy helps to use 
resources more efficiently, and therefore maintain sustainable economic growth for the 
economy (OECD, 2004).  
It is noted that most of the previous research has focused on CG mechanisms that are 
related to the monitoring role of corporate board of directors. Hence, it has tested the 
influence of the board and its sub-committee characteristics on the amount of 
information disclosed.  For instance, several studies examined the impact of board size, 
board independence, members’ experience, role duality, board activity, board 
committees, audit committee size, the experience of audit committee members, and 
audit committee meetings (e.g. Forker, 1992; Ho and Wong, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Ajinkya et al., 2005; Tauringana and Mangena, 2009; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 
2011). Additionally, the impact of ownership structure has been examined to 
understand managers’ incentives to extend corporate disclosure (e.g. Lakhal, 2005; 
Wang and Hussainey, 2013).  
The present study builds on the previous literature in order to develop and form the 
hypotheses of the present study. After controlling for firm characteristics effects, the 
current study suggests CG mechanisms as the main drivers for both quantity and quality 
of KPI reporting. In order to obtain more insight into managers’ incentives to control 
disclosures, this study examines the impact of directors’ compensation, and their plans 
to get finance from different sources on KPI quantity and quality.  
In particular, the proposed KPI reporting determinants include - in addition to firm 
characteristics - directors’ compensation, board size, board composition, board 
meetings, role duality, audit committee size (AC) size, AC meetings, managerial 
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ownership, major shareholding, and the issuance of shares, bonds and loans. 
To facilitate forming and testing the hypotheses, these determinants can be classified 
into the following categories: 3.4.1 Directors’ compensation, 3.4.2 Board 
characteristics, 3.4.3 Audit committee characteristics, 3.4.4 Ownership structure, 3.4.5 
Capital need variables, and 3.4.6 Firm characteristics variables as controls.20  
3.4.1 Directors’ compensation 
Directors’ compensation and their interests in company shares may be sufficient 
incentives for controlling KPI reporting. Because of the separation of ownership and 
control, there is a need to monitor managers’ actions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Directors’ compensation works as an efficient corporate governance mechanism. This 
mechanism aims to align the directors’ and the shareholders’ interests. Previous studies 
find that directors’ remuneration plans have an impact on CVD (Aboody and Kasznic, 
2000; Nagar et al., 2003; Grey et al., 2012). For instance, Aboody and Kasznic (2000) 
found that top executives take opportunistic disclosure decisions in order to affect their 
stock option compensation. Thus, they tend to disseminate bad news and delay good 
news around stock option award times. However, previous research did not examine 
how the extent and quality of CVD are affected by the average compensation for both 
categories of directors. Consistent with agency theory, firms with higher directors’ 
compensation can mitigate the agency problem. As directors of these companies would 
                                                 
20
 The main objective of the regulatory bodies - according to their theoretical frameworks - is to maintain 
the high quality of information disclosed. Hence, previous studies originally aimed at studying the 
determinants and consequences of corporate disclosure relying on the differences between firms in 
disclosure quality. However, these studies used disclosure quantity to measure disclosure quality. 
Therefore, one can argue that these theories and principles - followed in the previous literature - can 
serve to study the quantity as well as the quality of KPI reporting. Furthermore, the relatively high 
correlation which is found between both KPI reporting quantity proxies and KPI reporting quality 
proxies in Table 17 in the previous study (ρ = 0.76), is another  motivation to test whether or not they are 
substitutes. Consequently, the same hypotheses are developed for KPI reporting quantity and quality 
either in examining their determinants or their impact on firm value. Arguably, testing these shared 
hypotheses empirically in each study would indicate whether quantity and quality of KPI reporting have 
identical\different drivers\impacts. Hence, this would help us to find whether or not the quantity of KPI 
reporting could work as a proxy for its quality.   
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tend to disclose their private information, a lower degree of information asymmetry 
between directors and shareholders might be expected. Hence, this may improve the 
quantity and quality of KPI reporting.  
In line with this argument, signalling theory provides another explanation with regard 
to compensation influence on corporate disclosure. This is because executive and non-
executive directors have incentives to improve KPI reporting in order to show their 
impact on company’s performance and hence retain their high levels of compensation. 
Their objective may also be to signal themselves as high quality managers in the 
employment market. Therefore, these two hypotheses are formulated: 
H1. A positive association exists between executive compensation and KPI reporting 
quantity\quality. 
H2. A positive association exists between non-executive compensation and KPI 
reporting quantity\ quality. 
3.4.2 Board characteristics  
This group of variables is concerning with the board characteristics that may enhance\ 
alleviate the monitoring role of the board. These variables include: board size, board 
composition, board meetings, and role duality. 
3.4.2.1 Board size 
The board of directors represents the total number of executive and non-executive 
directors on the board. It plays an important role in the corporate governance of 
publicly listed companies. Healy and Palepu (2001) stated that electing a board of 
directors that acts on behalf of investors, is an efficient mechanism that affects 
mangers’ voluntary disclosure decisions and controls the agency problem. However, it 
was claimed that UK boards have a much weaker monitoring role as a result of soft CG 
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regulations in the UK, which allow firms to choose the board size that is most 
appropriate for their own needs (Guest, 2008). Wang and Hussainey (2013) claimed 
that larger boards’ effectiveness is negatively affected by the presence of problems 
regarding communication and coordination. 
In turn, some studies have indicated that larger boards incorporate a variety of expertise 
which results in greater effectiveness in terms of the boards’ monitoring role (e.g. Singh 
et al., 2004, Abdel Fattah, 2007). One can argue that directors serving on larger boards 
would have more incentive to signal their role in performance improvement to various 
parties. It was argued that talented managers are motivated by their desire to signal 
themselves to make voluntary disclosures (Graham et al., 2005). Furthermore, it was 
reported that this incentive is more important for managers of smaller and high growth 
firms (Graham et al., 2005). Thus, based on signalling theory, a positive association 
between board size and KPI reporting could be expected.  
Some previous studies found a positive association between board size and voluntary 
disclosure (e.g. Laksamana, 2008; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2011). Others found there 
to be no significant impact in terms of board size on corporate disclosure (e.g. Lakhal, 
2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006).  
 Based on these mixed results, the fourth hypothesis is formulated as: 
H3. A significant relationship exists between KPI reporting quantity\ quality and board 
size. 
3.4.2.2 Board composition  
Board composition refers to the proportion of non-executive directors (NEDs) on the 
board. Non-executive directors are expected to provide independent advice to executive 
directors. Boards with a higher proportion of non-executive directors are expected to be 
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more effective in performing a monitoring role, and thereby having a positive effect on 
accounting reporting quality, as they may aim to signal their competence to potential 
employers (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
 Previous studies which have examined the relationship between board composition and 
disclosure have provided mixed findings. Some studies found no statistically significant 
association between them (e.g. Ho and Wong, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Mangena and Pike, 2005; Lakhal, 2005). However, Tauringana and Mangena (2009) 
found that the proportion of NEDs is associated negatively with KPI reporting. On the 
other hand, a positive relationship has been reported between the proportion of NEDs 
and the level of corporate disclosure in many studies (e.g. Forker, 1992; Cheng and 
Courtenay, 2006, Abraham and Cox, 2007; Li et al., 2008; Laksamana, 2008; Wang 
and Hussainey, 2013). Following these studies, a stronger monitoring role would be 
expected from boards with a higher proportion of non-executive directors. Hence, a 
positive relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors on the board 
and KPI reporting will be hypothesised: 
H4. There is a positive relationship between board composition and KPI reporting 
quantity\ quality.  
3.4.2.3 Board meetings 
Frequent board meetings are important as a CG mechanism, because they enable the 
directors to control the company effectively. Thus, it can be argued that active boards – 
those with more frequent meetings - are more likely to monitor financial reporting. On 
the other hand, a positive association between board meetings and KPI reporting is 
expected in accordance with signalling theory. Active boards’ members will tend to 
signal their performance to potential employers. There is limited literature on the 
association between frequent board meetings and corporate disclosure in the UK. 
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Laksamana (2008) reported a positive association between board meetings and the 
transparency of compensation disclosure. In turn, Nelson et al. (2010) found no 
association between board meetings and the amount of executive stock options made by 
Australian companies.  
The current study aims to provide evidence with regard to the influence of effective boards 
using data from UK firms. The following hypothesis is formulated: 
H5. A significant association exists between board meetings and KPI reporting 
quantity\ quality.  
3.4.2.4  Role duality 
 Role duality occurs if the chief executive officer (CEO) holds the chairman position at 
the same time. According to agency theory, effective control over management 
performance will only exist if the two roles are separated (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Concentration of decision-making power resulting from role 
duality could result in opportunistic behaviour on the part of the CEO (Wang and 
Hussainey, 2013). Moreover, this may impair the board's governance role regarding 
disclosure policies (Li et al., 2008).  
It is important to investigate the impact of role duality on KPI reporting because the 
results of previous studies that examined the relationship between role duality and 
corporate disclosure are mixed. For instance, some studies found an insignificant 
influence in terms of duality on CVD (e.g. Ho and Wong, 2001; Cheng and Courtenay, 
2006; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). Other studies reported a significant and negative 
relationship between role duality and CVD (Forker, 1992; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Abdelsalam and Street, 2007; Wang and Hussainey, 2013). Thus, the following 
hypothesis is formulated: 
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H6. A significant association exists between role duality and KPI reporting quantity\ 
quality. 
3.4.3  Audit committee characteristics 
This group of variables is concerning with audit committee characteristics that improve 
financial reporting monitoring. These variables include: audit committee (AC) size, AC 
meetings.  
3.4.3.1  AC size     
The UK is the first country within the EU to show that the majority of its listed 
companies are keen to form ACs (Collier and Gregory, 1999). The Cadbury Committee 
(1992) in the UK stated that an audit committee adds assurance to shareholders that 
external auditors are serving as guards of their interests. The Smith Report (2003), 
states that the AC should monitor the integrity of the financial statements and review 
the company’s internal financial control system, as well as its risk management 
systems. Moreover, the Corporate Governance Combined Code (2010) in the UK 
recommends that the audit committee should involve at least three, or in the case of 
smaller companies, two independent non-executive directors. The AC monitoring role 
is not only about the financial reporting process, but also extends to the reporting of 
non-financial information (Li et al., 2012). Mangena and Pike (2005) suggested that 
larger audit committees lead to more effective monitoring, since they are more likely to 
have the essential expertise and views to be able to do that. However, mixed results 
have been obtained from previous studies. Mangena and Pike (2005) and Tauringana 
and Mangena (2009) found no statistically significant relationship between the level of 
disclosure and AC size. Felo et al. (2003) and Li et al. (2012) reported a positive 
relationship between AC size and the quality of financial reporting. The present study 
will empirically explore the relationship between AC size and the quantity and quality 
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of KPI reporting. The following hypothesis is formulated: 
H7. A significant relationship exists between AC size and KPI reporting quantity\ 
quality. 
3.4.3.2  AC meetings 
An active AC with a high frequency of meetings will have enough time to discharge its 
duties. The FRC (2012) recommends that should be no fewer than three AC meetings 
during the year. There are a few studies that have investigated the impact of active ACs. 
Collier and Gregory (1999) found that UK ACs are effective in their role of overseeing 
the external audit and ensuring audit quality. However, their study did not provide 
strong evidence that UK ACs are effective in strengthening firms’ internal controls.  
Abbott et al. (2004) documented that the activity of the AC has a significant and 
negative relationship with the occurrence of the restatement of the annual report. Other 
studies have provided evidence on a positive relationship between AC meetings and 
subcategories of financial reporting such as internet reporting (e.g. Kelton and Yang, 
2008; Li et al., 2012). The present study extends the empirical evidence on the 
association between active ACs and the information disclosed by examining the 
relationship between AC meetings and KPI reporting. 
Thus, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H8. There is a significant relationship between AC meetings and KPI reporting 
quantity\ quality.  
3.4.4 Ownership structure  
Arguably, concentration of ownership affects disclosure levels. This group of variables 
include: managerial ownership and major shareholding.  
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3.4.4.1 Managerial ownership 
According to agency theory, firms with a higher level of managerial ownership would 
align the interests of managers and shareholders, and hence may have lower agency 
costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Hence, a positive association is expected between 
managerial ownership and CVD. However, the findings of previous research into this 
relationship are mixed. Several studies showed a positive monitoring influence of 
managerial ownership and hence a positive relationship impact upon corporate 
disclosure (e.g. Chau and Gray, 2002; Jaing and Habib, 2009). In contrast, Eng and 
Mak (2003) reported a negative relationship between managerial ownership and the 
quality of corporate disclosures. Wang and Hussainey (2013) argued that managers can 
maximize their private benefits by reducing the level of voluntary disclosure based on 
management entrenchment theory. On the other hand, Forker (1992) found that the 
association between managerial ownership and the quality of share option disclosure is 
not statistically significant.  
Based upon agency and stakeholder theories, it is anticipated that managers with a high 
interest in the company’s shares will be motivated to extend the level of quantity and 
quality of KPI disclosed. This behaviour would be explained by the manager’s aim to 
reduce the agency problem (agency theory) and to meet other stakeholders’ needs for 
information (stakeholder theory). Thus, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H9. There is a significant relationship between managerial ownership and KPI 
reporting quantity\ quality.  
3.4.4.2 Major Shareholding 
The presence of block holders reduces agency costs as it affects the monitoring of 
management’s performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A positive association 
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between block holder’s ownership and voluntary disclosure is expected according to 
agency theory, as managers need to reduce information asymmetry. El-Gazzar (1998) 
argued that a high concentration of institutional ownership in a company motivates the 
managers to publish more voluntary disclosures in order to maintain confidence in the 
company. On the other hand, there is the counterargument that companies with a 
concentrated ownership structure do not have to disseminate more information, because 
the main shareholders can easily obtain it. They usually have access to such 
information perhaps through meetings with company management (Holland, 1998).  
 In fact, the evidence is mixed on the relationship between institutional ownership and 
disclosure in previous studies. While, Eng and Mak (2003) and Wang and Hussainey 
(2013) found no significant relationship between institutional investors and voluntary 
disclosure, some studies have provided evidence of a negative association between 
institutional ownership concentration and disclosure levels in interim reports 
(Schadewitz and Blevins, 1998). Other studies (e.g. Mangena and Pike, 2005; Lakhal, 
2005) reported a positive association between the two variables. Accordingly, the 
current study is motivated by these mixed results to examine the association between 
KPI disclosure and institutional investors. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
formulated: 
H10. There is a significant relationship between major shareholding and KPI reporting 
quantity\ quality. 
3.4.5 Capital need variables 
Capital need theory assumes a relationship between corporate disclosure and the need 
to get funds or to raise capital as cheaply as possible (Choi, 1973). Thus, a plan to raise 
capital may represent a good incentive for controlling the quantity and quality of KPIs 
reported in the annual report. Corporate managers who look for funds could use one or 
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more of the following resources: the issuance of shares, bonds, or raising loans. 
Theoretically, the information asymmetry problem could exist between company 
managers and outsider investors who do not have access to internal information about 
the company. Therefore, managers should disclose more information in order to obtain 
access to more and different resources. High levels of corporate disclosure may result 
in a better understanding of the company’s strategies. Thus, managers would be keen to 
mitigate information asymmetry through voluntary disclosure (Cooke, 1993; Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). Consequently, this will reduce perceived uncertainties and encourage 
investors to accept a lower rate of return (Choi, 1973). In line with this argument, 
Dhaliwal et al. (2011) found that firms that report non-financial social responsibility 
information are more likely to be able to raise larger amounts of equity capital in the 
two years following the reporting, compared with non-reporting firms. 
From a signalling perspective, managers seeking finance may wish to send good signals 
to the investors and debt holders. For investors, such communication is credible 
because managers making fraudulent signals will be penalised (Hughes, 1986). On the 
other hand, sending good signals to debtors may enable the company to avoid any 
additional restrictive covenants in debt contracts. On the other hand, managers could 
issue bad news via KPI reporting so as to avoid the consequences of having a reputation 
of withholding bad news (Skinner, 1994).     
 In general, it is expected that directors’ plans to obtain finance would affect KPI 
reporting.  Managers could use reporting on financial and non-financial KPIs in order 
to provide investors with a complete picture regarding corporate strategy and 
performance. That would help to raise capital as cheaply as possible, either from local 
or international markets.  
Moreover, the study extends the literature by examining whether or not managers’ 
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plans to access a different source of funds would have a different influence on KPI 
reporting quantity and quality. Thus, the following hypotheses are formulated: 
H11. There is a significant relationship between issuance of equity and KPI reporting 
quantity\ quality. 
H12. There is a significant relationship between issuance of bonds and KPI reporting 
quantity\ quality. 
H13. There is a significant relationship between acquiring loans and KPI reporting 
quantity\ quality. 
Table 18 summarises the expected signs between KPI reporting quantity \ quality and 
the various explanatory factors to be used in this study, based on the findings of the 
previous literature. 
 
3.4.6 Firm characteristics as control variables 
It is worth noting that the study has to control for firm characteristics that have been 
suggested in previous research as determinants of corporate disclosure (e.g. Cooke, 
1989; Malone et al., 1993; Wallace et al., 1994; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Watson et 
al., 2002, Mangena and Pike, 2005; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2011). Control variables 
include: firm size, profitability, liquidity, leverage, dividend yield, cross listing and 
industry.  
Firm size is the most common variable that is used in exploring corporate disclosure 
determinants. Large firms have more incentives to increase their voluntary disclosure 
levels. The size effect can be explained by agency theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1983, Inchausti, 1997), signalling theory (Wang and Hussainey, 2013), and political 
cost theory. In general, the majority of previous disclosure studies have found a positive 
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relationship between a firm’s size and its level of disclosure (e.g. Hossain et al., 1995; 
Mangena and Pike, 2005).  
Ahmed and Courtis (1999) showed that previous study results have provided mixed 
evidence on the association between a firm’s profitability and the level of corporate 
disclosure. According to signalling theory, a positive association between disclosure 
and profitability is expected. Managers of highly profitable companies tend to signal 
their quality to interested parties. Hence, they also could get better rewards and 
compensation arrangements (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Wallace et al., 1994). Moreover, 
to avoid external regulations, high profit firms will be motivated to provide more KPIs 
that are related to corporate social responsibility. 
There are a few studies that have provided mixed findings regarding the relationship 
between liquidity and corporate disclosure. The relationship between liquidity and 
reporting practices can be explained by agency theory and signalling theory. However, 
Watson et al. (2002) claimed that these theories provide mixed predictions in terms of 
this relationship. Companies with weak liquidity may increase their disclosure in order 
to reduce agency costs and reassure shareholders (Wallace et al., 1994). On the other 
hand, according to signalling theory, company managers will have an incentive to 
disclose more information if their liquidity is high, to showcase their skills in managing 
liquidity risks compared with other managers in companies with lower liquidity ratios. 
Furthermore, many empirical studies have denoted leverage (gearing) to be an 
important factor that may affect disclosure practices (e.g. Ho and Wong, 2001; Oyelere 
et al., 2003; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2011). Based on 
agency theory, monitoring costs are higher in highly leveraged firms. To reduce these 
costs, they have to disclose more information in order to show their ability to meet any 
obligations for the sake of creditors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, empirical 
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evidence on the association between gearing and disclosure is not conclusive.  
Additionally, several empirical studies have considered dividend propensity as one of 
the key determinants of corporate disclosure (e.g. Archambault and Archambault, 2003; 
Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2011; Wang and Hussainey, 2013). Signalling theory can be 
used to explain the impact of dividend propensity on corporate disclosure in the annual 
report. Companies with a high tendency to pay more dividends may have fewer 
incentives to disclose more information (Naser et al., 2006).  
Previous literature has suggested that listing in foreign stock exchanges has a positive 
association with corporate disclosure levels (Wallace et al., 1994; Gray et al., 1995; 
Mangena and Pike, 2005; Aly et al., 2010). Cross listing, or listing in a foreign market, 
gives firms many chances to have access to several alternative sources of finance.  The 
impact of cross listing can be explained by capital need theory. Participation in 
international capital markets offers the opportunity to increase the liquidity of a firm’s 
shares (Hope, 2003). Firms with a foreign listing have an incentive to make additional 
disclosures to reduce investors’ uncertainty about the performance of the firm (Gray et 
al., 1995). 
Finally, previous disclosure studies have investigated the relationship between the level 
of corporate disclosure and sector type (e.g. Cooke, 1989; Wallace et al., 1994). The 
relationship between type of business and reporting practices can be explained by 
signalling theory and political cost theory. Signalling theory suggests that the more 
homogeneous the industry, the more likely it is that firms will adopt similar reporting 
practices (Malone et al., 1993; Wallace et al., 1994; Aly et al., 2010). If a company 
within an industry fails to follow the same disclosure practices as others in the same 
industry, then it may be interpreted as a signal that it is hiding bad news (Craven and 
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Marston, 1999; Oyelere et al., 2003). 
On the other hand, within the framework of political cost theory, different industries are 
subject to different political costs (Ball and Foster, 1982). Thus, companies with 
vulnerable activities will employ voluntary disclosure to alleviate the political costs 
related to their activities (Oyelere et al., 2003). 
Some studies found an insignificant relationship between the two variables such as 
Wallace et al. (1994). However, the majority of the previous studies found a significant 
relationship between sector type and corporate disclosure (Cooke 1992; Craven and 
Marston, 1999; Mangena and Pike, 2005; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). It is predicted 
that KPI reporting would be affected by the type of businesses. Different industries 
would be influenced by different and unique value creation activities. The findings 
discussed in the previous chapter show that there is a variation between industries in 
terms of the quantity and quality of KPI reporting. For instance, Utilities sector 
companies have disclosed the largest amount of KPI. This might be explained - in line 
with stakeholder theory - by their aim to meet the different needs of their stakeholders 
(e.g. creditors, customers, and suppliers). In turn, Oil & Gas firms have provided the 
lowest level of KPI reporting quality. Apparently, these companies have avoided the 
negative consequences of high quality KPI disclosure. Hence, they control their 
disclosures to alleviate the political costs related to their activities. Therefore, the type 
of industry should be considered when analysing the determinants of KPI disclosure.  
Table 18 summarises the expected signs between KPI reporting and the various control 
variables to be used in this study, based on the findings of the previous literature. 
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Table 18 Explanatory variables and their expected relationship with KPI 
disclosure based on previous studies 
Variables Expected 
sign 
Examples for previous studies 
Directors’ 
compensations 
+ Aboody and Kasznic (2000); Nagar et al. (2003); 
Grey et al.(2012) 
Managerial 
ownership 
+ Forker (1992) ; Chau and Gray (2002); Jaing and 
Habib (2009); Wang and Hussainey( 2013)  
Board size + Singh et al. (2004); Lakhal (2005); Cheng and 
Courtenay (2006); Abdel-Fattah et al. (2007); 
Laksamana (2008); Wang and Hussainey( 2013) 
Board 
composition 
+ Forker (1992); Ho and Wong (2001); Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002); Ajinkya et al. (2005); Tauringana and 
Mangena (2009); Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2011) 
Board meetings + Laksamana (2008)  
Role duality - Forker (1992); Haniffa and Cooke (2002); Ho and 
Wong (2001); Cheng and Courtenay (2006); Ghazali 
and Weetman (2006); Abdelsalam and Street (2007); 
Wang and Hussainey (2013) 
AC size + Felo et al. (2003); Mangena and Pike (2005);  
Tauringana and Mangena  ( 2009); Li et al. (2012) 
AC meetings + Kelton and Yang (2008); Li et al. ( 2012) 
Major 
shareholding 
+ Schadewitz and Blevins (1998); Eng and Mak (2003); 
Mangena and Pike (2005); Lakhal (2005); Wang and 
Hussainey( 2013)  
The issuance of 
shares, bonds 
and loans 
+ Lang and Lundholm (1993); Boubaker et al. (2011); 
Dhaliwal et al. (2011)  
Firm size  + Hossain et al. (1995); Watson et al. (2002); Boesso 
and Kumar (2007); Tauringana and Mangena; (2009); 
Wang and Hussainey (2013). 
Profitability +/- Wallace et al. (1994); Ahmed and Courtis (1999); 
Tauringana and Mangena (2009); Hussainey and Al-
Najjar (2011). 
Leverage +/- Malone et al. (1993); Ahmed and Courtis (1999); 
Tauringana and Mangena, (2009); Hussainey and Al-
Najjar (2011); Boubaker et al. (2011). 
Liquidity +/- Wallace et al. (1994); Watson et al.  (2002); Mangena 
and Pike, (2005); Anis et al. (2012). 
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Cross listing + Cooke (1992); Wallace et al. (1994); Gray et al. 
(1995); Mangena and Pike (2005); Aly et al. (2010); 
Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012).  
Dividends + Naser et al. (2006); Wang, and Hussainey (2012); 
Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2011). 
Industry +/- Cooke (1992); Craven and Marston (1999); Mangena 
and Pike (2005); Beretta and Bozzolan (2004); 
Boesso and Kumar (2007); Boubaker et al. (2011); 
Elzahar and Hussainey (2012). 
 
 
3.5 The data, descriptive statistics, and the models 
To investigate the relationship between KPI reporting and all explanatory variables, 
panel regressions are conducted based upon regression models. This section begins 
with identifying the sample and the variables used in the present study. Descriptive 
statistics for the variables of this study are presented in section 3.5.2. Then, section 
3.5.3 will refer to some econometric concerns before carrying out the analyses. Finally, 
section 3.5.4 introduces the regression models.  
3.5.1 The data 
As mentioned earlier, the present study focuses on the annual reports of a sample of 
FTSE 350 non-financial UK firms over a five year period (2006-2010). The study 
sample is identified as 103 firms with 515 annual reports published between 2006 and 
2010. The reports are collected from the companies’ homepages and the Thomson One 
Banker database. Firms’ financial characteristics are downloaded from Datastream. 
Directors’ compensation data is collected from BoardEx. CG data is manually collected 
from the annual reports. 
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The steps followed in order to identify the sample firms are indicated in the previous 
chapter.21 Subsequently, various observations are excluded for the reasons illustrated in 
Panel (A) in Table 19, to end up with 498 firms as the final sample. Panel (B) in the 
same table provides a disaggregation of the sample across industries. Finally,  
 
Table 20 illustrates the definition and measurement for each variable in the present 
study. 
Table 19 Sample Selection and its disaggregation across industries  
PANEL A – SAMPLE SELECTION PROCESS 
Starting point: Top 350 UK firms based on market capitalisation, according to the 
2011 Financial Times ranking. Financial firms are then excluded. Subsequently, 103 
firms are selected randomly following two criteria: 1) each sector is represented in the 
same proportion as in the starting sample; 2) as firms are arranged according to market 
capitalisation; systematic sampling is used by choosing the first company in every 
sector as a starting point. Then, selection is continued by selecting the third, the fifth 
and so on. Then, selection is continued by selecting the third, the fifth and so on. This 
process results in 515 observations [103 * 5 years (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 
2010)]. Thereafter, the following exclusions take place: 
n observations 
excluded thereafter 
Reason for exclusion 
2 
KPI regulation not applicable in 2006  
(because of year end date) 
4 Missing data on directors’ compensation  
6 Missing CG data  
5 
Missing data on loans, equity, and bonds 
issued bonds the year next to the financial 
statements date. 
  
17 total number of observations excluded 
498 final sample 
PANEL B – SAMPLE CONSTITUENTS BY INDUSTRY  
Industry Frequency Percentage 
Basic Materials 40 8.0 
Consumer Goods 65 13.1 
Consumer Services 107  21.5 
Health Care 24 4.8 
Industrials 143 28.7 
Oil & Gas 54 10.8 
Technology 35 7.0 
Telecommunications 10 2.0 
                                                 
21
 For more details on selecting the sample firms, please see section  2.4. 
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Utilities 20 4.0 
TOTAL 498 100.0 
 
 
 
Table 20  The definition and measurement of the explanatory variables 
Variable Definition  Measurement 
EXCOMP Executive 
compensations 
The natural logarithm of executives 
directors’ compensation average 
NOEXCOMP Non-executive 
compensations 
The natural logarithm of non-
executives directors’ compensation 
average 
BORSIZE Board size The total number of directors on 
board 
BORCOMP Board composition The board composition and is 
calculated as the number of non-
executive directors divided by board 
size 
BORMEET Board meetings The total number of board meetings 
during the year 
ROLEDUAL Role duality A dummy variable equals 1 if the 
chairman is the same person as the 
CEO of the firm,0 otherwise 
ACSIZE Audit committee size The  total number of directors in 
audit committee 
ACMEET Audit committee 
meetings 
The  total number of audit committee 
meetings during the year 
MANGOWN Managerial ownership The percentage of directors’ share 
interests to ordinary shares 
MAJORSHAR Major shareholding The aggregate percentage of shares 
that hold by major shareholders (with 
at least 3% ownership). 
FUT_EQUITY The issuance of equity 
in t+1 
A dummy variable equals 1 if the 
firm has issued equity in the next 
year ,0 otherwise 
FUT_BONDS The issuance of bonds 
in t+1 
A dummy variable equals 1 if the 
firm has issued bonds in the next 
year ,0 otherwise 
FUT_LOANS The issuance of loans 
in t+1  
A dummy variable equals 1 if the 
firm got loans in the next year ,0 
otherwise 
SIZE Firm size The natural logarithm of market 
capitalization (WC08001) 
PROFITAB Profitability The profitability measured by return 
on equity ((WC01651) / 
((WC03501)) 
LIQUDITY Liquidity The ratio of total debt to total capital 
(WC08221) 
LEVERAGE Leverage The current assets (WC02201) / 
current liabilities (WC03101) 
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DIVYIELD Dividend yield Dividends per share / share price  
((WC05376)/(WC08001)) 
CROSSLIST Cross listing A dummy variable equals 1 if the 
firm’s shares are traded on foreign 
financial markets and 0 otherwise. 
Note: The definitions and measurement of the dependent variables are presented in Table 5. 
 
3.5.2   Descriptive statistics  
Table 21 shows the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables of the current 
study. Panel (A) displays the descriptive statistics for the continuous variables. Whereas 
the executive directors’ compensation ranges from £164,960 to £13,000,000, the 
average ranges from £24,060 to £315,480 for non-executive directors. The mean of the 
directors’ share interests in ordinary shares is 0.05. The median number of directors on 
the board is 9 with a minimum of 5 and a maximum of 16. The mean in terms of board 
composition illustrates that non-executive directors make up 62% of the board. This 
indicates that non-executive directors dominate the board structure of the sample firms, 
which can be considered as an indication of board monitoring in these firms. The 
number of board meetings as a proxy of board activity shows that the median number 
of meetings is 8 per year. The audit committee size median is 4 directors. A median of 
4 meetings is recorded for audit committee meetings during the year. That number of 
meetings is greater than three, which is the minimum number of audit committee 
meetings recommended by FRC (2012). Finally, the major shareholders hold a mean of 
38% stake in the firms represented in the sample, with a minimum 4% and a maximum 
of 77%.  
With regard to firm characteristics, the natural logarithm of market capitalisation for the 
sample firms varies from a minimum of 8.00 (£17,000,000) to a maximum of 11.019 
(£130 billion) with standard deviation of 0.688 (£18 billion). This huge variation is 
expected, as the sample firms are drawn from the FTSE 350 which includes the largest 
UK firms. It shows that firm size should be considered as it might have an effect on 
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KPI reporting in practice. However, the large variation may also refer to the existence 
of outliers. These firms’ profitability mean as measured by ROE is 0.08 which refers, in 
general, to the firms’ ability to generate profits from shareholders’ equity. However, the 
value of the ROE ratio should exceed the cost of equity capital, in order to add value to 
shareholders. The liquidity ratio median is 1.64 times, which indicates that firms in the 
sample do not suffer from financial problems in the short run. It shows that firms are 
able to cover their short term liabilities through their current assets. These companies 
are not highly leveraged, with a mean debt to total capital ratio of 0.366. However, the 
minimum of zero and the maximum of 1.42 for the leverage ratio indicate that these 
firms vary to some extent in their reliance on debt to finance their investments. Finally, 
the sample firms have a dividend to share price ratio with a median of 2.4%. As 
companies display good ability to secure current liabilities, it may be implied that these 
firms may prefer to retain profits in order to finance their growth.  
Panel (B) shows the descriptive statistics for the categorical variables; it indicates that 
most of the firms included in the sample (90.16%) are traded on foreign financial 
markets. Similarly, it is noted that the majority of the sample firms (95.79%) make a 
distinction between the chairman and the CEO positions. According to agency theory, 
this distinction between the two roles mitigates the agency problem. It works against 
CEO entrenchment, and supports board monitoring.  Moreover, the proportion of firms 
that got loans in the year following the financial statements’ date (25.7%) is double that 
of the proportion who got funds through issuing equity.  
Table 21 Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables 
 Panel (A) Descriptive statistics of continuous variables 
Variable Max Min Mean Median SD N 
EXCOMP 13,000 164.960 1,700 1,100 2,000 498 
NOEXCOMP 315,480 24,060 77,305 66,000 43,465 498 
MANGOWN 0.53 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.11 498 
BORSIZE 16.00 5.00 9.35 9.00 2.43 498 
BORCOMP 0.86 0.33 0.62 0.62 0.12 498 
BORMEET 17.00 4.00 8.61 8.00 2.51 498 
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ACSIZE 6.00 2.00 3.62 4.00 0.87 498 
ACMEET 8.00 1.00 3.99 4.00 1.27 498 
MAJORSHAR 0.77 0.04 0.38 0.39 0.17 498 
SIZE 11.019 8.00 9.194 9.064 0.688 498 
PROFITAB 0.52 -0.17 0.08 0.07 0.09 498 
LIQUIDITY 8.57 0.26 1.64 1.33 1.32 498 
LEVERAGE 1.42 0.00 0.366 0.338 0.279 498 
DIVYIELD 0.219 0.00 0.030 0.024 0.032 498 
Panel (B) Descriptive statistics for the categorical variables 
Variable Proportion N 
FUT_LOANS: Proportion of firms got loans in the year 
next to the financial statements date. 25.7% 498 
FUT_BONDS: Proportion of firms issued bonds in the 
year next to the financial statements date. 21.48% 498 
FUT_EQUITY: Proportion of firms issued equity in the 
year next to the financial statements date. 13.25% 498 
CROSSLIST: Proportion of firms whom shares are  
traded in foreign financial markets 90.16% 498 
ROLEDUAL : Proportion of directors who  are  the 
chairmen and the CEO  for a company at the same time 4.21% 498 
Panel A displays descriptive statistics of continuous variables used in the present study as proxies for 
firm characteristics and corporate governance attributes; EXCOMP is executives directors’ 
compensation average (in thousands); NOEXCOMP is non-executives directors’ compensation average; 
MANGOWN is the managerial ownership which is computed as a percentage of directors’ share 
interests to ordinary shares; BORSIZE is the total number of directors on board; BORCOMP is the 
board composition and is calculated as the number of non-executive directors divided by board size; 
BORMEET is the total number of board meetings during the year; ACSIZE is the is the total number of 
directors in audit committee; ACMEET is the  total number of audit committee meetings during the 
year; MAJORSHAR is the aggregate percentage of shares hold by major shareholders (with at least 3% 
ownership), SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalization (in £million); PROFITAB is the 
profitability measured by return on equity (the ratio of net income to book value of equity); LIQUDITY 
is measured by the current assets to current liabilities ratio; LEVERAGE is calculated as the ratio of 
total debt to total capital; DIVYIELD is a proxy for dividend policy (dividends per share / share price). 
 
  
Table 22 illustrates the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables which have been 
used in the main analysis or in further analyses. Panel (A) presents the descriptive 
statistics for the KPI quantity scores. The number of KPIs disclosed in the KPI section 
(QNTKSEC) by the sample firms ranges from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 24 
KPIs. The median of QNTKSEC is 6 KPIs. It appears that the majority of the KPIs 
reported are financial KPIs. The median number of financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI 
section (QNFKS) is 5 KPIs. While the median of non-financial KPIs disclosed in the 
KPI section (QNNFKSEC) is only one KPI, after considering the KPIs disclosed 
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outside the KPI section, the median number of non-financial KPIs disclosed in the 
whole report (QNNFKREP) is found to be 2 KPIs. It appears that the KPIs disclosed 
outside the KPI section are more likely to be one non-financial KPI. This conclusion is 
confirmed when comparing the mean of QNTKSEC (7.49) KPIs with the mean of 
QNTKREP (8.15) KPIs.  
Regarding KPI disclosure quality, the quality level for KPIs disclosed in the KPI 
section (QLTKSEC) ranges from 0 to 0.688. For the KPIs disclosed in the KPI section, 
the mean (median) of financial KPI reporting quality (QLFKS) is 0.345 (0.375). The 
level of non-financial KPI reporting quality (QLNFKSEC) is lower, with a mean 
(median) of 0.267 (0.286). As a result, the mean (median) of KPI reporting quality 
(QLTKSEC) is 0.363 (0.375). However, it seems that the high quality of KPI reporting 
outside the KPI section has driven the total quality of KPI reporting QLTKREP to be 
slightly higher than the corresponding QLTKSEC, with a mean (median) of 0.37 
(0.388). 
 
Table 22 Descriptive statistics of dependent variables 
Panel (A) Descriptive statistics for KPI Quantity scores 
Variable Max Min Mean Median SD N 
QNTKSEC 24.00 0.00 7.49 6.00 5.08 498 
QNFKS 19.00 0.00 5.34 5.00 3.50 498 
QNNFKSEC 15.00 0.00 2.17 1.00 2.92 498 
QNNFKREP 16.00 0.00 2.84 2.00 3.38 498 
QNTKREP 24.00 0.00 8.15 7.00 5.38 498 
Panel (B) Descriptive statistics for KPI Quality scores 
Variable Max Min Mean Median SD N 
QLTKSEC 0.688 0.000 0.362 0.375 0.174 498 
QLFKS 0.691 0.000 0.345 0.375 0.175 498 
QLNFKSEC 0.786 0.000 0.267 0.286 0.251 498 
QLNFKREP 0.818 0.000 0.309 0.327 0.254 498 
QLTKREP 0.665 0.000 0.370 0.388 0.170 498 
Panel (A) displays descriptive statistics for KPI quantity scores: QNFKS is financial KPIs disclosed in 
the KPI section; QNNFKSEC is non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; QNNFKREP Non- 
financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report; QNTKSEC is the total number of financial and non-
financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section. QNTKREP is the total number of financial and non-
financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report. 
Panel (B) displays descriptive statistics for KPI quality scores: QLFKS is the quality of financial KPIs 
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disclosed in the KPI section; QLNFKSEC is the quality of non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI 
section; QLNFKREP the quality of non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report; QLTKSEC is  the 
aggregated quality of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section. QLTKREP is the 
aggregated quality of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report. 
 
 
3.5.3 Econometric procedures 
Cooke (1998) states that the transformation of data is basically helpful in many cases: 
when non-linear relationship exists between dependent and independent variables, in 
the event that the errors are not nearly a normal distribution, where a problem of 
hetroscedasticity exists, or when the relationship between dependent and independent 
variables is monotonic. Based upon the original distribution of the scores, common 
transformations include logarithm, square root, inverse, reflect and log, reflect and 
square root, reflect and inverse (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007, p.87). Following most of 
the disclosure studies (e.g. Li et al., 2012); many continuous variables have been 
transformed. Directors’ compensation (EXCOMP, NOEXCOMP) and firm size (SIZE) 
are transformed using the log of the original values in order to become more 
approximate to a normal distribution (Cooke, 1998; Pallant, 2005; Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2007).  
Furthermore, many procedures are performed to avoid multicollinearity among the 
independent variables. A perfect relationship between these variables would affect the 
reliability of the estimates, and might cause a wide degree of inflation with regard to 
the standard errors for the coefficient (Acock, 2008). Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) 
state that multicollinearity among independent variables results in a problem in terms of 
assessing the importance of each dependent variable in the regression. Therefore, it is 
needed to compare the total relationship of the independent variables with the 
dependent variable (correlation) and the correlations of the independent variables with 
each other  (in the correlation matrix) (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). The Pearson 
correlation matrix is the initial tool to detect multicollinearity. Gujarati (2003) indicates 
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that collinearity among the independent variables is acceptable if the correlation 
coefficient (r) is a maximum of 0.80. 
At an earlier step in the analysis, any proxy that is found to have a strong relationship 
with another explanatory variable is replaced with another one. For instance, the 
number of non-executives on the board was introduced as a proxy for board 
independence. However, it is replaced with another proxy which is the number of non-
executive directors divided by the board size. Moreover, the Pearson correlation matrix 
is illustrated in Table 23 and indicates that multicollinearity is not a problem in the 
present study. It is clear that all associations among the explanatory variables are below 
0.80.22  
Finally, Table 23 shows that the correlation is positive and statistically significant 
between proxies that are used to separately measure KPI reporting quantity or quality. 
This shows a consistency among each group of measures in capturing the required 
information. In addition, a positive and statistically significant relationship is found 
between the number of KPIs disclosed in the KPI section and their quality (ρ = 0.76). It 
is shown that the quantity and the quality of KPI reporting share the same determinants. 
Each of KPI reporting quantity and quality is positively correlated with most of the CG 
attributes and firm characteristics (i.e. Executive compensation; Non-executive 
compensation; Board size; Board composition; Audit committee size; Audit committee 
meetings; Firm size). In contrast, KPI reporting quantity\quality looks to be negatively 
associated with role duality, liquidity, managerial ownership, and major shareholding. 
However, further investigation is needed to obtain empirical evidence on the KPI 
reporting determinants. This investigation should take into account the mutual effects 
of these determinants.  
                                                 
22
 Further check for multicollinearity is performed by calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF) after 
carrying out each regression. 
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3.5.4 Regression models 
As mentioned above, a positive relationship exists between the quantity of (financial\ 
non-financial\total) KPIs disclosed in annual reports and their quality. This is 
considered as a motivation for examining whether or not both KPI reporting quantity 
and quality are derived from the same determinants. To empirically test the relationship 
between the quantity and quality of KPI reporting and the proposed determinants, the 
following models are employed: 
QNTKSEC = α + β1 EXCOMP + β2 NOEXCOMP + β3 BORSIZE+ β4 BORCOMP+ 
β5BORMEET+ β6 ROLEDUAL+ β7 ACSIZE+ β8 ACMEET + β9MANGOWN + β10 
MAJORSHAR+ β11 FUT_EQUITY+ β12 FUT_BONDS+ β13 FUT_LOANS+ Firm 
characteristics as control variables+ ε. 
QLTKSEC= α + β1 EXCOMP + β2 NOEXCOMP + β3 BORSIZE+ β4 BORCOMP+ 
β5BORMEET+ β6 ROLEDUAL+ β7 ACSIZE+ β8 ACMEET + β9MANGOWN + β10 
MAJORSHAR+ β11 FUT_EQUITY+ β12 FUT_BONDS+ β13 FUT_LOANS+ Firm 
characteristics as control variables+ ε.  
Where: 
QNTKSEC = the total number KPIs disclosed in the KPI section. QLTKSEC = the 
aggregated quality average for financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI 
section.   α    = the intercept.  
β1 …….β 13= Regression coefficients.  
 ε       = Error term 
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Table 23 Pearson correlation matrix for explanatory variables 
 
*Significance at the 5% level or above. All variables are defined in Table 5 and Table 18.  
Variable QNTKSEC QLTKSEC QNFKS QNNFKSEC QNNFKREP QNTKREP QLFKS QLNFKSEC QLNFKREPQLTKREP EXCOMP NOEXCOMP MANGOWN BORSIZE BORCOMP BORMEET ROLEDUAL ACSIZE ACMEET MAJORSHAR FUT_EQUITY FUT_BONDS FUT_LOANS SIZE PROFITAB LIQUIDITY LEVERAGEDIVYIELD CROSSLIST
QNTKSEC 1
QLTKSEC 0.7645* 1
QNFKS 0.8915* 0.7041* 1
QNNFKSEC 0.6945* 0.4302* 0.3399* 1
QNNFKREP 0.6321* 0.4659* 0.3575* 0.7972* 1
QNTKREP 0.9499* 0.7658* 0.8655* 0.6192* 0.7458* 1
QLFKS 0.7328* 0.9190* 0.7840* 0.3270* 0.3820* 0.7410* 1
QLNFKSEC 0.5963* 0.5292* 0.3545* 0.8348* 0.6443* 0.5286* 0.4220* 1
QLNFKREP 0.5697* 0.5494* 0.3835* 0.6840* 0.8160* 0.6407* 0.4531* 0.8354* 1
QLTKREP 0.7291* 0.9614* 0.6740* 0.4040* 0.4944* 0.7701* 0.8838* 0.5052* 0.5959* 1
EXCOMP 0.2656* 0.3233* 0.2721* 0.1254* 0.2357* 0.3127* 0.2942* 0.2013* 0.2937* 0.3380* 1
NOEXCOMP 0.2769* 0.2866* 0.2146* 0.2455* 0.3160* 0.3111* 0.2419* 0.2266* 0.2863* 0.2865* 0.5655* 1
MANGOWN -0.1146* -0.0958* -0.0949* -0.1014* -0.1364* -0.1324* -0.0586 -0.1481* -0.1764* -0.1004* -0.3139* -0.2271* 1
BORSIZE 0.2830* 0.2790* 0.2452* 0.2423* 0.2344* 0.2829* 0.2787* 0.2396* 0.2241* 0.2641* 0.4747* 0.3240* -0.1693* 1
BORCOMP 0.2050* 0.2975* 0.2164* 0.0846 0.1706* 0.2366* 0.2815* 0.1647* 0.2546* 0.3110* 0.5487* 0.2952* -0.1892* 0.1822* 1
BORMEET -0.076 -0.0176 -0.0597 -0.1020* -0.0496 -0.0491 -0.0371 -0.087 -0.0457 0.0073 -0.1055* -0.0827 -0.1177* -0.1387* -0.0098 1
ROLEDUAL -0.1136* -0.1532* -0.0849 -0.0992* -0.1289* -0.1296* -0.1333* -0.1429* -0.1765* -0.1647* -0.0816 -0.1746* 0.2866* -0.0607 -0.0981* -0.0813 1
ACSIZE 0.1188* 0.2542* 0.1225* 0.0604 0.1198* 0.1493* 0.2212* 0.1503* 0.1808* 0.2515* 0.4080* 0.2438* -0.2416* 0.5208* 0.3606* -0.0211 -0.0305 1
ACMEET 0.1641* 0.2763* 0.1742* 0.0621 0.1289* 0.1937* 0.2675* 0.1222* 0.1789* 0.2865* 0.3307* 0.2300* -0.1472* 0.2892* 0.3778* 0.2168* -0.0053 0.3483* 1
MAJORSHAR -0.1669* -0.1323* -0.1496* -0.1343* -0.2634* -0.2348* -0.1248* -0.1201* -0.2167* -0.1508* -0.4077* -0.3377* 0.3728* -0.3992* -0.0559 -0.0647 0.1725* -0.2867* -0.1587* 1
FUT_EQUITY 0.0285 -0.0231 0.0483 0.0041 -0.0373 0.0063 -0.0079 0.0127 -0.0202 -0.0335 -0.0686 -0.008 0.0042 -0.0255 0.0691 0.0341 0.0948* -0.0414 -0.0103 0.0898* 1
FUT_BONDS 0.2335* 0.1585* 0.1975* 0.1899* 0.2125* 0.2452* 0.1410* 0.1492* 0.1677* 0.1575* 0.4223* 0.3044* -0.2190* 0.4455* 0.2712* -0.019 -0.0368 0.3169* 0.2056* -0.3041* -0.0314 1
FUT_LOANS 0.2605* 0.1823* 0.2331* 0.2156* 0.2350* 0.2670* 0.1926* 0.1836* 0.2000* 0.1653* 0.2978* 0.2826* -0.1347* 0.3269* 0.1915* -0.0213 -0.0091 0.1707* 0.1687* -0.1988* 0.1767* 0.3076* 1
SIZE 0.2827* 0.2827* 0.2452* 0.2274* 0.2935* 0.3104* 0.2787* 0.2083* 0.2554* 0.2682* 0.7749* 0.5562* -0.2488* 0.6956* 0.4310* -0.1532* -0.0437 0.4426* 0.3727* -0.4874* -0.0565 0.5256* 0.4084* 1
PROFITAB -0.0408 0.0041 -0.08 -0.0221 -0.0299 -0.0474 -0.0252 -0.0299 -0.0309 0.0004 0.0817 -0.0255 0.0926* -0.0495 0.0679 -0.0671 -0.0119 -0.0596 -0.0597 0.0234 -0.0418 -0.0714 -0.1258* 0.0732 1
LIQUIDITY -0.1067* -0.0943* -0.0911* -0.0930* -0.1410* -0.1335* -0.0974* -0.1017* -0.1430* -0.1157* -0.3464* -0.2102* 0.3276* -0.2082* -0.2525* -0.0776 0.1073* -0.1513* -0.1889* 0.2286* 0.0405 -0.2118* -0.1396* -0.3042* 0.0791 1
LEVERAGE 0.1073* 0.022 0.0424 0.1430* 0.1169* 0.0907* -0.0141 0.0628 0.0596 0.0085 0.1671* 0.2469* -0.2808* 0.0964* 0.1250* 0.1787* -0.0376 0.0417 0.1703* -0.1613* 0.0435 0.2194* 0.0651 0.1475* -0.0659 -0.4140* 1
DIVYIELD 0.1205* 0.0702 0.0769 0.1470* 0.1188* 0.1227* 0.0682 0.1070* 0.0856 0.0958* 0.0403 0.1511* -0.1269* 0.0638 0.0188 0.1437* -0.035 0.047 0.0709 -0.1682* 0.1206* 0.0573 0.0553 -0.0046 0.0436 -0.1740* 0.3175* 1
CROSSLIST 0.1627* 0.1042* 0.1508* 0.1303* 0.0669 0.1195* 0.0895* 0.1171* 0.0578 0.051 0.1429* 0.2106* -0.0672 0.1489* 0.1274* -0.0039 0.0106 0.0718 -0.0722 -0.1093* 0.0496 0.1236* 0.1789* 0.2041* 0.0249 0.005 0.1548* 0.0102 1
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3.6 The main analyses 
The main analyses aim at getting clear answers to research questions 2 and 3.  By 
employing the models illustrated in the previous section, the hypotheses that were 
developed in section 3.4 are tested. This section includes the basic procedures to ensure a 
high degree of confidence in the results in 3.6.1. Additionally, the empirical results are 
provided in 3.6.2. 
3.6.1  Econometric procedures 
One of the key concerns that could negatively affect the confidence in terms of the 
regression results are the outliers. The term ‘outlier’ refers to an observation of the 
dependent or independent variables, with values that are inconsistent with the rest of the 
observations in the data set (Rawlings et al., 1998, p.331). Severe outliers lead to an 
asymmetric distribution of the residuals, and may dominate the results (Acock, 2008). 
There are many ways to detect outliers and identify the influential observations. Using 
software such as Stata makes it easier to conduct a Shapiro-Wilk test to check whether or 
not the residuals are normally distributed around the predicted dependent variable scores. 
Rejecting the null hypothesis in that test (normality) gives an indication of the outliers’ 
existence.   
To identify these outliers (Acock, 2008), the software is asked to predict the estimated 
score based upon the regression, then to predict the residuals and sort them according to 
their values. Consequently, observations with regard to the highest and lowest Z score are 
to be considered as outliers.  
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) indicate two strategies to reduce the influence of the 
outliers after considering the following alternatives:  
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a) At first the original data should be checked to ensure its accuracy.  
b)  If the outliers are caused by a variable which is highly correlated with 
other variables, but is not important in the analysis, it can be eliminated. 
c) If the cases with extreme scores are not part of the targeted population, 
they should be deleted. 
If the outliers are retained in the analysis, there are two possible strategies to reduce their 
impact on the analysis: 
a) Changing the largest and smallest scores by assigning specified scores to them. 
b) Transforming variables to make the distribution more nearly normal. 
In order to maintain the sample size, the present study does not adopt any option that 
leads to the elimination of some cases. Moreover, all cases are part from the target 
population, and hence they represent a source of information that could be critical to the 
analysis.  The study deals with the outliers by adopting both of these strategies. 
Following several studies (e.g. Aggarwal et al., 2009); the data is winsorised by setting 
all outliers at 99% of the data. This option is usually preferred by researchers to reduce 
the impact of outliers on the estimators (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). 
As indicated before with regard to some independent variables, transformation is also 
utilised with regard to the scores of the dependent variables. Rawlings et al. (1998) state 
that transformation could handle heterogeneous variances in dependent variables’ data so 
as to make them more homogeneous on the transformed scale. As mentioned above, there 
are several methods to transform variables. Cook (1998) argued that the following 
methods are used in disclosure studies - ranks, percentile ranks, normal scores, and the 
log of odds ratio. He suggests that selecting the relevant method of transformation would 
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be affected by the data itself. For instance, getting the square root of scores (SQRT) 
would suit a distribution with a moderate positive skewness, while using the log of scores 
would be more convenient for a distribution with a significant positive skewness 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Therefore, Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) conclude that 
researchers should try more than one method of transformation in order to have the 
fewest outliers, and get the nearest kurtosis and skewness values that are too close to 
zero. Accordingly, the study carries out many regressions after undertaking different 
methods of transformation (log of dependent and\or independent variables, SQRT of 
dependent and\or independent variables, normal scores). The best improvement in the 
analysis is achieved by transforming dependent scores using SQRT, as long as 
transforming many dependent variables is done by applying log as mentioned above.  
Wooldridge (2003) points out that using panel data has some econometric concerns. The 
unobserved residuals for the unit (the firm in the current study) mean that these 
unobserved residuals may be serially correlated - because of an unobserved effect - across 
years.23 Furthermore, the residuals for a specific year may be correlated across firms 
(Petersen, 2009).  Failure to deal with cross-sectional dependence (the firm effect) and 
time series dependence (the time effect) in the panel data, leads to biased standard errors 
and incorrect inferences (Petersen, 2009; Gow et al., 2010). Petersen (2009) argues that 
even if one source of correlation is addressed (e.g. by including time dummies to correct 
for the time effect), yet the other effect (i.e. the firm effect) will be left in the data. Gow 
et al. (2010) evaluated the different methods that are applied by researchers in accounting 
studies to address firm and time effects. These methods include OLS standard errors, 
White standard errors, Newey-West standard errors, Fama-MacBeth, Z2, as well as 
                                                 
23 ‘The key feature of panel data that distinguishes it from a pooled cross section is the fact that the same 
cross-sectional units (individuals, firms, or counties) are followed over a given time period’ (Wooldridge, 
2003, p.11). 
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robust standard errors clustered by time, firm and both. Those methods are examined 
under four different settings: a) non-existence of firm and time effects, b) existence of 
firm effects only, c) existence of time effects only, and d) existence of both firm and time 
effects. In contrast to other methods, they found that only clustering by firm and time 
(CL-2) produced well-specified tests statistics under all assumptions. Rather, when 
applying other methods, the estimates either are not robust with regard to  any form of 
effects (in the event of performing OLS and White standard errors), or just robust for one 
form of effect (in the event of following other methods).  Consistent with this finding, 
Petersen (2009) states that fixed and random effect models produce unbiased estimates in 
the case of the permanent firm effect. On the other hand, clustering by firm and time 
effects is unbiased, and correctly produces confidence intervals whether the firm effect is 
permanent or temporary.  
The current study uses a panel data on a sample of UK companies for five years. 
Therefore, the study employs clustering by both firm and time in order to consider any 
unobserved firm and time effects within the panel data set. As indicated above, this 
technique would improve the accuracy of the analysis through getting correct estimates 
and inferences. To employ clustering by firm and time technique, the necessary 
commands and programing instructions are provided by Petersen (2009). The researcher 
had to follow these instructions and install the commands before carrying out the 
analysis. 24 
In order to empirically test the hypotheses of the present study, all regressions are run 
using Stata software. Stata is a flexible statistical program that allows users to apply pre- 
programmed commands or use further commands that have been invented by different 
users (Hamilton, 2006).  
                                                 
24
 The needed commands and programing instructions are provided in: 
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/petersen/htm/papers/se/se_programming.htm 
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As mentioned before, after carrying out each regression, the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) is calculated. This procedure is an additional step to ensure that explanatory 
variables are not extremely correlated. The rule that has been applied is that correlation 
between independent variables is accepted as long as VIF is still smaller than 10 
(Gujarati, 2003; Acock, 2008). 
Despite the fact that all procedures showed that multicollinearity among explanatory 
variables is acceptable in accordance with previous studies, the study considers any 
concerns with regard to hidden correlations that might exist between CG variables. 
Therefore, these variables are grouped into groups: executive and non executive directors' 
compensation, board characteristics, audit committee characteristics, and ownership 
structure. Then, these groups are included separately - together with the control variables 
- in different models from model (1) to model (5). Additionally, capital need variables are 
included - together with control variables - in model (6). Finally, all explanatory variables 
are included in model (7).25 
3.6.2 Empirical results  
As mentioned above, all regressions are run using Stata software. The analyses include 
industry dummies to control for the industry effect. Moreover, the study employs 
clustering by firm and time effects to counter any unobserved cross-sectional and time 
series dependence. The results regarding the determinants of the quantity of and the 
quality of total KPIs disclosed in the KPI section are presented in 3.6.2.1. The results 
with respect to the determinants of reporting on KPI subcategories are presented in 
3.6.2.2.  
                                                 
25
 The researcher is grateful to the external examiner Dr Basil Al-Najjar for this suggestion. 
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3.6.2.1 The determinants of KPI reporting   
Table 24 and Table 25 present the empirical findings with regard to the factors affecting 
the quantity of total KPIs disclosed in the KPI section within the annual report 
(QNTKSEC), and the quality of reporting with regard to these KPIs (QLTKSEC) 
respectively. In general, the findings show that the regression models are significant with 
high F values at the 1% level. This means that the proposed determinants explain a 
significant part of the quantity and quality of KPI reporting.  In addition, the VIF values 
refer to the absence of multicollinearity between the explanatory variables. The adjusted 
R2   values in Table 24 and Table 25 indicate that the proposed models can explain 14.8% 
- 22.3% of the variation in QNTKSEC, and 11.8% - 24.5% of the total variation in 
QLTKSEC.  
Table 24 KPI reporting in the KPI section: the determinants of quantity 
Variable Mo1 Mo2 Mo3 Mo4 Mo5 Mo6 Mo7 
EXCOMP 0.517 
0.324 
     0.369 
0.271 
NOEXCOMP  0.785** 
0.316 
    0.61** 
0.262 
BORSIZE   0.09** 
0.035 
   0.12** 
0.039 
BORCOMP   1.56** 
0.606 
   1.27** 
0.603 
BORMEET   -0.04* 
0.022 
   -0.05* 
0.024 
ROLEDUAL   -0.6** 
0.258 
   -0.57* 
0.32 
ACSIZE    -0.027 
0.091 
  -0.146 
0.108 
ACMEET    0.086 
0.071 
  0.092 
0.078 
MAJORSHAR     0.171 
0.333 
 -0.008 
0.322 
MANGOWN     -0.034 
0.754 
 0.447 
0.695 
FUT_EQUITY      0.048 
0.21 
0.001 
0.207 
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FUT_BONDS      0.169* 
0.097 
0.12** 
0.045 
FUT_LOANS      0.347** 
0.147 
0.284* 
0.145 
SIZE 0.292* 
0.173 
0.380** 
0.127 
0.149 
0.132 
0.47*** 
0.124 
0.54*** 
0.128 
0.40*** 
0.111 
-0.253 
0.197 
PROFITAB -1.033 
0.72 
-0.77 
0.7 
-0.811 
0.628 
-0.846 
0.767 
-0.995 
0.709 
-0.69 
0.663 
-0.42 
0.593 
LIQUIDITY 0.079 
0.074 
0.065 
0.072 
0.095 
0.062 
0.07 
0.071 
0.072 
0.073 
0.074 
0.072 
0.087 
0.066 
LEVERAGE -0.096 
0.297 
-0.143 
0.295 
-0.002 
0.234 
-0.15 
0.272 
-0.08 
0.283 
-0.078 
0.243 
-0.11 
0.227 
DIVYIELD 2.221 
2.525 
1.829 
2.633 
1.826 
2.268 
2.309 
2.663 
2.649 
2.54 
2.226 
2.428 
0.826 
2.007 
CROSSLIST 0.281 
0.247 
0.228 
0.263 
0.224 
0.241 
0.335 
0.252 
0.273 
0.245 
0.218 
0.25 
0.218 
0.289 
Constant -3.7** 
1.453 
-5.2*** 
1.503 
-0.743 
1.063 
-2.5** 
1.113 
-3.04** 
1.206 
-1.707* 
1.027 
-2.188 
1.52 
F 9.2*** 9.9*** 8.5*** 8.02*** 7.65*** 8.32*** 5.9*** 
Adj R-squared 0.16 0.162 0.195 0.154 0.148 0.164 0.223 
Mean VIF 1.59 1.31 1.42 1.27 1.29 1.29 1.79 
Max VIF 2.61 1.64 2.62 1.55 1.49 1.73 5.18 
N 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.        
Dependent variable: QNTKSEC is the total number of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the 
KPI section. Explanatory variables: executives’ compensation in Mo1; non-executives’ compensation 
in Mo2; board characteristics in  Mo3; audit committee characteristics in  Mo4; Ownership structure 
variables  in Mo5;  capital need variables in Mo6; and all explanatory variables used in the analyses 
in  Mo7. All variables are defined in Table 5 and Table 18.  All regressions include industry dummies. 
Standard errors in the second line for each variable and are corrected for firm and t ime clustering. 
 
Table 25 KPI reporting in the KPI section: the determinants of quality 
Variable Mo1 Mo2 Mo3 Mo4 Mo5 Mo6 Mo7 
EXCOMP 0.2** 
0.061 
     0.127** 
0.04 
NOEXCOMP  0.18*** 
0.055 
    0.14*** 
0.038 
BORSIZE   0.020** 
0.007 
   0.023** 
0.008 
BORCOMP   0.42*** 
0.112 
   0.251** 
0.107 
BORMEET   -0.002 
0.003 
   -0.003 
0.004 
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ROLEDUAL   -0.17*** 
0.038 
   -0.191** 
0.06 
ACSIZE    0.022 
0.021 
  0.001 
0.026 
ACMEET    0.034*** 
0.01 
  0.033** 
0.011 
MAJORSHAR     0.075 
0.066 
 0.065 
0.063 
MANGOWN     -0.045 
0.152 
 0.156 
0.109 
FUT_EQUITY      -0.014 
0.045 
-0.025 
0.042 
FUT_BONDS      0.006 
0.01 
-0.013 
0.01 
FUT_LOANS      0.045** 
0.016 
0.027 
0.018 
SIZE 0.031 
0.031 
0.07*** 
0.017 
0.017 
0.023 
0.06*** 
0.018 
0.11*** 
0.021 
0.09*** 
0.021 
-0.077** 
0.034 
PROFITAB -0.13 
0.137 
-0.063 
0.137 
-0.058 
0.113 
-0.019 
0.141 
-0.117 
0.131 
-0.083 
0.125 
0.029 
0.106 
LIQUIDITY 0.006 
0.014 
0.002 
0.014 
0.01 
0.012 
0.003 
0.012 
0.004 
0.014 
0.004 
0.014 
0.008 
0.011 
LEVERAGE -0.043 
0.067 
-0.053 
0.063 
-0.031 
0.049 
-0.057 
0.061 
-0.039 
0.062 
-0.034 
0.056 
-0.047 
0.057 
DIVYIELD 0.468 
0.646 
0.401 
0.673 
0.353 
0.63 
0.422 
0.685 
0.623 
0.689 
0.55 
0.648 
0.151 
0.604 
CROSSLIST 0.032 
0.062 
0.019 
0.065 
0.016 
0.058 
0.053 
0.057 
0.03 
0.061 
0.024 
0.061 
0.032 
0.061 
Constant -0.7** 
0.243 
-0.96** 
0.311 
-0.002 
0.161 
-0.261 
0.18 
-0.50** 
0.223 
-0.283 
0.209 
-0.71** 
0.275 
F 9.4*** 9.11*** 10.0*** 9.9*** 6.2*** 5.7*** 7.4 
Adj R-squared 0.147 0.137 0.194 0.156 0.118 0.12 0.245 
Mean VIF 1.59 1.31 1.42 1.27 1.29 1.29 1.79 
Max VIF 2.61 1.64 2.62 1.55 1.49 1.73 5.18 
N 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.        
Dependent variable: QLTKSEC is the aggregated quality score of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed 
in the KPI section. Explanatory variables: executives’ compensation in Mo1; non-executives’ 
compensation in Mo2; board characteristics in  Mo3; audit committee characteristics in  Mo4; 
Ownership structure variables  in Mo5;  capital need variables in Mo6; and all explanatory variables 
used in the analyses in  Mo7. All variables are defined in Table 5 and Table 18.  All regressions include 
industry dummies. Standard errors in the second line for each variable and are corrected for firm and time 
clustering. 
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The findings illustrate the impact of each group of variables on the quantity and quality of 
KPI reporting. Regarding the effect of Directors’ compensation, model (1), model (2), 
and model (7) in Table 24 indicate that only non-executives’ compensation has a 
significant influence on QNTKSEC at a level of 5%. In contrast, model (1) and model (7) 
in Table 25 show that executives’ compensation has a significant impact on QLTKSEC at 
the 5% level. Moreover, model (2) and model (7) in Table 25 indicate that non-
executives’ compensation have a positive and significant relationship with QLTKSEC at 
the 1% level. Therefore, H1 that expects a positive association between executive 
compensation and the quantity as well as the quality of KPI reporting, is partially 
accepted. On the other hand, H2 is supported, as non-executives’ compensation are found 
to have a positive and significant effect on KPI reporting quantity and quality. 
Concerning the effect of board characteristics, the results in model (3) and model (7) in 
Table 24 and Table 25 show that, board size and board composition have a positive and 
significant impact on QNTKSEC as well as on QLTKSEC. Hence, these results support 
H3 and H4.  In contrast, the reported results in model (3) and model (7) in Table 24  
reveal that the board meetings variable has a weak and negative influence on QNTKSEC 
at a level of 10%, whereas it has no significant effect on QLTKSEC as is indicated in 
model (3) and model (7) in Table 25 . Hence, H4 is partially accepted. Moreover, it is 
indicated that role duality has a negative and significant influence on QNTKSEC as well 
as on QLTKSEC. These results lead us to accept H6, which anticipates a significant 
association between role duality and KPI reporting. 
H7 posits that a significant relationship exists between AC size and KPI reporting, but the 
results reported in model (4) and model (7) in Table 24 and Table 25 illustrate that this 
relationship is not statistically significant. Hence, H7 is not accepted. However, AC 
meetings significantly affect QLTKSEC according to the results reported in model (4) 
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and model (7) in Table 25, while these meetings have an insignificant association with 
QNTKSEC. Therefore, H8, which expects a significant relationship between AC 
meetings and KPI reporting, is partially accepted. 
With regard to the effect of ownership structure, the results reported in model (5) and 
model (7) in Table 24 and Table 25 do not provide supporting evidence for the 
relationship between the quantity and quality of KPI reporting on the one hand, and 
managerial ownership as well as major shareholding, on the other. As a result, H9 and 
H10 cannot be accepted. 
Concerning the impact of capital need variables, model (6) and model (7) in Table 24 and 
Table 25 indicate that plans to issue equity do not influence KPI reporting. Thus, these 
results do not support H11. On the other hand, the plans to issue bonds have a statistically 
significant and positive relationship with KPI reporting quantity rather than with its 
quality. Therefore, H12, which posits a significant relationship between the plans to issue 
bonds and KPI reporting, is partially accepted. Furthermore, model (6) and model (7) in 
Table 24 show that the intent to obtain loans has a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with KPI reporting quantity at levels of 5% and 10% respectively. However, 
the plans to acquire loans appear to have a significant relationship with KPI reporting 
quality at a level of 5% in model (5) in Table 25. Thus, H13 can be partially accepted. 
Finally, the findings do not support a significant association between the firm 
characteristics group (i.e. firm size, profitability, liquidity, leverage, dividend yield, and 
cross listing) and QNTKSEC as well as QLTKSEC. The exception to this conclusion is 
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firm size, which has a positive and significant effect on KPI reporting in the majority of 
the models reported in Table 24 and Table 25 . 26 
3.6.2.2 The determinants of reporting on KPI subcategories 
This section reports the empirical findings with regard to the determinants of reporting on 
financial as well as non-financial KPIs. These findings would help in investigating 
whether KPI reporting quantity and quality are derived from the same factors.  
3.6.2.2.1 The determinants of financial KPI reporting 
Table 59 in Appendix (2) shows the key factors that affect reporting in terms of the 
quantity of financial KPIs (QNFKS). High F values indicate that the regression models 
are significant at the 1% level. The models proposed can explain 19.5% - 24.0% of the 
variation in QNFKS. Table 60 in Appendix (2) presents the determinants of non-financial 
KPI reporting (QLFKS). The models proposed can explain 11.1% - 18.0% of the 
variation in QNFKS. Table 59 and Table 60 indicate that there are no concerns regarding 
multicollinearity between the determinants of QNFKS and QLFKS according to VIF 
values.  
As illustrated in Table 59, executives’ compensation positively affects QNFKS at a level 
of 5% which are executives’ compensation, whereas non-executive compensation has a 
weak positive effect on QNFKS at the 10% level (as reported in model 2). With respect to 
CG characteristics, board size has a positive and statistically significant association with 
QNFKS at the 5% level (as reported in model 3 and model 7). Model (3) in Table 59 
suggests that board composition has a positive and significant relationship with QNFKS 
at the 5% level (as reported in model 3).  
                                                 
26
 To check the robustness of the results, all models reported in Table 24 and Table 25 are re-estimated 
using different measurements for some of firm characteristics variables. The findings are almost similar to 
the results discussed in  3.6.2.1. 
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The findings in Table 59 do not support the significant association between AC 
characteristics as well as ownership structure variables with QNFKS. On the other hand, 
the results indicate a significant positive relationship between firm’s plans to get loans 
and QNFKS at the 5% level (as reported in model 6 and model 7).  
Table 60 reveals that the same factors significantly affect QLFKS. In addition, the results 
indicate that QLFKS is also positively influenced by AC meetings at a significance level 
of 5%, while it has is a negative and significant relationship with role duality.   
3.6.2.2.2 The determinants of non-financial KPI reporting  
Table 61 and Table 62 in Appendix (2) illustrate the determinants that affect non-
financial KPI reporting quantity (QNNFKSEC) and quality (QLNFKSEC). The 
importance of this analysis is that, despite being recommended by the UK CA (2006), 
companies do not disclose sufficient KPIs in practice, as displayed in descriptive 
statistics. These analyses would introduce the characteristics of companies that pay 
attention to enhancing QNNFKSEC and QLNFKSEC. 
Table 61 and Table 62 indicate that the proposed explanatory variables explain a 
significant part of the variation in QNNFKSEC and QNNFKSEC. The models proposed 
can explain 19.5% - 24.0% of the variation in QNNFKSEC, and explain 11.1% -18.8% of 
the total variation in QLNFKSEC. As indicated in Table 61 and Table 62, three variables 
show identical results with regard to their positive and highly significant association with 
QNNFKSEC as well as QLNFKSEC. These variables are: non-executives’ compensation, 
board size, and board composition. Moreover, it is noted that QLNFKSEC is influenced 
significantly and positively by executives’ compensation (as indicated in model 1 and 
model 7 in Table 62), and negatively with both role duality and board meetings (as 
indicated in model 2).  Finally, the findings provide evidence that incentives to increase 
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QNNFKSEC depend on the source for raising capital. Firms show a tendency to increase 
the quantity and quality of non-financial KPI reporting when they are planning to obtain 
loans at a level of 10% (as noted in model 6 and model 7 in Table 61 for QNNFKSEC, 
and model 6 in Table 62 for QLNFKSEC). In contrast, a negative and significant 
relationship is documented between getting funds through issuing equity and 
QNNFKSEC at a level of 10% (as noted in model 7 in Table 61).  
3.7 Discussion of the results 
This section discusses the results in detail in terms of the explanatory variables groups. 
This discussion links the findings with the hypotheses that are developed in section 3.4. 
3.7.1 Directors’ compensation variables  
Table 26 summarises the findings with regard to directors’ compensation variables 
(executives’ compensation, and non-executives’ compensation). 
Table 26 The findings in terms of directors’ compensation variables  
Variable QNTKSEC QLTKSEC 
Model (1) Model (7) Model (1) Model (7) 
EXCOMP   (+)** (+)** 
 Model (2) Model (7) Model (2) Model (7) 
NOEXCOMP (+)** (+)** (+)*** (+)*** 
 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.  (+): positive 
relationship; (-): Negative relationship. QNTKSEC is the total number of financial and non-financial KPIs 
disclosed in the KPI section; QLTKSEC is the aggregated quality score of financial and non-financial 
KPIs disclosed in the KPI section. Explanatory variables: EXCOMP is Executive compensation; 
NOEXCOMP is Non-executive compensation. Explanatory variables: Mo1 includes executives’ 
compensation in addition to control variables; Mo2 includes non-executives’ compensation in 
addition to control variables; and all explanatory variables used in the analyses are included in Mo7.  
The results indicate that executives’ compensation has a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with the quality of KPI reporting, but is not significantly 
associated with its quantity. These findings are in line with agency and signalling 
theories. Shareholders in firms with highly compensated directors would be eager to 
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evaluate the results produced by those directors (Jonas, 2007). The analyses’ findings 
suggest that highly compensated directors will tend to disclose high quality KPI 
information. This information might include their private information about the targets 
for each KPI.  Consequently, a lower degree of information asymmetry between directors 
and shareholders could be achieved. Similarly, it is clear that highly compensated non-
executives are more likely to signal themselves as high quality managers in the 
employment market. Accordingly, they improve the level of quantity and quality of KPI 
reporting. These results provide evidence suggesting that managerial remuneration plays 
an important role for the shareholders. Hence, they support the choice to increase the 
quantity and quality of KPI information which is disseminated by the directors. There are 
relatively few previous studies that have investigated the link between directors’ 
compensation and corporate disclosure (e.g. Aboody and Kasznic, 2000; Nagar et al., 
2003; Grey et al., 2012). The findings of the current study add to the literature by 
providing evidence on the association between directors’ compensation and both the 
amount and quality of disclosure. 
3.7.2 Board characteristics 
Table 27 presents a summary of the results with regard to board-related variables (board 
size, board composition, board meetings and role duality). 
Table 27 The findings of board characteristics variables  
Variables QNTKSEC QLTKSEC 
Model (3) Model (7) Model (3) Model (7) 
BORSIZE (+)** (+)** (+)** (+)** 
BORCOMP (+)** (+)**  (+)*** (+)** 
BORMEET (-)* (-)*   
ROLEDUAL (-)** (-)* (-)*** (-)** 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.  (+): positive 
relationship; (-): Negative relationship. QNTKSEC: the total number of financial and non-financial KPIs 
disclosed in the KPI section; QLTKSEC: the aggregated quality score of financial and non-financial KPIs 
disclosed in the KPI section. Explanatory variables: BORSIZE: Board size; BORCOMP: Board 
composition; BORMEET: Board meetings; ROLEDUAL: Role duality. Explanatory variables: Mo3 
includes board characteristics in addition to control variables; and all explanatory variables used in 
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the analyses are included in Mo7.  
 
The findings reported indicate that board size variable has a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with the quantity and quality of KPI reporting. These findings are 
in line with some of the previous literature that examines the relationship between board 
size and corporate disclosure (e.g. Laksamana, 2008; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2011). 
The positive association demonstrates the effectiveness in terms of performing the 
monitoring role on the part of UK boards. 
These findings might be against Guest’s (2008) argument that UK soft regulations lead to 
weakness in performing monitoring role on the part of UK boards. The results suggest 
that larger boards increase the quantity of KPI reporting, and improve its quality thanks to 
the diversity of expertise on the board. The results could be explained by signalling 
incentives. Larger boards have a greater motivation to disclose more high quality KPIs in 
order to magnify their performance, and hence more likely to be followed and assessed 
by different employers.  
The results also indicate that board composition has a positive and significant relationship 
with the dependent variables. Although the findings concerning KPI quantity is different 
from the findings of Tauringana and Mangena (2009) who reported a negative association 
between the proportion of NEDs and the amount of KPI disclosed, that study focused 
only on one sector (i.e. the media sector). The findings of the current study show 
consistency with the findings of many previous studies that focus on disclosure quantity 
(e.g. Li et al., 2008; Laksamana, 2008; Wang and Hussainey, 2013), or disclosure quality 
(e.g. Forker, 1992).  
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The results support the evidence that boards with a high proportion of non-executive 
directors are expected to be more effective in performing the monitoring role, and hence, 
affect corporate disclosure positively. The findings suggest that independent directors 
might affect KPI reporting positively in order to signal their competence to potential 
employers (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
With regard to the board meetings variable, the findings display a weak and negative 
relationship between board meetings and the number of KPIs disclosed in the KPI 
section. The findings also indicate that board meetings have no significant effect on KPI 
reporting quality.  
Arguably, active boards with frequent meetings lead to better monitoring in terms of 
financial reporting (Laksamana, 2008). However, the findings may be because board 
meetings are used for discussing general objectives and polices. Consequently, detailed 
issues may be left to the meetings of the relevant sub-committees (the audit committee in 
our case). Moreover, it could be claimed that board meetings do not measure accurately 
the extent of board activity and its reflection on financial reporting. In this regard, future 
research may look for another proxy for board activity. For instance, board meeting 
minutes which identify how much of the meeting is allocated to the discussion of 
financial reporting issues. This would be a relevant proxy that measures - in detail - the 
efficiency of board meetings in terms of discussing disclosure choices.    
Concerning the impact of role duality on KPI reporting, the findings indicate that the 
relationship is negative and statistically significant between role duality and KPI 
reporting quantity as well as its quality. It is observed that the negative impact of role 
duality is stronger on the quality of KPI reported in the KPI section. These findings are 
consistent with other studies which report a significant and negative relationship between 
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role duality and CVD quantity (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Abdelsalam and Street, 
2007; Wang and Hussainey, 2013), and quality (Forker, 1992).  
The present findings can be interpreted using the propositions of agency theory. The 
concentration of decision-making power resulting from role duality could weaken a 
board’s monitoring role with regard to disclosure practices (Li et al., 2008). Combining 
the two roles of the CEO and the chairman creates resistance against some other CG 
forces like NEDs and ACs (Forker, 1992). As a result, a dominant personality leads to a 
negative effect on providing more KPI information or improving its quality. 
3.7.3 Audit committee characteristics 
The present study investigates the relationship between two of the AC characteristics and 
KPI reporting (i.e. AC size and AC activity).  
Table 28 presents a summary of the findings with regard to these variables.  
Regarding AC size, no evidence is found of a relationship between AC size and KPI 
reporting quantity or quality. These results are consistent with the finding of previous 
studies (i.e. Mangena and Pike, 2005; Tauringana and Mangena, 2009; Elzahar and 
Hussainey, 2012) that reported the same findings with respect to AC size association with 
disclosure quantity. 
Table 28 The findings with regard to AC characteristics 
Variables QNTKSEC QLTKSEC 
Model (4) Model (7) Model (4) Model (7) 
ACSIZE     
ACMEET   (+)*** (+)** 
 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.  (+): positive 
relationship; (-): Negative relationship. QNTKSEC: the total number of financial and non-financial KPIs 
disclosed in the KPI section; QLTKSEC: the aggregated quality score of financial and non-financial KPIs 
disclosed in the KPI section. Explanatory variables: BORSIZE: Board size; BORCOMP: Board 
composition; BORMEET: Board meetings; ROLEDUAL: Role duality; ACSIZE: Audit committee size; 
ACMEET: Audit committee meetings. Explanatory variables: Mo4 includes audit committee 
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characteristics in addition to control variables; and all explanatory variables used in the analyses are 
included in Mo7.  
 
These results can be interpreted in line with the Corporate Governance Combined Code 
(2010) which recommends that the audit committee should involve at least three - or in 
the case of smaller companies, two - NEDs. As presented in the descriptive statistics in 
Table 21, it seems that UK companies comply with this recommendation. The number 
reported for AC members is between 2 to a maximum of 6, and the average as well as the 
median number of AC members is almost 4 members. This might causes the insignificant 
relationship that was found between AC size and KPI reporting in the present study. 
Concerning the impact of active ACs, despite being unable to support a positive 
association between AC activity and KPI reporting quantity, the findings show that the 
coefficient estimate with regard to   ACMEET is positive and highly significant for KPI 
reporting quality. 
 That result indicates the role of AC meetings as a CG mechanism, suggesting that active 
ACs would be able to have an oversight of, and control, KPI reporting quality. The 
finding supports the argument that frequent AC meetings enable the committee to have 
enough time to discharge its duties. As the positive effect on KPI reporting quality has 
been achieved with an average of four AC meetings in the current sample, it can be 
suggested that UK companies should be encouraged to follow the FRC (2012) 
recommendation that asks for many AC meetings during the year, with a minimum of 
three.  
3.7.4 Ownership structure  
The results with regard to ownership structure variables (managerial ownership and major 
shareholding) indicate that there is no significant impact of either of them on the quantity 
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or the quality of KPI reporting.  
The insignificant effect of managerial ownership adds to the mixed results reported in 
previous studies (e.g. Chau and Gray, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003). However, this result is 
consistent with Forker (1992) who found that the association between managerial 
ownership and quality of share option disclosure is not statistically significant. The result 
may be the outcome of two different managerial incentives with contradictory impacts. 
The first is the managers’ motivation to increase KPI reporting in order to reduce the 
agency problem (based on agency theory). The second is their motivation to achieve self 
benefits by withholding some KPIs or reducing the quality of KPI information disclosed. 
On the other hand, despite the fact that a high concentration of ownership is considered as 
a CG mechanism that motivates managers to reduce agency costs and increase CVD 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; El-Gazzar, 1998), the findings are not consistent with 
agency theory.  The results might be due to the fact that the main shareholders have easy 
access to KPI information via other means (e.g. interviews with board members). 
However, the findings are in line with some previous studies such as those of Eng and 
Mak (2003) and Wang and Hussainey (2013) who found no significant relationship 
between institutional investors and voluntary disclosure. 
3.7.5 Capital need variables 
Table 29 presents a summary of the results with regard to capital need variables (the 
issuance of equity in t+1, the issuance of bonds in t+1, and the issuance of loans in t+1). 
The findings show that managers’ plans to obtain finance from different sources have 
different implications for KPI reporting.  
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Table 29 The findings of capital need variables  
Variables QNTKSEC QLTKSEC 
Model (6) Model (7) Model (6) Model (7) 
FUT_EQUITY     
FUT_ BONDS    (+)* (+)**   
FUT_LOANS (+)** (+)* (+)**  
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.  (+): positive 
relationship; (-): Negative relationship. QNTKSEC: the total number of financial and non-financial KPIs 
disclosed in the KPI section; QLTKSEC: the aggregated quality score of financial and non-financial KPIs 
disclosed in the KPI section. Explanatory variables: MAJORSHAR: Major shareholding; FUT_EQUITY: 
The issuance of equity in t+1; FUT_ BONDS: The issuance of bonds in t+1; FUT_LOANS: The issuance 
of loans in t+1. Explanatory variables: Mo6 includes capital need variables in addition to control 
variables; and all explanatory variables used in the analyses are included in Mo7.  
 
The results do not provide evidence of the relationship between KPI reporting and 
managers’ plans to issue new equity. These results could be interpreted as being in line 
with Lang and Lundholm’s (2000) study which found that firms that substantially 
increase their disclosure levels before the offering may experience a dramatic fall in the 
stock price after announcing the offering (which exceeds the increase in the price that 
existed before the announcement). In contrast, firms with a consistent level of disclosure 
before an announcement might not suffer from this substantial correction reaction in 
price. In the current study, it can be argued that there is a trade-off between managers’ 
incentives to mitigate information asymmetry through increasing KPI disclosure levels 
and quality, and their motivation to maintain a steady level of disclosure so that they can 
avoid any major decline in share price after an announcement date. This trade-off could 
result in the insignificant relationship that exists between the plans to issue equity and 
KPI reporting.  
With respect to other variables in this group, the findings document a positive and 
statistically significant association between the corporate tendency to issue bonds and the 
number of KPIs reported in the KPI section. Furthermore, the results show that 
companies which plan to obtain loans are more likely to increase the number of KPIs 
reported.  
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These results confirm the fact that managers are driven by the need for finance to increase 
the volume of KPI disclosures. However, managers do not place the same emphasis on 
KPI reporting quality. The results provide insight into the impact of the potential source 
of finance on disclosure practices. The managers show their focus by sending particular 
signals to a sector of the stakeholders (i.e. potential creditors) through publishing more 
KPIs, while they do not place the same stress when they communicate with other 
investors (i.e. when they plan to issue new equity).  
3.7.6 Firm characteristics (control variables) 
Six firm characteristics variables are introduced in the current study as control variables 
(firm size, profitability, liquidity, leverage, dividend yield, and cross listing). 
Interestingly, only firm size shows a significant and positive influence on KPI reporting 
quantity and quality. However, similar results have been reported in previous studies. For 
instance, it is documented that an insignificant association exists between corporate 
disclosure and profitability (e.g. Mangena and Pike, 2005), liquidity (e.g. Mangena and 
Pike, 2005; Anis et al., 2012), leverage (e.g. Ho and Wong, 2001; Oyelere et al., 2003; 
Abraham and Cox, 2007), dividend yield (Naser et al., 2006), and cross listing (e.g. 
Oyelere et al., 2003; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012).  
Notably, firm size shows a negative association with KPI reporting quality in model (7) 
of Table 25. This result is in contrast with the majority of previous studies which found a 
positive association between firm size and disclosure quantity or quality for CVD (e.g. 
Hossain et al., 1995; Mangena and Pike, 2005; Hassan et al., 2006; Boesso and Kumar, 
2007; Tauringana and Mangena, 2009; Wang and Hussainey, 2013). Model (7) of Table 
25 includes the whole set of variables used in the current study. Giving that the negative 
sign of firm size coefficient is reported only in this model, while it shows a positive 
direction in other models (that include the sub-groups of those variables), it can be 
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claimed that the negative sign results from hidden multicollinearity among the 
explanatory variables. 27  However, this result indicates that larger firms tend to provide a 
lower level of KPI disclosure quality than smaller firms. This might be due to the nature 
of the KPI information itself, as it was argued that the significance of disclosure 
incentives differs according to the disclosure topic or even within the same topic (Beattie 
and Smith, 2012). Furthermore, the negative association between firm size and KPI 
reporting might be explained by the larger firm’s preference to provide this information 
via other means of communication (e.g. conference calls, presentation to financial 
analysts, and websites).  
Overall, drawing upon the findings of the main analyses, two groups of variables appear 
to have a significant impact on KPI reporting quantity and quality: directors’ 
compensation, and board characteristics variables. In turn, the key effect in terms of 
capital need variables is on KPI reporting quantity.  
The analyses findings indicate that KPI reporting is not associated with other firm 
characteristics. The non-significant results with regard to these characteristics - which are 
commonly used as controls in previous research - shed light on the important role of CG 
mechanisms and directors’ compensation as drivers for corporate disclosure. According 
to the main analyses findings, focusing on these factors would motivate UK firms to 
increase the amount and quality of KPI reported in the KPI section in the annual report.  
Concerning the analyses that investigate the determinants of KPI subcategories, the 
results suggest that the factors proposed in the current study could explain the variation in 
financial and non-financial KPI reporting. 
                                                 
27
 The researcher is grateful to the external examiner Dr Bassil Al-Najjar for this clarification. 
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Regarding the findings with respect to factors that affect financial KPI reporting, these 
findings are important as the majority of companies place stress on disclosing financial 
KPIs. The results are consistent with agency and signalling theories. Directors with high 
levels of compensation, larger boards with a high percentage of NEDs tend to improve 
QNFKS and QLFKS in order to show their action in support of shareholders’ interests, 
and to signal themselves as talented directors in the employment market. Additionally, 
agency theory, stakeholder theory, and capital need theory can be used to interpret the 
positive relationship between firms’ plans to obtain loans and QNFKS as well as QLFKS. 
The results also reveal that QNFKS and QLFKS are not derived from identical set of 
determinants. 
The findings suggest that, in line with agency theory, the monitoring power of active AC 
lead to an increase in QLFKS. Correspondingly, role duality shows a negative effect on 
QLFKS as it works against the monitoring role of the board. Finally, the positive 
relationship between managerial ownership and QLFKS can be explained by the 
alignment of interests among managers and shareholders when managers own a relatively 
large stake in the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
With respect to non-financial KPI reporting determinants, the results suggest that CG 
mechanisms that are related to board characteristics play a key monitoring role, which in 
turn, lead to higher levels of QNNFKSEC and QLNFKSEC. In addition, the findings 
provide evidence that incentives to increase QNNFKSEC depend on the source for 
raising capital. Firms show a tendency to increase the quantity and quality of non-
financial KPI reporting when they are planning to seek loans. In contrast, they limit 
QNNFKSEC in the event of getting funds through issuing equity. This finding could be 
explained by capital need and stakeholder theories; directors may use reporting on non-
financial KPIs in order to provide debtors with a complete picture regarding corporate 
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strategy and performance. In contrast, directors may prefer to focus on providing 
financial performance information when they communicate with shareholders with regard 
to increasing their stake in the firm.  
3.8 Further analysis 
As mentioned before, the research instrument is designed to collect and score other KPIs 
that are disclosed in other parts of the annual report rather than in the KPI section. This 
procedure mainly affects the non-financial KPI reporting scores, and the total KPI 
reporting scores. As a result, new dependent variables are introduced. These variables 
are: QNNFKREP, which represents the number of non-financial KPIs disclosed in the 
whole report (those in the KPI section + those in other parts of the report), QNTKREP 
which represents the total number of financial and non-financial KPIs that are disclosed 
in the whole report, QLNFKREP which is the quality score of non-financial KPIs 
disclosed in the whole report, and QLTKREP which represents the aggregated quality 
score of financial and non-financial KPIs that are disclosed in the whole report. 
In a further step of the analyses, the KPIs that are reported in other sections in the annual 
report are considered. These analyses add more depth to the study, as they show the 
extent to which the main findings are robust when considering these KPIs.28 
3.8.1 The determinants of total non-financial KPI reporting 
Table 63 Table 64 in Appendix (2) present the results with regard to the key determinants 
affecting reporting on non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report. The models 
proposed can explain 17.3% to 23.3% of the variation in QNNFKREP, and explain 
10.8% to 21.6% of the total variation in QNNFKREP. Furthermore, there are no concerns 
                                                 
28
 To check the robustness of these results, all models reported in Table 59, Table 60, Table 61, and Table 
62 are re-estimated using different measurements for some of the firm characteristics variables. The results 
confirm the findings discussed in  3.6.2.1 
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regarding multicollinearity between the determinants of QNNFKREP and QLNFKREP 
according to VIF values. 
 Regarding the results of these analyses, it seems that the majority of explanatory 
variables continue to have the same relationship with reporting on non-financial KPIs in 
the analyses that investigate the determinants of QNNFKSEC and QLNFKSEC.29 In 
addition, Table 63 reveals that executives’ compensation show a weak positive effect in 
terms of QNNFKREP, while major shareholding appears to have a negative influence on 
it at a significance level of 10%. On the other hand, a weak positive relationship is 
observed between AC meetings and QLNFKREP (as reported in model 4 in Table 64).  
To conclude, these results are very close to the results in the analyses that investigate the 
determinants of QNNFKSEC and QLNFKSEC. Hence, they add to the robustness of the 
findings with regard to the determinants of non-financial KPI reporting.  
3.8.2 The determinants of total KPI reporting  
Table 65 and Table 66 in Appendix (2) report the analyses’ findings which indicate the 
main factors affecting reporting on KPIs disclosed in the whole report in terms of 
quantity (QNTKREP) and quality (QLTKREP). The findings show that the proposed 
explanatory variables explain a significant part of QNTKREP and QLTKREP.  The 
adjusted R2 values indicate that the models proposed can explain 15.5% to 24.1% of the 
variation in QNTKREP, and explain 12.1% to 27.3% of the total variation in QLTKREP.  
In short, the findings are consistent with the results produced in the main analyses which 
focus on the KPIs disclosed in the KPI section.30 Compared with the main analyses, it is 
observed that the executives’ compensation variable has become significant in its positive 
                                                 
29
 Look at Table 61 and Table 62 for further details.  
30
 Look at Table 24 and Table 25 for further details. 
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effect on KPI reporting quantity at a level of 5% (as reported in model 1 and model 7 of 
Table 65).  
For KPI reporting quality, Table 66 illustrates the results are almost as the same as those 
produced in the main analyses. However, it is revealed that managerial ownership shows 
a weak positive effect on QLTKREP. 
3.9 Conclusion  
 This study provides answers to research questions Q2 and Q3; it examines factors 
affecting the level of quantity and quality of KPI reporting in the UK (Q2). It also links 
the findings to question the validity of using the quantity of disclosure as a proxy for 
quality in accounting studies (Q4). 
Arguably, KPI information is disclosed on voluntarily basis. Directors are able to control 
the level and the quality of KPI reporting thanks to the elastic nature of the regulations. 
The study draws upon different theories that explain directors’ motivations to disseminate 
more information. Consequently, the determinants of KPI reporting quantity and quality 
are proposed and sorted into six groups of variables. Panel data regressions are conducted 
to test the hypotheses of the study. Focusing on KPIs that are disclosed in the KPI 
section, the findings show that there is a significant relationship between board 
characteristics and KPI reporting. In particular, board size, board composition, non-
executives’ compensation, and firm’s plans to acquire loans, have a significant and 
positive relationship with the quantity and quality of KPI reporting. In contrast, role 
duality has a negative influence on both of them.  
Given the study objective to examine whether the quantity and quality of KPI reporting 
are derived from the same factors, it is observed that they are not identically derived from 
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the same factors. The study reports that executives’ compensation and the number of AC 
meetings have a positive impact on the quality of KPI disclosures rather than their 
quantity. On the other hand, a firm intending to issue bonds is significantly and positively 
related with the quantity of KPIs disclosed in the KPI section, whereas board meetings 
have a negative association with it. These results question the proposition of using the 
quantity of disclosure as a proxy for its quality in most accounting studies. 
Unlike previous research, it is documented that no firm characteristics have an influence 
on KPI disclosure with the exception of firm size which has a significant effect on KPI 
quality. These empirical results are confirmed by investigating the determinants of KPI 
subcategories. The findings of these analyses are consistent with the above results, 
suggesting that the factors proposed in the present study can explain the variation in 
quantity and quality of financial and non-financial KPI reporting. 
To add to the robustness of the results, KPIs disclosed outside the KPI section are 
considered in further analyses. The findings of these further analyses are too close to 
those of the main analyses that investigate the determinants of KPI reporting for the KPIs 
disclosed in the KPI section. 
In short, CG mechanisms and directors’ compensation appear as the key drivers towards 
higher levels of KPI reporting in terms of quantity and quality. This places a stress on the 
need to improve CG mechanisms in UK firms. Moreover, the findings provide strong 
evidence that shareholders could affect the quantity and quality of KPI reporting by 
offering higher compensation for non-executives. 
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Chapter 4 - The impact of KPI reporting on firm value 
4.1 Overview  
KPI reporting could provide many types of information to the public. Some of this 
information is neither included in the financial statements, nor clearly presented in these 
statements. KPI reporting could include non-financial information such as the number 
of new stores, the number of senior appointments secured internally, recordable 
incident rates, and total emissions. Furthermore, according to ASB (2006), KPI 
information could contain forward-looking information that shows the targets for these 
KPIs as well as management commentary on these targets.  
As indicated in the previous chapter, KPI information is available to insiders, and they 
decide to disclose it for many purposes (i.e. signalling).   High quality KPI information 
could provide a better picture of business performance and progress to the investors. 
Information with respect to current and future performance can be compared with that 
of competitors. Given the variation between UK firms in terms of the quantity and 
quality of KPI reporting discussed earlier, it could be expected that KPI reporting could 
have an impact on firm value in the UK.    
In general, the previous literature provides mixed results about the relationship between 
corporate disclosure and firm value. In addition, previous studies place more focus on 
the impact of providing a higher quantity of disclosure on firm value. This chapter aims 
to provide answers to research questions Q3 and Q4. It extends the literature by 
examining the effects of KPI reporting on firm value in the UK (Q3). Furthermore, it 
investigates whether the quantity and quality of KPI reporting have a different influence 
on firm valuation. Hence, the analyses carried out provide evidence with regard to the 
validity of using the quantity of disclosure as a proxy for its quality in accounting 
studies (Q4). Moreover, further analyses in this chapter provide evidence with regard to   
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how different types of KPI information (i.e. financial KPIs, and non- financial KPIs) 
could have a different impact on firm value.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: section 4.2 provides the 
theoretical basis for explaining the value relevance of corporate disclosure, as well as 
reviewing previous relevant literature. Section 4.3 develops the hypotheses of the study. 
Section 4.4 illustrates the data, provides the data in terms of descriptive statistics, and 
introduces the regression models employed. Section 4.5 contains the main analyses, and 
a discussion of the empirical results. Section 4.6 reports the empirical findings with 
regard to the impact of KPI subcategories reporting. Finally, section 4.7 reports the 
conclusion of this part of the study. 
4.2 Theory and previous literature  
4.2.1 Theory 
This chapter mainly focuses on examining whether disclosing more and higher quality 
KPI information affects firm value. The association between corporate disclosure and 
firm value can be explained through agency theory and the efficient market hypothesis. 
 Theoretically, firm value is increased as a result of enhanced disclosure levels through 
either reducing the cost of capital or increasing the cash flow to its shareholders, or both 
(Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Arguably, high 
disclosure levels would reduce the cost of capital because it leads investors to reduce 
their estimation of the risk level, and therefore reduces the required rate of return when 
acquiring a firm’s shares (Coles et al., 1995; Clarkson et al., 1996). Additionally, the 
value of the firm would be increased after the anticipated increase in stock liquidity as 
the transaction costs would be reduced, and the demand for firm’s shares would be 
increased (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991).  
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As discussed before, the information asymmetry problem and agency conflicts could 
exist among company managers and outsider stakeholders (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Outsiders usually do not have access to internal information about the company which 
is available to managers. This could have an impact on the external shareholders’ 
expectations regarding risk, required returns, and company cost of capital, and thus its 
share value. Hence, enhanced corporate disclosure is a tool used to mitigate these 
problems (Hassan, 2009).  
Healy and Palepu (1993) claimed that the greater the disclosure level, the higher the 
possibility that investors understand managers’ business strategies. Reducing the 
information asymmetry between management and uninformed investors would result in 
a reduction in the uncertainty surrounding the future performance of the firm, and an 
increase in its shares’ liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Consequently, the 
lower transaction costs as well as the higher demand for firm’s shares could result in an 
increase in share price and hence the value of the firm would increase (Coles et al., 
1995; Clarkson et al., 1996). On the other hand, a high demand for firm’s shares could 
lead to a reduction in the firm’s cost with regard to equity capital (Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991; Healy and Palepu, 1993). 
However, these potential effects of enhanced disclosure may not be feasible because 
enhanced disclosure could have a negative effect upon the competitiveness of the firm 
(Healy and Palepu, 1993), and therefore one might anticipate that additional disclosure 
might have adverse effects on a firm’s valuation. 
Furthermore, Chung et al. (2012) argued that increasing the amount of disclosure, 
regardless of its quality, may not affect the capital market, suggesting that an 
incremental amount of disclosure increases the level of noise. Poor quality disclosure 
causes a lack of investor confidence, which could lead to difficulties in getting funds 
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from capital markets (Clarkson et al., 2004). In contrast, high quality reporting impacts 
positively on a firm’s value as a result of attracting institutional investors and incurring 
lower capital costs (Dhaliwal et al., 2011).  
KPI reporting provides information that helps different stakeholders to assess the 
current and future performance of a firm with regard to operating, social and 
environmental activities. However, KPI information offers clear measures to evaluate 
positive and negative developments in the firm (Boesso and Kumar, 2007). Therefore, 
the quantity and quality of KPI disclosures might have different effects on firm 
valuation.  
Arguably, KPI information would mitigate the information asymmetry problem. It may 
reduce the uncertainty of firms' future performance, and hence increase stock liquidity 
which positively affects firm value.  
Thus, if KPI information is provided by a firm with a lower level of reporting quality, 
investors’ concerns about the credibility of this information would be increased. 
Consequently, the shares of this firm could be mispriced or undervalued by investors.  
Additionally, higher quantity KPI information might lead to negative effects on a firm’s 
valuation if it displays a negative picture of the firm’s social and environmental 
performance. Investors might overestimate the costs and risks related to these activities 
which might negatively influence their expectations with regard to future performance, 
and consequently their expectation about the firm’s value. In this case, high quality KPI 
information could support a negative influence on investors’ perceptions.  
On the other hand, in line with the efficient market hypothesis, share prices are adjusted 
in line with the information available. According to Fama (1970), in an efficient stock 
market, information is incorporated in the share prices. Therefore, there is no chance of 
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outperforming the market by predicting future share prices either through technical or 
fundamental analyses (Malkiel, 2003). Thus, Fama (1970) shows that there are three 
forms of stock market in terms of efficiency: strong market efficiency, semi-strong 
market efficiency, and weak form of market efficiency. 
First, in a strong efficient market, all available (public and private) information is fully 
reflected in share prices. Second, in a semi-strong efficient market, share price is 
adjusted based on public information disclosed about the firm. Finally, in a weak form 
of efficient market, share prices follow a random walk which is independent of the 
historical information that is available about prices.  
However, it is argued that markets are not perfectly efficient. For instance, it is stated 
that: 
‘By the start of the twenty first century, the intellectual dominance of the efficient 
market hypothesis had become far less universal. Many financial economists and 
statisticians began to believe that stock prices are at least partially predictable. A new 
breed of economists emphasized psychological and behavioural elements of stock-price 
determination, and they came to believe that future stock prices are somewhat 
predictable on the basis of past stock price patterns as well as certain “fundamental” 
valuation metrics. Moreover, many of these economists were even making the far more 
controversial claim that these predictable patterns enable investors to earn excess risk 
adjusted rates of return’ (Malkiel, 2003, p.60). 
In reference to the current study, KPI disclosures that are published within the annual 
report would contain public and private information. It can be argued that, whatever the 
form of efficiency of the stock market, share prices would be adjusted as a result of the 
release of such information. Therefore, market participants would not be able to 
outperform the market and obtain abnormal returns using KPI information. 
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Investors would expect that KPI information - provided by the agent - is of high quality 
so as to incorporate this information into the stock valuation. However, managers may 
act against the interests of shareholders by building their own empires, enjoying perks, 
earning from insider trading, or by making inappropriate investments (Schleifer and 
Vishny, 1997).  Hence, managers might maximise their own wealth at the expense of 
shareholder value. Therefore, shareholders need to monitor firm’s disclosures to assess 
its quality, and to avoid any misleading information introduced by managers (Patten, 
2005).  
CG mechanisms are introduced to align the interests of the managers (the agent) and 
those of the shareholders (the principal) (Fama and Jensen, 1983). These mechanisms 
include incentive schemes that base directors’ compensation on long term return targets 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Moreover, CG mechanisms comprise activating the AC 
role in monitoring the financial reporting process, improving internal controls, and 
maintaining effective risk management. They also include increasing non executive 
directors’ representation on the board in order to ensure that executive directors work 
on maximizing shareholder value. Finally, management ownership and block holders 
might help in reducing the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. 
They carry out an effective role in ensuring that managers are not entrenched (Laporta 
et al., 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Setia-Atmaja, 2009). 
4.2.2 Previous literature 
The purpose of this section is to review the academic literature on the economic 
consequences of corporate disclosure, with particular emphasis on its impact upon firm 
value. This discussion provides insights on the potential impact of KPI reporting. 
Corporate disclosure influences on the stock market is of a great interest in accounting 
research. Previous studies have shown that corporate disclosure could affect stock 
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market participants’ anticipations and decisions. For instance, many studies have 
documented a relationship between disclosure levels and the number of analysts 
following the firm, analysts’ forecast accuracy, cost of capital, and the value of the firm 
(e.g. Dhaliwal et al., 1979; Firth, 1984; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Clarkson and 
Satterly, 1997; Botosan, 1997; Francis et al., 1997;  Rogers and Grant, 1997; Sengupta, 
1998; Eng and Teo, 2000; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002, Vanstraelen et al., 2003; Beak et 
al., 2004; Wang et al., 2008; Hassan et al., 2009;  Yu, 2010 Dhaliwal et al., 2012). The 
findings of these studies are, to some extent, related to the current study, as they offer 
evidence of the usefulness of some types of information that are also provided as part of 
KPI reporting. This information includes forward-looking information and non-
financial information.  
On the other hand, the previous studies that investigated the impact of corporate 
disclosure on firm value showed mixed results. A number of these studies suggest that 
corporate disclosure - in general or by focusing on a particular type - has a positive 
association with firm value. For example, Uyar and Kiliç (2012) documented that 
voluntary disclosure levels in Turkish annual reports are related to the level of firm 
value (measured by market capitalisation). Similarly, Silva and Alves (2004) found that 
firm value has a significant and positive relationship with financial information 
voluntarily disclosed online by Latin American companies. 
In turn, Murray et al. (2006) found no significant impact on the part of social and 
environmental disclosure upon the market performance of large UK firms. They 
highlighted the need to clarify the theory that explains why investors do not react to 
higher levels of social and environmental disclosure. 
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Hassan et al. (2009) found that the relationship between the two variables is complex 
and closely associated with the type of disclosure (mandatory/voluntary). They reported 
that there is no significant association between firm value and voluntary disclosure 
made by Egyptian firms, while it has a negative and significant relationship with 
mandatory disclosure. Furthermore, Uyar and Kiliç (2012) found that the association 
between voluntary disclosure and firm value has been affected by firm value 
measurement. In particular, their results changed from positive to being insignificant 
when they employed market-to-book value as the dependent variable in the regression 
model instead of market capitalisation.  
Most previous studies did not focus on the potential effect of disclosure quality upon 
firm value. Accounting research usually uses disclosure quantity as a proxy for its 
quality (e.g. Hussainey and Mouselli, 2010; Mouselli et al., 2012). According to this 
proposition, one can assume an equivalent impact in terms of both disclosure quantity 
and quality upon firm value.  
Few studies have shown that disclosure quality affects the stock market. These studies 
indicate that firms with lower reporting quality could face lower levels of stock returns, 
or suffer from mispricing problems (e.g. Healy et al., 1999; Drake et al., 2009; Chung et 
al., 2012, Mouselli et al., 2012). Notably, the previous literature that examined the 
impact of corporate disclosure quality has used different proxies that might not directly 
measure disclosure quality.31  
A number of these studies were conducted in the US using the analysts’ disclosure 
ratings (AIMR) or the existence of American Depositary receipts (ADR) as proxies for 
disclosure quality. For instance, Healy et al. (1999) found that higher reporting quality -
                                                 
31
 For a further detailed review of disclosure quality measures, see section  2.2.2. 
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measured by analyst disclosure ratings - are associated with higher stock returns. The 
findings suggest that firms with high disclosure quality attract the attention of investors 
and analysts and increase stock liquidity.  
Baek et al. (2004) study suggested a similar finding in the Korean setting during periods 
of Asian crises. They found that firms with higher disclosure quality (proxied by having 
ADR)32, experienced a smaller decrease in their value during the financial crises. Chung 
et al. (2012) reported that investors in the Korean stock market misprice firms that issue 
derivative-related loss announcements of low disclosure quality (i.e. that issue the 
information on the underlying foreign currency subsequent to the announcement date). 
In the UK, Mouselli et al. (2012) showed that disclosure quality (measured by the 
number of future-oriented statements) can explain variations in stock returns. 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no previous study that directly tested the 
effects of KPI reporting on firm value.  KPI information includes different types of 
information that might attract stock market participants. KPI reporting provides 
financial and non-financial information that evaluates firm performance. KPI 
disclosures also present past and future-oriented information. This information is not 
only limited to financial performance, but also is related to social and environmental 
performance. 
Therefore, the current study builds on previous research that generally showed the 
importance of information included within KPI disclosures for stock market 
participants. For instance, previous literature provides evidence of financial analysts 
focusing on certain types of information such as non-financial information (e.g. Epstein 
                                                 
32  The existence of American Depositary Receipts (ADR) refers to non-US companies that are listed on 
the US stock market(s). ADR is used as a proxy of disclosure quality because of their commitment to 
enhance disclosure levels.  
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and Palepu, 1999; Breton and Taffler, 2001; Beattie and Pratt, 2002). Other studies 
highlighted the importance of narrative reporting to sell-side financial analysts, such as 
financial and non-financial indicators (Dempsey et al., 1997), and non-financial 
forward-looking information (Hussainey and Walker, 2006). 
Haggard et al. (2008) argued that investors value credible and enhanced firm-specific 
information that is voluntarily disclosed by firms. The study indicates that firms that 
make this information easy to access by investors would avoid price crashes. Booker et 
al. (2011) conducted an experimental study that highlights the role of the content of 
non-financial performance indicator narratives on users’ perceptions.  
Empirically, Mavrinac and Seisfeld (1997) provided evidence of investor reliance upon 
non-financial data. In particular, they showed that investors express their interest in 
non-financial factors that could shape firms’ performance in the future. These factors 
include product quality, the perceived quality of management, investment in employee 
development, and the corporate innovations. Therefore, it can be expected that firms 
that show clearly to the public any improvements in their KPI results concerning such 
factors could add to their shareholder value.  Ittner and Larcker (1998) found that non-
financial customer satisfaction indicators are value relevant to the stock market. They 
argued that disclosing these measures provide information to the market on expected 
cash flows. Thus, they found that releasing these measures is statistically associated 
with excess stock return over a ten day announcement period. However, Barton et al. 
(2010) examined the value relevance of some financial indicators including sales, 
EBITDA, operating income, income before income taxes, income before extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations, net income, total comprehensive income, and 
operating cash flows. They found that these indicators displayed value relevance in 46 
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countries during 1996–2005. No single indicator gained dominance in all countries. 
However, investors showed higher value towards those indicators that include core 
operating expenses and exclude more transitory items like extraordinary items, gains 
and losses, and other comprehensive income (i.e., operating income and EBITDA). On 
the other hand, Dorestani and Rezaee (2011a) examined the role played by non-
financial KPIs in analysts’ forecasts. They investigated the association between non-
financial KPI disclosures and the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts for a sample of US 
firms for the two-year period between 2006 and 2007. Their results suggest that the 
change in KPI quantity (measured by the ratio of the total number of KPI keywords 
disclosed to total words included in management discussion and analysis) does not have 
a significant impact on analysts’ forecast accuracy (measured by forecast errors). 
Dorestani and Rezaee (2011b) found a positive association between the quantity of non-
financial KPIs disclosed and the perceptions of investors about quality of earnings 
(measured by a factor that captures the association between current accruals and cash 
flows). Yet, they found this relationship significant only for Oil and Gas companies. 
However, Dorestani and Rezaee’s studies examine the effects of non-financial KPI 
reporting quantity rather than its quality. They also did not consider financial KPI 
reporting in their analyses. Looking at UK studies that explored the importance of KPIs 
for stock market participants, only Hussainey and Walker (2006) investigated to what 
extent analysts’ reports could rely on KPI disclosure. Their study gives a good 
indication that financial analysts depend on different KPIs among high and low growth 
UK companies. However, the study did not investigate the impact of KPI disclosures on 
firm valuation.  
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To conclude, the results of previous studies regarding the association between corporate 
disclosure and corporate value are mixed. It is argued that this association is sensitive to 
the type of disclosure, and the proxy employed for firm value. This suggests that the 
relationship between corporate disclosure and firm value is still an open empirical 
question. Additionally, a limited number of studies have investigated the impact of 
disclosure quality upon the stock market. None of these studies has examined the 
relationship between disclosure quality (considering the qualitative characteristics of 
information disclosed) and firm value.  Although previous studies have shown that 
market participants pay attention to many types of information that can be included in 
KPI disclosures, there is a lack of evidence on KPI reporting association with firm 
value.  
The variation among UK firms’ KPI reporting in practice provides a good research 
avenue to test the association between KPI reporting and firm value. As mentioned 
earlier, this type of disclosure is mandated, but the regulations allow firms’ directors to 
control it. Furthermore, although CG attributes are found to affect firm value in some 
previous studies (e.g. Klein, 1998; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Aggarwal et al., 2009), 
the nature of CG regulations has a similar orientation. Firms are allowed to comply with 
the CG code or just explain the reasons for not complying with it. Therefore, it is 
interesting to examine how firm value could be affected by corporate KPI reporting in 
this unique setting.  
In addition, the current study seeks to fill the following gap in the literature. As 
mentioned earlier, low quality incremental information could cause noise to stock 
market participants. Several studies reveal that disclosure quality is valued by investors 
(e.g. Baek et al., 2004). In contrast to the previous studies that used disclosure quantity 
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as a proxy for its quality, the current study challenges this proposition by measuring 
KPI reporting quality by considering all qualitative attributes of the information implied 
by the ASB (2006) guidance for best practice. 
This study would extend the literature on the relationship between firm’s value and 
corporate disclosure in general, and KPI reporting specifically. To the best of the 
author’s knowledge, there is no study - either in the UK context or in any other context 
- that has examined whether the quantity of KPI disclosure and its quality have different 
relationships with firm value.  
4.3 Research hypotheses 
The aim of the current study is to test the effect of KPI quantity as well as KPI reporting 
quality on firm value (Q3). This helps to examine whether the quantity and quality of 
KPI disclosure have the same relationship with firm value, and hence, it could also help 
in examining whether disclosure quantity can be used as a proxy for its quality (Q4).  
4.3.1 KPI reporting quantity and quality and firm value 
The literature on the impact of corporate disclosure on firm value is limited and offers 
mixed results. In addition, most of these studies have focused on the impact of 
disclosure quantity regardless of its quality. This provides a good opportunity to analyse 
the relationship between KPI reporting including its subcategories and firm value.   
KPI disclosures include different types of information that might be of interest to 
investors including financial indicators about firm operating activities, financial 
performance, and capital expenditure. Moreover, KPI information might contain non-
financial indicators related to firm performance such as social and environmental 
activities.   
From the agency theory perspective, since KPI reporting may provide investors with 
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data that is available to insiders, one could expect that KPI disclosures would mitigate 
the information asymmetry problem. Information on financial and non-financial KPI 
would reduce uncertainty about business performance. Therefore, increasing the 
quantity of KPIs disclosed could help the investor to evaluate the success of 
management in terms of achieving a firm’s objectives, and also to evaluate future 
prospects. It is argued that more released information might lead to an increase in the 
demand for corporate shares and, in turn, its price (Healy and Palepu, 1993; Clarkson et 
al., 2013). 
Some studies suggest a positive association between the quantity of disclosure and the 
value of the firm. For example, Healy et al. (1999) found that firms with higher levels 
of voluntary disclosure are more likely to show an increase in stock price, regardless of 
their earnings.  
Therefore, one can expect that the higher the quantity of KPIs disclosed, the higher the 
market value of the firm. However, enhanced disclosure could have adverse effects if it 
puts the firm at a competitive disadvantage compared with its rivals (Healy and Palepu, 
1993; Hassan et al., 2009), or if it makes more noise to the investors which negatively 
affects their valuation (Chung et al., 2012). As mentioned before, the extant literature 
does not present strong evidence on the positive association between corporate 
disclosure and firm value. Furthermore, it is found that the direction and magnitude of 
the relationship is associated with the type of disclosure (Hassan et al., 2009) and the 
proxy that is used for firm value (Uyar and Kiliç, 2012). 
On the other hand, several studies show that the quality of different types of disclosure 
is relevant and important to the users. For example, it can improve share price 
anticipation of earnings (Hussainey et al., 2003; Schleicher et al., 2007, Hussainey and 
Walker, 2009). It is has also been shown that disclosure quality can be used 
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interchangeably with other information sources such as dividend propensity (Hussainey 
and Walker, 2009), and accruals quality (Mouselli et al., 2012). Regardless of the 
approach used to measure disclosure quality in these studies, it can be argued that 
reporting quality can be employed to affect the perceptions of stock market participants 
about firm performance. Gelb and Zarowin (2002) found that the relationship between 
stock price and firm’s earning performance is stronger in firms with higher disclosure 
quality, in contrast to firms with low levels of disclosure quality (measured by 
disclosure ratings). 
In general, the previous studies did not directly examine the impact of disclosure quality 
- as opposed to its quantity - on firm value. One exception was the study of Gelb and 
Zarowin (2002) that used analyst ratings as an indication of disclosure quality. 
However, previous studies used the amount of disclosure as a proxy for its quality. 
Their results are more relevant with regard to explaining the different impacts of 
disclosure quantity.  
Taking into consideration that KPI information might include new and incremental 
information which is not included in the financial statements; investors might reflect 
this information in their share prices assessment. For instance, KPI information might 
provide the investors with future prospects of financial as well as non-financial KPIs 
and their relationship with the strategy of the firm. It also might include non-financial 
KPI information about environmental aspects such as recycling rates, emissions of 
manufacturing operations, and environmental accidents. In addition, KPI reporting may 
also provide vital information about the workforce such as staff attrition rate, and the 
number of senior appointments sourced internally.  Therefore, it is expected that 
disseminating KPI information would lead to share prices adjustments in accordance 
with the efficient market hypothesis. However, stock market participants will not be 
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able to achieve abnormal returns relying on KPI information. In other words, KPI 
information would affect firm value, but without outperforming the market and yielding 
abnormal returns.  
As mentioned before, markets do not seem to be perfectly efficient. For example, Ball 
(1978) documented the occurrence of drifts in share price after the announcement of 
new information. He argued that markets are not efficient in processing new 
information, and hence, this information was not incorporated in adjusting share prices. 
Furthermore, Owusu-Ansah (2000) pointed to the importance of the timeliness of 
annual reports. He claimed that accounting information - disclosed in the annual report - 
could be useless to the users if the annual report is published too late.   
 Therefore, it can be argued that KPI information would affect share prices based upon 
these considerations. First, this information should not be published too late. Second, 
KPI information should be of high quality in order for it to be comprehended and 
incorporated correctly in share prices by investors. 
On balance, previous studies lead to the prediction of a relationship between KPI 
reporting and firm value. Taking into consideration the highly positive relationship 
between KPI reporting quantity and KPI reporting quality, one can expect that each of 
them has a similar effect upon firm value. However, given the contradictory and limited 
evidence in previous studies regarding corporate disclosure association with firm value 
in the UK, the current study investigates the direction and extent of the relationship 
between KPI reporting and firm value using a different measure to assess KPI 
disclosure quality. This would help to test whether KPI reporting quantity and its 
quality can work as substitutes. Therefore, it is hypothesised that: 
H1: There is a significant relationship between KPI reporting and firm value. 
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H1a: There is a significant relationship between KPI reporting quantity and firm value. 
H1b: There is a significant relationship between KPI reporting quality and firm value. 
4.3.2 Corporate governance mechanisms and firm value 
Drawing upon agency theory, the general objective of CG mechanisms is to align 
managers’ interests with shareholders’ interests. It is anticipated that CG mechanisms 
motivate managers to increase shareholder’s value (Bruce et al., 2007). According to 
previous studies, it is expected that various factors have an impact on firm value. 
Therefore, this study considers the impact of CG mechanisms - proposed by previous 
studies - on firm value (e.g. Morck et al., 1988; Laporta et al., 2002; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006 Hassan et al., 2009; Aggarwal, 2009; Setia-Atmaja, 2009; Ezat, 2010; 
Ammann et al., 2011; Ujunwa, 2012). To facilitate forming and testing the hypotheses, 
CG variables are classified into the following categories: Directors’ compensation in 
section 4.3.2.1, Board characteristics in section 4.3.2.2, AC characteristics in section 
4.3.2.3, and Ownership structure in section 4.3.2.4. 
4.3.2.1 Directors’ compensation 
Al-Najjar et al. (2011) showed that high CEO compensation reflects high managerial 
talent which leads to making value added decisions for shareholders (e.g. cutting capital 
and M&A expenditures). According to agency theory, incentive plans are designed to 
encourage board directors to maximize shareholders’ wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). That is achieved by linking directors’ compensation with the financial objectives 
of the firm. Hence, it can be expected that high directors’ remuneration could be 
associated with higher firm performance. Bruce et al. (2007) claimed that bonus 
schemes makes executives perceive that they are being monitored. Al-Najjar et al. 
(2011) found that higher compensation paid to CEOs is positively associated with firm 
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performance as measured by Tobin’s Q for UK firms over the period from 2003 to 
2009.  
However, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the relationship between total 
compensation - either for executive or non-executive directors - and firm value has not 
been investigated in the literature. Therefore, the current study addresses this issue and 
the following hypotheses are formulated: 
H2. An association exists between executive compensation and firm value. 
H3. An association exists between non-executive compensation and firm value. 
4.3.2.2 Board characteristics 
4.3.2.2.1 Board size 
It is claimed that the combined experience and knowledge of board members is 
essential in today’s complex business environment (Conger et al., 1998). Hence, it is 
argued that a large board could help the firm to secure critical resources that positively 
impact on its financial performance (Dalton et al., 1999). However, previous studies 
have shown inconsistent results with regard to board size effect on firm performance or 
value (Goodstein et al., 1994; Yermack, 1996; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006; Ezat, 2010; Ujunwa, 2012). Thus, this relationship between board size 
and firm value is examined. The following hypothesis is formulated: 
H4: There is a significant relationship between board size and firm value. 
4.3.2.2.2 Board composition 
Boards with a high proportion of NEDs can reduce the agency problem. Managers are 
usually dominated by their self-interest targets at the expense of shareholders. 
Therefore, boards with a high proportion of NEDs could better perform monitoring 
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roles (Dalton et al., 1999). Hence, it appears that this factor could have a significant 
effect on investment decisions and hence on firm value. However, there are some 
disadvantages of boards that are dominated by NEDs.  In particular, such boards might 
suffer from the lack of strategic decisions (Goodstein et al., 1994), in addition to the 
lack of local experience and training of outsider directors in contrast to insiders (Dalton 
et al., 1999). Previous studies showed mixed findings regarding the association between 
board composition and firm value (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006; Aggarwal et al., 2009; Setia-Atmaja, 2009). Therefore, the following hypothesis 
is formulated: 
H5: There is a significant relationship between board composition and firm value. 
4.3.2.2.3 Board meetings 
 In general, previous research does not provide clear evidence of the relationship 
between board meetings and firm value.  Thus, it is suggested that boards with more 
frequent meetings are superior when it comes to setting a firm’s strategy and 
monitoring managers’ performance (Conger et al., 1998). In reference to agency theory, 
this could reduce the agency problem and, in turn, would affect shareholders’ wealth. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H6: There is a significant relationship between board meetings and firm value. 
4.3.2.2.4 Role duality 
According to agency theory, if the CEO of the firm holds the chairman position, board 
monitoring will be impaired. This situation would lead to CEO entrenchment which 
negatively affects the firm’s financial performance (Chen at al., 2008; Ujunwa, 2012). 
However, several studies failed to find evidence that firm value is significantly affected 
by CEO duality (e.g. Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Aggarwal et al., 2009). It can be 
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argued that the concentration of power will enable the CEO - who has enough 
experience and knowledge about the operating and financial activities of the firm - to 
control the firm and improve its performance. Hence, this duality might have a positive 
impact on firm value. Therefore, the role duality effect on firm value will be 
investigated in the current study. Thus, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H7: There is a significant relationship between role duality and firm value. 
4.3.2.3  Audit committee characteristics 
As one of the main CG mechanisms, the AC role is to oversee financial reporting, the 
internal control system and risk management in the firm. It is anticipated that effective 
ACs which have enough human and time resources would have more ability to 
undertake its responsibilities, and protect shareholders’ interests. Arguably, the larger 
ACs and the more active ACs would be associated with better firm valuation. 
Nevertheless, previous empirical studies have not provided evidence that directly 
supports this argument. In contrast, most of these studies focused on the association 
between AC characteristics and financial reporting quality (e.g. Klein, 2002; Carcello 
and Neal, 2003). 
The next hypotheses are formulated as follows: 
H8: There is a significant relationship between AC size and firm value. 
H9: There is a significant relationship between AC meetings and firm value. 
4.3.2.4 Ownership structure  
4.3.2.4.1 Managerial ownership 
Managerial ownership is considered as one of the CG mechanisms that reduces agency 
conflicts between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this 
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regard, Cheng et al. (2012) claimed that managerial ownership can operate as an 
alternative for board monitoring mechanisms. The previous literature has shown mixed 
results with respect to managerial ownership’s impact on firm value. For instance, 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) found that there is no significant relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm value. Thus, Morck et al. (1988) indicated that at 
relatively low and high levels of ownership, firm value is positively associated with 
managerial ownership. Yet, this relationship turns out to be negative at the medium 
level of ownership. On the other hand, Cheng et al. (2012) found that management 
entrenchment causes the association between managerial ownership and firm value to 
be negative at low and high levels of ownership. In turn, this relationship becomes 
negative between the two variables at the medium level of ownership due to a 
convergence of interests effect. To test the relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm value, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H10: There is a significant relationship between managerial ownership and firm value. 
4.3.2.4.2 Block holders’ ownership 
Block holders’ ownership may have different effects on firm valuation. La Porta et al. 
(2002) indicated that controlling shareholders are willing to pay more for financial 
securities when they feel that their rights are better protected. Hence, they improve their 
valuation of a firm, as they know that most of its profits will come back to them. On the 
other hand, controlling shareholders might raise another agency problem. It can be 
expected that in the event of poor investor protection and/or weak CG in a firm, block 
holders might expropriate minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et 
al., 2002). In such a case, investors might lower their valuation of the firm. The 
relationship between block holders and firm value is investigated as the outcomes of 
empirical work on the block holders’ valuation effect are mixed. A positive relationship 
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in terms of block holders’ ownership and firm value is documented in some studies (e.g. 
La Porta et al., 2002; Aggarwal et al., 2009), whereas a negative association is reported 
in other studies (e.g. Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ezat, 2010). The following hypothesis 
is formulated: 
H11: There is a significant relationship between block holders’ ownership and firm 
value. 
4.3.3 Firm characteristics and other control variables  
Following previous studies (e.g. Lins, 2003; Aggarwal et al., 2009; Hassan et al., 2009; 
Cheng et al., 2012), this study deals with several firm characteristics. These controls 
are: firm size, profitability, leverage, cross listing, cash to assets ratio, capital 
expenditure to assets ratio, and property, plant, and equipment to sales ratio.33 Larger 
firms have more resources than smaller firms. Therefore, a positive association was 
reported between firm size and firm value in several previous studies (e.g. Hassan et al., 
2009; Ezat, 2010). With regard to profitability, firms that report higher profits would 
signal their capabilities to the investors. It might be perceived that these firms have 
competitive advantages that enable them to achieve higher profits which positively 
affect shareholder value. In addition, profitable firms are perceived as firms with more 
growth opportunities. Hence, in line with Hassan et al. (2009), a positive relationship is 
also expected between profitability levels and firm value. With respect to leverage, 
Hodgson and Stevenson-Clarke (2000) stated that high leverage could lead to positive 
change in firm value for two reasons. First, tax deductibility on borrowing causes 
decrease in the cost of debt, and in turn increases firm value. Second, managers in 
highly leveraged companies send good signal to the investors in terms of their 
                                                 
33
 Some variables used in the second study are excluded because of collinearity with the suggest ed 
variables in the third study such as liquidity. Therefore, the variables used in the study of KPI reporting 
relationship with firm value - especially the control ones  – are, to some extent, different from those used 
in the study of KPI reporting determinants. 
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confidence in the firm’s ability to cover debt costs in the future. Moreover, cross listing 
is considered as a control variable in the current study. Listing in foreign markets 
facilitates firms’ access to alternative sources of finance. Cross listing also positively 
affects the liquidity of firms’ shares (Hope, 2003). Thus, a positive association is 
expected between cross listing and firm value. Finally, investors usually consider the 
information related to firms’ current operations and future growth opportunities before 
improving or lowering their valuation of these firms. A firm with higher possibilities of 
growth would attract more investors. Therefore, following many studies (e.g. Aggarwal 
et al., 2009), the study uses the cash to assets ratio, the capital expenditure to assets 
ratio, and the property, plant, and equipment to sales ratio as proxies for current 
operations, resources and future growth opportunities.   
4.4 Data, regression models, and descriptive statistics 
This section presents the data collected, the models employed, and the definition of all 
the variables used. It also shows the data descriptive statistics. Panel regressions are 
employed in order to examine the relationship between firm value and KPI reporting as 
well as other explanatory variables. Section 4.4.1 introduces the sample and the 
variables used in the current study. Then, section 4.4.2 introduces the regression 
models. Finally, descriptive statistics for the variables used in the current study are 
presented in 4.4.3.  
4.4.1 The data 
As mentioned earlier, the present study focuses on the annual reports for a sample of 
UK, FTSE 350, non-financial firms over a five year period (2006-2010). The study 
sample is the same sample used in the previous chapters. It consists of 515 annual 
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reports of 103 firms published between 2006 and 2010. 34Various observations are 
excluded for the reasons illustrated in Panel (A) in Table 30, to come up with 485 
observations as the final sample. Panel (B) in the same table provides a disaggregation 
of the sample across industries.   
Table 30 Sample selection and its disaggregation across industries 
PANEL A – SAMPLE SELECTION PROCESS 
Starting point: Top 350 UK firms based on market capitalisation, according to the 2011 
Financial Times ranking. Financial firms are then excluded. Subsequently, 103 firms 
are selected randomly following two criteria: 1) each sector is represented in the same 
proportion as in the starting sample; 2) as firms are arranged according to market 
capitalisation; systematic sampling is used by choosing the first company in every 
sector as a starting point. Then, selection is continued by selecting the third, the fifth 
and so on. Then, selection is continued by selecting the third, the fifth and so on. This 
process results in 515 observations [103 * 5 years (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010)]. 
Thereafter, the following exclusions take place: 
n observations 
excluded 
thereafter 
Reason for exclusion 
2 KPI regulation not applicable in 2006 (because of year end date). 
4 Missing data on directors’ compensation. 
6 Missing CG data.  
3 Missing data on data stream. 
15 Having negative book value of shareholders’ equity.35 
 
30 total number of observations excluded 
485 final sample 
PANEL B – SAMPLE CONSTITUENTS BY INDUSTRY  
Industry Frequency Percentage 
Basic Materials 40 8.25 
Consumer Goods 62 12.78 
Consumer Services 97  20.00 
Health Care 24 4.95 
Industrials 143 29.48 
Oil & Gas 51 10.52 
Technology 38 7.48 
Telecommunications 10 2.06 
Utilities 20 4.12 
TOTAL 485 100.0 
  
                                                 
34
 For more details on the sample firms, please see section  2.4. 
35
 Excluding firms with negative book value of equity is an essential step in the analyses to avoid 
capturing any effects of financial distress (Lins, 2003: p.163).  
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4.4.2 The models  
According to the theoretical framework, a relationship is expected between KPI 
reporting (quantity and quality) and firm value. Empirical studies used different proxies 
in order to capture investors’ reactions to the information disclosed.  For instance, stock 
return has been used in many previous studies to investigate the effect of information 
released (e.g. Conover and Wallace, 1995; Healy et al., 1999; Bloomfield and Wilks, 
2000; Lang and Lundholm, 2000; Bushee and Leuz, 2005; Hussainey and Mouselli, 
2010; Roychowdhury and Sletten, 2012; Tsalavoutas et al., 2012). In addition, Tobin’s 
Q has also been used to measure firm value in some studies (e.g. Morck et al., 1988; 
Laporta et al., 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Hassan et al., 2009; Aggarwal, 2009; 
Setia-Atmaja, 2009; Ezat, 2010). Other studies have used market-to-book value to 
reflect the market value of the firm compared with its book value (e.g. Hassan et al., 
2009; Uyar and Kiliç, 2012). 
Following previous studies (e.g. Morck et al., 1988; Laporta et al., 2002; Lins, 2003; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Hassan et al., 2009; Aggarwal, 2009), Tobin’s Q ratio is 
used as a measure of the dependent variable (firm value) in the main analysis. 
Additionally, market-to-book ratio is used as well to check the robustness of results 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Hassan et al., 2009). 
Tobin’s Q is equal to the ratio of the firm's market value to the replacement cost of its 
physical assets (Morck et al., 1988: p. 296), or ‘The ratio of the market value of assets 
to their replacement value at the end of the most recent fiscal year’ (La Porta et al., 
2002: p.1156). This ratio implies investors’ perception of the value of a firm by 
reflecting this perception on the ratio’s value. If the ratio is larger than one, it will refer 
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to an improvement in that firm’s value due to the efficient usage of its resources, and 
vice versa (Hassan et al., 2009).  
Following Lins (2003), Tobin's Q ratio is computed as: 
 Tobin’s Q (TQ) = (total assets + market value of equity − total common equity)/total 
assets. 
Regarding market-to-book ratio (MB), it is measured as the ratio of the market value of 
equity to the book value of that equity. This ratio is a good indicator of how a firm is 
being valued by investors. If the ratio exceeds 1, it means that the firm is overvalued by 
investors and vice versa (Hassan et al., 2009).36 
The market value of equity is calculated as the number of outstanding shares at the year 
end, multiplied by the market value of the share at three months after the year end. This 
procedure is to ensure that share prices are affected by the KPI information that is 
released in the annual reports.37  
Regarding the explanatory variables, the variable of interest is KPI reporting, including 
KPI reporting quantity and KPI reporting quality. Additionally, CG attributes are used 
as explanatory variables. Finally, following previous studies (e.g. La Porta et al., 2002; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, Aggarwal et al., 2009; Hassan et al., 2009; Cheng et al., 
2012), several firm characteristics, as well as other control variables, are included in the 
model.   
 Furthermore, the industry effect is considered in the analyses because it could have an 
effect on firm valuation.  Political cost theory posits that different industries might be 
                                                 
36
 A logarithm transformation is used in order to bring the distribution of TQ and MB nearer to normality 
(see chapter three: sections 3.5.3 and 3.6.1 for more details on such procedures). 
37 
Another procedure is followed to check for the robustness of the results by using the market value of 
equity six months after the year end in all regression models.  
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subject to different political costs (Ball and Foster, 1982). These costs may arise from 
the nature of the industries’ activities or from following specific regulations.  Moreover, 
being in the public eye could push firms within an industry to employ particular 
practices or incur extra expenditures, while firms in other industries may not be subject 
to these commitments.    
Thus, the current study uses these two models: 
The main analysis model:   
TQ =  α+ β1 QNTKSEC + β2 QLTKSEC+ β3 EXCOMP+ β4  NOEXCOMP + β5 
BORSIZE+ β6  BORCOMP+ β7 BORMEET+  β8 ROLEDUAL+ β9 ACSIZE+ β10 
ACMEET +β11MANGOWN + β12 MAJORSHAR+ firm characteristics and other 
control variables+ ε 
The model used for robustness purposes: 
MB = α+ β1 QNTKSEC + β2 QLTKSEC+ β3 EXCOMP+ β4  NOEXCOMP + β5 
BORSIZE+ β6  BORCOMP+ β7 BORMEET+  β8 ROLEDUAL+ β9 ACSIZE+ β10 
ACMEET +β11MANGOWN + β12 MAJORSHAR+ firm characteristics and other 
control variables+ ε 
Whereas: 
TQ = TQ+3: which denotes Tobin’s Q ratio three months after the year end.   
MB= MB+3: which represents market-to-book ratio three months after the year end.   
QNTKSEC= KPI reporting quantity. 
QLTKSEC= KPI reporting quality. 
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 α     =    the intercept.  
β1 …….β 12= Regression coefficients.  
 ε       = Error term 
Table 31 illustrates the definition and measurement for each variable of the present 
study. 
Table 31 Study variables: definitions & measurement 
Variable Definition  Measurement 
Dependent Variables  
TQ+3 
 
TobinsQ   The natural logarithm of: (total assets 
(WC02999) + market value of equity three 
months after the year end - total common 
equity (WC03501))/ total assets(WC02999) 
MB+3 Market-to-book 
ratio 
The natural logarithm of market value of 
equity (three months after the year end) to 
book value of equity (WC03501) ratio. 
New explanatory Variables
38 
CASH_ASSETS Cash to total 
assets ratio 
Cash (WC02003) to total assets (WC02999).  
CAPEX_ASSETS Capital 
expenditures to 
assets ratio 
 Capital expenditures (WC04601) / total 
assets (WC02999). 
PRPLEQ_SALES Property-
plants-
equipment to 
sales ratio 
Property, plants, and equipment 
expenditures (WC02501) / sales 
(WC01001). 
 
4.4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 32 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the current study. 
Panel A refers to the continuous variables used in the main analysis and further 
analyses, whereas Panel B illustrates descriptive statistics for categorical variables. The 
results indicate the variation in firm value for the sample firms when measured by 
                                                 
38
 Except these three new variables: CASH_ASSETS, CAPEX_ASSETS, and PRPLEQ_SALES, other 
variables are used in the previous study. Thus, more details about measurement and econometric 
considerations with regard to these variables can be found in chapter three: sections 3.5.3 and 3.6.1. 
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Tobin’s Q (market-to-book ratio) after three months. Tobin’s Q ratio (market-to-book 
ratio) three months after the year end ranges from a minimum of 0.54 (0.09) to a 
maximum of 34.00 (160.46) with a mean of 2.014 (5.103). The mean and median of TQ 
(MB) generally suggest that sample firms are over-valued by investors taking into 
account the book value of assets (equity). 
 Regarding the main explanatory variables, KPI quantity scores (QNTKSEC) is 
relatively small with a median of 6 KPIs.  The majority of these KPIS are financial 
KPIS with median of 5 KPIs. 
With regard to KPI reporting quality, a low level of KPI reporting quality scores 
(QLTKSEC) is observed with a mean of 0.36. Apparently, quality scores are mainly 
derived by financial KPI quality scores (QLFKS). The mean of QLFKS is 0.35, 
whereas a lower level of quality scores is shown for non-financial KPIs (0.27). 
With respect to the main CG variables attributes, executive directors’ compensation 
varies from £164,960 to £13,000,000, while it varies from £24,060 to £315,480 for non-
executive directors. The median percentage of non-executive directors is 0.625 from 9 
directors (the median of board size). This indicates that non-executive directors 
generally represent the majority of the board. The board meetings as a proxy of board 
activity show that the meetings median is 8 times per year. The audit committee size 
median is 4 directors; on average this committee has 4 meetings per year. The average 
of directors’ share interests in ordinary shares is 0.05%. Finally, the major shareholders 
hold an average stake of 38.9 % in the firms represented in the sample.  
With regard to firm characteristics, the natural logarithm of market capitalisation for 
sample firms varies from minimum of 8.00 (£17,000,000) to a maximum of 11.02 
(£130 billion) with standard deviation of 0.69 (£18 billion). The mean profitability of 
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these firms as measured by ROE is around 0.08. The leverage ratio indicates that firms 
in the sample are not highly leveraged with a mean debt to total assets of 0.34. The 
figures show that these firms vary widely with regard to their dividend yield ratios 
which range from 0.0 to 0.219. Similarly, a wide variation is observed with respect to 
the ratios that are introduced to control for financial performance that affects firm 
growth. The variation in these ratios reflects the fact that firms vary in their ability to 
grow in the future. Firms vary in terms of generating cash from their assets. This affects 
their ability to meet their commitments, as well as their ability to invest in new projects 
in the future. Similarly, it is shown that firms also vary in their capital expenditure 
which also affects their future performance, and hence their value. This variation in 
these ratios between the sample firms is expected, as the sample is drawn from FTSE 
350 firms. Hence, it is essential to control for the effects of this variation in order to 
ensure the robustness of the results. 
Panel C shows the descriptive statistics for the categorical variables. It indicates that 
most of the firms included in the sample (89.9%) are traded on foreign financial 
markets. Similarly, it is noted that the majority of the sample firms (95.1%) make a 
distinction between chairman and CEO positions.  
Table 32 Descriptive statistics for study variables 
Panel (A) Descriptive statistics for continuous variables 
Variable Max Min Mean Med SD N 
TQ+3 34.00 0.54 2.01 1.58 2.35 485 
MB+3 160.46 0.09 5.10 2.67 14.62 485 
QNTKSEC 24.00 0.00 7.53 6.00 5.10 485 
QLTKSEC 0.688 0.00 0.36 0.38 0.17 485 
EXCOMP 13,000 164.960 1,700 1,100 2,000 485 
NOEXCOMP 315,480 24,060 77,012 65,000 43,726 485 
BORSIZE 16.00 5.00 9.38 9.00 2.45 485 
BORCOMP 0.86 0.33 0.62 0.63 0.12 485 
BORMEET 17.00 4.00 8.59 8.00 2.50 485 
ACSIZE 6.00 2.00 3.64 4.00 0.87 485 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE IMPACT OF KPI REPORTING ON FIRM VALUE 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ic
es 
178 
ACMEET 8.00 1.00 4.00 4.00 1.25 485 
MANGOWN 0.53 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.11 485 
MAJORSHAR 0.77 0.04 0.38 0.39 0.17 485 
SIZE 11.02 8.00 9.21 9.08 0.69 485 
PROFITAB 0.52 -0.173 0.08 0.07 0.08 485 
LEVERAGE 0.990 0.00 0.34 0.32 0.237 485 
DIVYIELD 0.219 0.00 0.029 0.024 0.03 485 
CASH_ASSETS 50.55 0.06 8.51 5.86 8.58 485 
CAPEX_ASSETS 27.04 0.00 5.09 3.68 4.85 485 
PRPLEQ_SALES 516.30 0.89 57.72 21.86 90.24 485 
Variables used in further analyses:     
QNFKS 19.00 0.00 5.37 5.00 3.48 485 
QNNFKSEC 15.00 0.00 2.18 1.00 2.94 485 
QNNFKREP 16.00 0.00 2.90 2.00 3.43 485 
QNTKREP 24.00 0.00 8.24 7.00 5.43 485 
QLFKS 0.69 0.00 0.35 0.38 0.17 485 
QLNFKSEC 0.79 0.00 0.27 0.29 0.25 485 
QLNFKREP 0.82 0.00 0.31 0.33 0.25 485 
QLTKREP 0.67 0.00 0.37 0.39 0.17 485 
Panel (B) Descriptive statistics for the categorical variables 
Variable Proportion 
CROSSLIST: Proportion of firms whom shares are traded in foreign 
financial markets. 
89.9% 
ROLEDUAL: Proportion of directors who are the chairmen and the CEO 
for a company at the same time. 
4.9 % 
Panel (A) displays descriptive statistics for continuous variables: Dependent variables: : TQ +3: TobinsQ after three months from 
the financial year end respectively, MB+3: Market-to-book ratio after three months from the financial year end; Explanatory 
variables: QNTKSEC: the quantity of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; QLTKSEC: the aggregated 
quality of financial and non-financial KPIs that disclosed in KPI section; EXCO MP: Executive compensation (in thousands); 
NO EXCO MP: Non-executive compensation; BO RSIZE: Board size; BO RCO MP: Board composition; BO RMEET: Board 
meetings; ACSIZE: Audit committee size; ACMEET: Audit committee meetings; MANGO WN: Managerial ownership; 
MAJO RSHAR: Major shareholding; SIZE: Firm size; PRO FITAB: Profitability; LEVERAGE: Leverage; CASH_ASSETS : 
Cash to total assets ratio; CAPEX_ASSETS: capital expenditures to assets ratio; PRPLEQ_SALES: property-plants-equipment to 
sales ratio. Variables used in further analyses : QNFKS: the quantity of financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; QLFKS: the 
aggregated quality score of financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; QNNFKSEC: the quantity of non-financial KPIs disclosed 
in the KPI section; QLNFKSEC: the aggregated quality score of non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; Q NNFKREP: 
the quantity of non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report; QLNFKREP: the aggregated quality score of non-financial KPIs 
disclosed in the whole report; ; Q NTKREP: quantity of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report; 
Q LTKREP: the aggregated quality score of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report. Panel (B) Descriptive 
statistics categorical variables: CROSSLIST: Cross listing; RO LEDUAL: Role duality (all variables are defined in Table 32). 
As mentioned earlier, multicollinearity relationships among independent variables 
could affect the reliability of the results. The Pearson correlation matrix is illustrated in 
Table 33. It indicates that associations among the explanatory variables are below 0.80 
as a threshold (Gujarati, 2003). As mentioned earlier, the relatively high correlation 
between both KPI reporting quantity proxies and KPI reporting quality proxies is a 
good motivation to test whether or not each of them has the same impact on firm value.  
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The highly significant associations between firm value proxies represent a good 
justification for using them for the purpose of checking the robustness of the results. 
The correlation results also show a negative but not statistically significant association 
between firm value (measured by Tobin’s Q) and KPI reporting quantity (QNTKSEC). 
However, the association between firm value (measured by Tobin’s Q) and quantity of 
financial KPIs (QNFKS) is negative and statistically significant. The correlation matrix 
also shows that KPI reporting quality (QLTKSEC) is not associated with firm value. 
However, it is obvious that there is a negative correlation between firm value (measured 
by Tobin’s Q) and the quality of non financial KPI reporting quality (QLNFKSEC). 
This relationship does not hold when using the market-to-book ratio as a proxy of firm 
value. Thus, it might indicate that the relationship is weak, or it needs to be proved by 
further empirical analysis.    
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Table 33 Pearson correlation matrix 
 
*Significance at the 5% level or above. All variables are defined in Table 32. 
 
VARIABLE TQ+3 MB+3 QNTKSEC QLTKSEC EXCOMP NOEXCOMP BORSIZE BORCOMP BORMEET ACSIZE ACMEET MANGOWN MAJORSHAR SIZE PROFITAB LEVERAGE DIVYIELD CASH_ASSETS CAPEX_ASSETS PRPLEQ_SALES QNFKS QNNFKSECQNNFKREPQNTKREP QLFKS QLNFKSEC QLNFKREP QLTKREP
TQ+3 1
MB+3 0.8522* 1
QNTKSEC -0.1245* -0.017 1
QLTKSEC -0.0541 0.021 0.7645* 1
EXCOMP 0.1425* 0.2346* 0.2656* 0.3233* 1
NOEXCOMP 0.0855 0.2164* 0.2769* 0.2866* 0.5655* 1
BORSIZE -0.0844 -0.0125 0.2830* 0.2790* 0.4747* 0.3240* 1
BORCOMP 0.0296 0.1040* 0.2050* 0.2975* 0.5487* 0.2952* 0.1822* 1
BORMEET -0.1432* -0.0913* -0.076 -0.0176 -0.1055* -0.0827 -0.1387* -0.0098 1
ACSIZE -0.0021 0.0627 0.1188* 0.2542* 0.4080* 0.2438* 0.5208* 0.3606* -0.0211 1
ACMEET 0.0282 0.0667 0.1641* 0.2763* 0.3307* 0.2300* 0.2892* 0.3778* 0.2168* 0.3483* 1
MANGOWN -0.0048 -0.0766 -0.1146* -0.0958* -0.3139* -0.2271* -0.1693* -0.1892* -0.1177* -0.2416* -0.1472* 1
MAJORSHAR 0.0663 -0.0773 -0.1669* -0.1323* -0.4077* -0.3377* -0.3992* -0.0559 -0.0647 -0.2867* -0.1587* 0.3728* 1
SIZE 0.0759 0.1714* 0.2827* 0.2827* 0.7749* 0.5562* 0.6956* 0.4310* -0.1532* 0.4426* 0.3727* -0.2488* -0.4874* 1
PROFITAB 0.3988* 0.3309* -0.0408 0.0041 0.0817 -0.0255 -0.0495 0.0679 -0.0671 -0.0596 -0.0597 0.0926* 0.0234 0.0732 1
LEVERAGE 0.0091 0.1919* 0.1073* 0.022 0.1671* 0.2469* 0.0964* 0.1250* 0.1787* 0.0417 0.1703* -0.2808* -0.1613* 0.1475* -0.0659 1
DIVYIELD -0.1412* -0.0769 0.1205* 0.0702 0.0403 0.1511* 0.0638 0.0188 0.1437* 0.047 0.0709 -0.1269* -0.1682* -0.0046 0.0436 0.3175* 1
CASH_ASSETS 0.3094* 0.1631* -0.0814 -0.0591 -0.1562* -0.1549* -0.2510* -0.0266 -0.1206* -0.1626* -0.1511* 0.2239* 0.2896* -0.2519* 0.3221* -0.2038* -0.2180* 1
CAPEX_ASSETS -0.0298 -0.0742 -0.1357* -0.1527* -0.0562 0.0388 -0.0047 -0.1200* -0.0792 -0.1093* -0.0826 0.057 -0.0203 0.0245 0.0523 -0.0045 -0.0125 -0.0312 1
PRPLEQ_SALES -0.2283* -0.2615* -0.001 -0.0866 -0.0755 -0.0366 0.1024* 0.0369 -0.0501 -0.0409 0.0414 -0.0288 0.1272* 0.0146 -0.1724* 0.1239* -0.053 -0.0448 0.2887* 1
QNFKS -0.1570* -0.0609 0.8915* 0.7041* 0.2721* 0.2146* 0.2452* 0.2164* -0.0597 0.1225* 0.1742* -0.0949* -0.1496* 0.2452* -0.08 0.0424 0.0769 -0.1300* -0.1759* -0.0781 1
QNNFKSEC -0.078 0.0136 0.6945* 0.4302* 0.1254* 0.2455* 0.2423* 0.0846 -0.1020* 0.0604 0.0621 -0.1014* -0.1343* 0.2274* -0.0221 0.1430* 0.1470* -0.0121 0.0408 0.1409* 0.3399* 1
QNNFKREP -0.0812 0.0254 0.6321* 0.4659* 0.2357* 0.3160* 0.2344* 0.1706* -0.0496 0.1198* 0.1289* -0.1364* -0.2634* 0.2935* -0.0299 0.1169* 0.1188* -0.012 -0.0248 0.0678 0.3575* 0.7972* 1
QNTKREP -0.1289* -0.0128 0.9499* 0.7658* 0.3127* 0.3111* 0.2829* 0.2366* -0.0491 0.1493* 0.1937* -0.1324* -0.2348* 0.3104* -0.0474 0.0907* 0.1227* -0.0792 -0.1585* -0.0281 0.8655* 0.6192* 0.7458* 1
QLFKS -0.0894* -0.005 0.7328* 0.9190* 0.2942* 0.2419* 0.2787* 0.2815* -0.0371 0.2212* 0.2675* -0.0586 -0.1248* 0.2787* -0.0252 -0.0141 0.0682 -0.0968* -0.1318* -0.0758 0.7840* 0.3270* 0.3820* 0.7410* 1
QLNFKSEC -0.1033* -0.0252 0.5963* 0.5292* 0.2013* 0.2266* 0.2396* 0.1647* -0.087 0.1503* 0.1222* -0.1481* -0.1201* 0.2083* -0.0299 0.0628 0.1070* -0.0101 0.0541 0.0852 0.3545* 0.8348* 0.6443* 0.5286* 0.4220* 1
QLNFKREP -0.1127* -0.012 0.5697* 0.5494* 0.2937* 0.2863* 0.2241* 0.2546* -0.0457 0.1808* 0.1789* -0.1764* -0.2167* 0.2554* -0.0309 0.0596 0.0856 -0.0075 0.0015 0.036 0.3835* 0.6840* 0.8160* 0.6407* 0.4531* 0.8354* 1
QLTKREP -0.071 0.0156 0.7291* 0.9614* 0.3380* 0.2865* 0.2641* 0.3110* 0.0073 0.2515* 0.2865* -0.1004* -0.1508* 0.2682* 0.0004 0.0085 0.0958* -0.0553 -0.1575* -0.0875 0.6740* 0.4040* 0.4944* 0.7701* 0.8838* 0.5052* 0.5959* 1
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4.5 The main analyses 
The main analyses provide evidence of the effect of financial and non-financial KPI 
reporting upon firm valuation. The study achieves this aims by empirically testing the 
hypotheses developed in section 4.3. This section provides the empirical results with 
regard to KPIs reported in the KPI section in 4.5.1. Moreover, section 4.5.2 provides the 
results with respect to the separate influence of financial and non-financial KPIs 
disclosed in the KPI section.  
4.5.1 The association between firm value and KPI reporting  
The current study follows all the econometric procedures that have been applied in the 
previous chapter, in order to ensure a high degree of confidence in the empirical 
results.39 Consequently, the study follows Aggarwal et al. (2009) by winsorising all data 
at 1% and 99% in order to deal with severe outliers and prevent their effect on the 
results. Additionally, dependent variables are transformed - by undertaking logs of the 
original values of the firm value ratios - in order to have the fewest possible outliers, 
and to bring their distributions more closely to normality. Furthermore, the study 
applies clustering by both firm and year, in order to address any unobserved cross 
sectional and time series dependence within the panel data set (Petersen, 2009; Gow et 
al., 2010). Moreover, the analyses include industry dummies to control for the industry 
effect. Finally, multicollinearity among explanatory variables is checked using the 
variance inflation factor (VIF). A correlation between independent variables is accepted 
as long as VIF is smaller than 10 as a threshold (Gujarati, 2003; Acock, 2008). 
However, to avoid any concerns regarding hidden correlations that might exist between 
CG variables, these variables are grouped into groups: executive and non-executive 
                                                 
39
 For more details about econometric considerations, see chapter three: section 3.6.1. 
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directors' compensation, board characteristics, audit committee characteristics, and 
ownership structure. Then, these groups are included separately - together with KPI 
reporting variables and control variables - in different models (from model (1) to model 
(5)) beside the general model which includes all variables (model 6). 40 
Table 34 Firm value (TQ) & KPI reporting quantity in KPI section 
 
Variable Mo1 Mo2 Mo3 Mo4 Mo5 Mo6 
QNTKSEC -0.021* 
0.011 
-0.021* 
0.011 
-0.016 
0.011 
-0.02 
0.013 
-0.02 
0.012 
-0.017* 
0.01 
EXCOMP 0.058 
0.061 
    0.051 
0.059 
NOEXCOMP  0.048 
0.073 
   0.063 
0.056 
BORSIZE   -0.011 
0.008 
  -0.015** 
0.007 
BORCOMP   -0.039 
0.126 
  -0.214 
0.132 
BORMEET   -0.007 
0.008 
  -0.009 
0.007 
ROLEDUAL   0.148** 
0.047 
  0.168** 
0.059 
ACSIZE    0.013 
0.017 
 0.025 
0.019 
ACMEET    0.009 
0.018 
 0.014 
0.013 
MANGOWN     -0.139 
0.181 
-0.211 
0.146 
MAJORSHAR     0.129 
0.122 
0.122 
0.113 
SIZE 0.045 
0.028 
0.064** 
0.022 
0.101*** 
0.026 
0.058** 
0.024 
0.081** 
0.026 
0.071** 
0.032 
PROFITAB 0.891** 
0.297 
0.909** 
0.309 
0.851** 
0.303 
0.931** 
0.283 
0.896** 
0.302 
0.904** 
0.282 
LEVERAGE 0.071 
0.077 
0.067 
0.083 
0.075 
0.059 
0.069 
0.068 
0.071 
0.077 
0.054 
0.063 
CROSSLIST -0.003 
0.041 
-0.008 
0.043 
-0.006 
0.044 
0.001 
0.047 
-0.005 
0.042 
0.008 
0.043 
CASH_ASSETS 
 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
CAPEX_ASSETS 
 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.002 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
PRPLEQ_SALES 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
                                                 
40
 The researcher thanks the external examiner Dr Basil Al-Najjar for this suggestion. 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 
Constant -0.64** 
0.253 
-0.69** 
0.332 
-0.634** 
0.212 
-0.51** 
0.197 
-0.66** 
0.271 
-1.02*** 
0.251 
F 11.9*** 11.8*** 11.4*** 11.2*** 11.4*** 9.8*** 
Adj R-squared 0.276 0.274 0.301 0.276 0.279 0.321 
Mean VIF 2.05 1.89 1.91 1.85 1.87 2.16 
Max VIF 3.89 3.9 3.89 3.91 4.09 5.53 
N 485 485 485 485 485 485 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.  
  Dependent variable: TQ +3: Tobins Q three months after the year end. Explanatory variables: QNTKSEC: the total number of 
financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section in addition to  executives’ compensation in Mo1; non-executives’ 
compensation in Mo2; board characteristics in  Mo3; audit committee characteristics in  Mo4; Ownership structure variables  
in Mo5; and  all explanatory variables used in the analyses in  Mo6. All variables are defined in Table 31.  All regressions 
include industries dummies.  Standard errors in the second line for each variable are corrected for firm and time clustering.  
 
Table 34 shows the association between firm value (measured by Tobin’s Q) and the 
aggregated quantity (QNTKSEC) scores for KPIs reported in the KPI section.  
Regression models are significant at the 1% level, indicating that, on average, the 
proposed models can explain about 27.4% - 32.1% of the total variation in Tobin’s Q. 
Moreover, VIF values indicate that there are no concerns regarding multicollinearity 
among the explanatory variables.  
The results in the general model (model 6) show that the quantity of KPIs reported in 
the KPI section (QNTKSEC) has a negative and statistically significant relationship 
with Tobin’s Q at a level of 10%. This result holds only in model (1) and model (2) that 
include executives’ compensation and non-executives’ compensation respectively. This 
finding suggests that there is a weak negative association between firm value and the 
amount of KPIs disclosed in the KPI section. Consequently, H1a - which expects an 
association between KPI reporting quantity and firm value - is partially confirmed.  
With respect to the negative effect of QNTKSEC on firm value, this finding adds to the 
contradictory evidence on the relationship between accounting disclosure and firm 
value. This result is inconsistent with the findings of some studies that are based on 
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agency theory framework (e.g. Healy et al., 1999).  These studies suggest a positive 
impact in terms of enhanced disclosure upon firm valuation, thanks to the reduction in 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. The negative effect of 
QNTKSEC can be explained from different angles. First, consistent with Chung et al.’s 
(2012) assertion that extra information could have a negative effect on firm value, the 
excessive KPIs disclosed cause extra noise from the investors’ point of view, which 
negatively affects their valuation of the firm.  Second, the negative effect on firm value 
could be driven by the content of the KPIs disclosed, and how it is perceived by 
investors. There is a possibility that KPI information itself might raise concerns about a 
firm’s performance which might lead investors to lower their valuation.  In terms of this 
proposition, and in accordance with the efficient market hypothesis, the more KPIs 
disclosed will be reflected inversely on share price, and in turn, firm value will go 
down.  In contrast, KPI information could offer positive news for investors, but this 
news might be less positive than their own expectations, or might make them suspicious 
because it may be very different from the information gained from other sources rather 
than the annual reports. Accordingly, the greater the amount of KPIs disclosed, the 
more there may be a drop in firm value. Third, investors might misinterpret this practice 
on the part of firms to disclose more KPI. They might perceive providing enhanced 
disclosure as a way of misleading them about the actual firm performance. Investors 
might also consider that a company’s rivals would benefit from this excessive critical 
information, which could have a negative effect on their expectations about the firm 
performance, and hence lower their valuation (Hassan et al., 2009). 
However, this finding is important for UK firms. It indicates that firms have to be aware 
that more KPI disclosure might have an adverse impact on their value. Therefore, 
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companies have to study carefully the cost-benefit trade-off before increasing the 
number of KPIs disclosed. 
Regarding board characteristics variables, Table 34 shows that only board size 
(BORSIZE) and role duality (ROLEDUAL) has a statically significant relationship with 
firm value. The coefficient on BORSIZE is significantly negatively related to Tobin’s Q 
at the level of 5% in model (6). However, this result becomes insignificant in model (3) 
that focuses on the relationship between QNTKSEC as well as board characteristics on 
the one hand, and firm value on the other. Thus, H4, which expects an association 
between board size and firm value, is partially confirmed. This result is consistent with 
several studies (e.g. Goodstein et al., 1994; Yermack, 1996; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; 
Ujunwa, 2012). It is in line with the interpretation that big boards are not efficient 
because of the free-rider problem (Ujunwa, 2012). In contrast, ROLEDUAL is 
significantly positively associated with firm value at a level of 5% in models (3) and 
(6). Thus, H7, which expects a significant relationship between role duality and firm 
value, is confirmed. This finding can be explained by signalling theory rather than by 
agency theory. CEO duality seems to be perceived by investors as a signal of effective 
control and leadership. They might consider that the CEO leads the firm to achieve a 
better performance due to the use of his technical knowledge.   
On the other hand, the results presented in Table 34 suggest that better governance does 
not lead to a higher firm valuation. Therefore, the findings do not lead us to accept the 
hypotheses related to directors’ compensation, other board characteristics, audit 
committee characteristics, and ownership structure.  
 The weak effect of CG attributes on firm value is documented in many studies (Klein, 
1998; Laing and Weir, 1999; Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Weir et al., 2002). This 
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finding agrees with a number of UK studies that question the need to impose certain CG 
structures on UK firms in order to increase shareholders’ wealth (Laing and Weir, 1999; 
Weir et al., 2002).  
Meanwhile, it is apparent that investors pay more attention to other aspects in order to 
shape their perception of firms. The results emphasise the importance of firm 
characteristics in firm valuation. In particular, the results indicate that the coefficients of 
size (SIZE), profitability (PROFITAB), and cash to assets (CASH_ASSETS) ratios are 
statistically significant and positively related to firm value.  
These results are in line with previous studies which found a positive and significant 
relationship between firm value and SIZE (e.g. Hassan et al., 2009), PROFITAB (e.g. 
Setia-Atmaja, 2009), and CASH_ASSETS (e.g. Aggarwal, 2009). These results are in 
line with the view that firm characteristics could play a role as substitutes of board 
monitoring mechanisms. For instance, large firms are subjected to more pressure and 
intervention from a range of different stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, politicians, fund 
suppliers, financial analysts). Therefore, one can expect that the agency problem would 
be mitigated as managers of large firms are better monitored if compared with those of 
small ones.  
Table 35 Firm value (TQ) & KPI reporting quality in the KPI section 
Variable Mo1 Mo2 Mo3 Mo4 Mo5 Mo6 
QLTKSEC -0.043 
0.054 
-0.038 
0.058 
0.008 
0.066 
-0.046 
0.065 
-0.037 
0.062 
-0.021 
0.059 
EXCOMP 0.056 
0.06 
    0.048 
0.057 
NOEXCOMP  0.035 
0.078 
   0.052 
0.058 
BORSIZE   -0.013 
0.008 
  -0.016** 
0.008 
BORCOMP   -0.061 
0.129 
  -0.228* 
0.133 
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BORMEET   -0.006 
0.008 
  -0.008 
0.007 
ROLEDUAL   0.156** 
0.048 
  0.170** 
0.058 
ACSIZE    0.015 
0.017 
 0.028 
0.02 
ACMEET    0.009 
0.019 
 0.013 
0.013 
MANGOWN     -0.14 
0.182 
-0.211 
0.145 
MAJORSHAR     0.129 
0.125 
0.123 
0.116 
SIZE 0.041 
0.027 
0.061** 
0.022 
0.099*** 
0.026 
0.052** 
0.025 
0.076** 
0.027 
0.073** 
0.032 
PROFITAB 0.916** 
0.286 
0.932** 
0.3 
0.877** 
0.295 
0.955*** 
0.273 
0.920** 
0.293 
0.925*** 
0.278 
LEVERAGE 0.075 
0.078 
0.073 
0.085 
0.08 
0.059 
0.072 
0.068 
0.074 
0.077 
0.059 
0.062 
CROSSLIST -0.007 
0.04 
-0.012 
0.042 
-0.01 
0.043 
-0.003 
0.046 
-0.009 
0.041 
0.004 
0.044 
CASH_ASSETS 
 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
CAPEX_ASSETS 
 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.004 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
PRPLEQ_SALES 0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
Constant -0.61** 
0.262 
-0.630* 
0.358 
-0.641** 
0.217 
-0.486** 
0.202 
-0.64** 
0.271 
-0.99*** 
0.261 
F 11.5*** 11.4*** 11.2*** 10.9*** 11.1*** 9.6*** 
Adj R-squared 0.269 0.267 0.297 0.27 0.273 0.316 
Mean VIF 2.06 1.89 1.91 1.85 1.88 2.16 
Max VIF 3.9 3.9 3.89 3.90 4.09 5.56 
N 485 485 485 485 485 485 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.  
  Dependent variable: TQ +3: TobinsQ three months after the year end. Explanatory variables: Q LTKSEC is the aggregated 
quality score of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section in addition to executives’ compensation in Mo1; non-
executives’ compensation in Mo2; board characteristics in Mo3; audit committee characteristics in Mo4; O wnership 
structure variables  in Mo5;  and all explanatory variables used in the analyses in Mo6. All variables are defined in Table 31.  
All regressions include industries dummies.  Standard errors in the second line for each variable are corrected for firm and time 
clustering. 
 
With respect to KPI reporting quality; Table 35 shows the association between firm 
values measured by Tobin’s Q and the aggregated quality of KPIs reported in the KPI 
section (QLTKSEC).  Regression models are significant at the 1% level, indicating that, 
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on average, the proposed models can explain about 26.7% - 32.1% of the total variation 
in Tobin’s Q. Moreover, VIF values indicate that there are no concerns regarding 
multicollinearity among the explanatory variables.  
All models report that there is no significant relationship between QLTKSEC and firm 
value. Hence, the hypothesis H1b which predicts a significant association between 
those variables cannot be accepted. This result is not in line with several studies which 
suggest that disclosure quality is value relevant to market participants (e.g. Healy et al., 
1999; Baek et al., 2004). However, the current study uses different measures of 
disclosure quality. This result can be explained by the low level of KPI reporting by UK 
firms in general. One can argue that investors could not perceive the differences 
between these companies in terms of KPI reporting quality. Therefore, the effect of KPI 
reporting quality on firm value could not be observed. 
Despite the above findings with regard to the weak negative association between KPI 
reporting quantity and firm value, it can be concluded that the results do not provide 
strong evidence of the KPI reporting effect on firm value. Thus, the main hypothesis of 
the study (H1) cannot be accepted. Accordingly, Q3 has been answered. Furthermore, 
the results indicate - to some extent - that QNTKSEC and QLTKSEC may have a 
different impact on firm value. Taking into consideration chapter three’s findings which 
indicate that neither of them is derived from the same factors, it can be argued that 
quantity of disclosure should not be used as a proxy for its quality in accounting studies. 
Thus, research question (Q4) is answered.  
Indeed, the findings presented -in Table 34 and Table 35- suggest that companies might 
prevent the potential decline in their value by controlling the number of KPIs disclosed 
in the KPI section. On the other hand, the insignificant association between the quality 
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of KPI reporting and firm value will not motivate these companies to increase that 
quality by following ASB (2006) guidance. However, it is recommended that they 
consider the quality of disclosure together with its quantity to avoid the noise caused by 
excessive information (Chung et al., 2012). Therefore, this finding is important for 
regulators, in that they should reflect on ways to encourage more firms to be more 
compliant. 
Looking at the impact of board characteristics, Table 35 indicates that the positive and 
significant impact of ROLEDUAL remains unchanged (at the 5% level in models (3) 
and (6)). Similarly, the BORSIZE effect remains negative and significant, but at the 5% 
level in the general model. Yet, it is shown that board composition (BORCOMP) has a 
limited negative relationship with firm value at the level of 10%, based upon the results 
obtained from model (6).  
This result suggests that NEDs’ dominance is perceived as a signal of a non-efficient 
board. Investors consider that firm performance might be influenced by NEDs’ lack of 
experience. Arguably, this result indicates that investors are satisfied with a smaller 
percentage of NEDs on the board. They may rely on alternative mechanisms to mitigate 
the agency problem. This finding is in line with previous studies which showed that CG 
can be achieved by alternative mechanisms that are adapted to firms’ own 
characteristics and the surrounding environment (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Weir et 
al., 2002). Likewise in terms of the results reported for KPI quantity regressions, the 
findings do not support the hypotheses related to directors’ compensation, other board 
characteristics, audit committee characteristics, or ownership structure.  
Finally, the results remain unchanged with respect to the association between firm 
characteristics and firm value. In particular, the results indicate that the coefficients of 
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size (SIZE), profitability (PROFITAB), and the cash to assets (CASH_ASSETS) ratios 
are statistically significant and positively related to firm value.  
It is worth mentioning that the models in Table 34 and Table 35 are re-estimated using 
Tobin’s Q after six months from the year end, as well as market-to-book ratio (after 
three and six months from the year end) as measures for firm value. It is found that the 
results are not substantially different from those reported above.41  
4.5.2 The association between firm value and reporting on KPI subcategories 
This section reports the empirical findings with regard to the influence of reporting on 
KPI subcategories. Section 4.5.2.1 presents the results with regard to financial KPI 
reporting, while section 4.5.2.2 shows the results with regard to reporting on non-
financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section. These analyses provide a clear picture with 
regard to the value relevance of KPI reporting. They also give evidence of the accuracy 
of using quantity and quality of disclosure as substitutes. 
4.5.2.1 Firm value and financial KPI reporting   
Table 36 and Table 37 show the influence of financial KPI reporting on firm value 
measured by Tobin’s Q. Whereas, the results report that QNFKS has a negative and 
statistically significant influence on firm value at a level of 5% in all models except 
model (3), Table 37 indicates that financial KPI reporting quality (QLFKS) does not 
have a significant association with firm value. These findings indicate that QNFKS and 
QLFKS have different relationships with firm value, which raises more concerns about 
using the quantity of disclosure as an alternative for its quality in accounting research 
(Q4). 
                                                 
41
 Results are not reported. 
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Table 36  Firm value (TQ) & financial KPI reporting quantity 
Variables Mo1 Mo2 Mo3 Mo4 Mo5 Mo6 
QNFKS -0.029** 
0.011 
-0.03** 
0.012 
-0.024* 
0.013 
-0.028** 
0.013 
-0.03** 
0.013 
-0.03** 
0.012 
EXCOMP 0.063 
0.062 
    0.056 
0.059 
NOEXCOMP  0.046 
0.074 
   0.061 
0.056 
BORSIZE   -0.011 
0.008 
  -0.02** 
0.007 
BORCOMP   -0.031 
0.126 
  -0.209 
0.13 
BORMEET   -0.007 
0.008 
  -0.009 
0.008 
ROLEDUAL   0.149** 
0.048 
  0.167** 
0.06 
ACSIZE    0.013 
0.017 
 0.025 
0.019 
ACMEET    0.01 
0.018 
 0.016 
0.012 
MANGOWN     -0.136 
0.18 
-0.205 
0.145 
MAJORSHAR     0.129 
0.121 
0.121 
0.112 
SIZE 0.044* 
0.027 
0.066** 
0.021 
0.102*** 
0.026 
0.059** 
0.025 
0.082** 
0.025 
0.070** 
0.032 
PROFITAB 0.873** 
0.283 
0.893** 
0.297 
0.834** 
0.29 
0.916*** 
0.271 
0.880** 
0.289 
0.887** 
0.269 
LEVERAGE 0.062 
0.08 
0.058 
0.086 
0.066 
0.06 
0.058 
0.07 
0.062 
0.079 
0.044 
0.064 
CROSSLIST 0 
0.039 
-0.005 
0.042 
-0.004 
0.042 
0.005 
0.045 
-0.002 
0.04 
0.012 
0.042 
CASH_ASSETS 
 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
CAPEX_ASSETS 
 
0.003 
0.003 
0.002 
0.003 
0.002 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.002 
0.003 
PRPLEQ_SALES 0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
Constant -0.654** 
0.256 
-0.69** 
0.34 
-0.639** 
0.21 
-0.511** 
0.197 
-0.67** 
0.262 
-1.0*** 
0.246 
F 12.1*** 11.9*** 11.6*** 11.5*** 11.6*** 9.9*** 
Adj R-squared 0.281 0.278 0.305 0.28 0.283 0.325 
Mean VIF 2.05 1.89 1.9 1.85 1.87 2.16 
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Max VIF 3.91 3.93 3.91 3.94 4.12 5.53 
N 485 485 485 485 485 485 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.  
 Dependent variable: TQ +3 are TobinsQ three months after the year end. Explanatory variables: : QNFKS: the quantity of financial 
KPIs disclosed in the KPI section in addition to executives’ compensation in Mo1; non-executives’ compensation in Mo2; board 
characteristics in  Mo3; audit committee characteristics in  Mo4; Ownership structure variables  in Mo5;  and all explanatory 
variables used in the analyses in  Mo6. All variables are defined in Table 31.  All regressions include industries dummies.  Standard 
errors in the second line for each variable are corrected for firm and time clustering.  
 
Table 37 Firm value (TQ) & financial KPI reporting quality 
Variables Mo1 Mo2 Mo3 Mo4 Mo5 Mo6    
QLFKS -0.051 
0.045 
-0.045 
0.048 
-0.008 
0.056 
-0.053 
0.054 
-0.045 
0.053 
-0.025 
0.054 
EXCOMP 0.056 
0.061 
    0.048 
0.057 
NOEXCOMP  0.034 
0.079 
   0.051 
0.058 
BORSIZE   -0.012 
0.008 
  -0.016**  
0.008 
BORCOMP   -0.055 
0.129 
  -0.226*   
0.136 
BORMEET   -0.006 
0.008 
  -0.008 
0.007 
ROLEDUAL   0.154** 
0.048 
  0.170**  
0.058 
ACSIZE    0.014 
0.017 
 0.028 
0.02 
ACMEET    0.009 
0.019 
 0.014 
0.013 
MANGOWN     -0.137 
0.182 
-0.21 
0.145 
MAJORSHAR     0.13 
0.125 
0.122 
0.115 
SIZE 0.042 
0.027 
0.061** 
0.021 
0.099*** 
0.026 
0.053** 
0.025 
0.077** 
0.026 
0.073**  
0.033 
PROFITAB 0.909** 
0.279 
0.925** 
0.294 
0.873** 
0.291 
0.948*** 
0.268 
0.913** 
0.287 
0.921*** 
0.273 
LEVERAGE 0.073 
0.079 
0.071 
0.086 
0.078 
0.06 
0.069 
0.068 
0.072 
0.078 
0.058 
0.064 
CROSSLIST -0.007 
0.04 
-0.011 
0.042 
-0.01 
0.043 
-0.002 
0.046 
-0.009 
0.041 
0.004 
0.044 
CASH_ASSETS 
 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006**  
0.002 
CAPEX_ASSETS 
 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.002 
0.003 
0.004 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
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PRPLEQ_SALES 0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
Constant -0.615** 
0.262 
-0.629* 
0.359 
-0.639** 
0.218 
-0.487** 
0.202 
-0.643** 
0.269 
-0.983*** 
0.26 
F 11.5*** 11.4*** 11.2*** 10.9*** 11.1*** 9.6*** 
Adj R-squared 0.27 0.268 0.297 0.271 0.273 0.316 
Mean VIF 2.05 1.88 1.91 1.85 1.87 2.16 
Max VIF 3.9 3.89 3.89 3.9 4.09 5.54 
N 485 485 485 485 485 485 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.  
 Dependent variable: TQ +3  is TobinsQ three months after the year end. Explanatory variables:  QLFKS is the quality of financial 
KPIs disclosed in the KPI section. in addition to executives’ compensation in Mo1; non-executives’ compensation in Mo2; board 
characteristics in  Mo3; audit committee characteristics in  Mo4; Ownership structure variables  in Mo5;  and all explanatory 
variables used in the analyses in  Mo6. All variables are defined in Table 31.  All regressions include industries dummies.  Standard 
errors in the second line for each variable are corrected for firm and time clustering.  
The importance of this analysis is that the majority of UK companies place emphasis on 
disclosing financial KPIs. Indeed, the results reveal that the findings discussed in the 
previous section are greatly derived from the effect of financial KPI reporting. These 
results suggest that companies can avoid decreases in their values by controlling the 
number of financial KPIs disclosed.  
When looking at the impact of CG variables, it is clear that the majority of the results 
discussed in  4.5.1 are confirmed. In particular, board size (BORSIZE) is negatively 
associated with firm value at a level of (5%) in the general model (model 6) in Table 36 
and Table 37. Moreover, role duality (ROLEDUAL) has a positive and highly 
significant effect on firm value. The coefficient of ROLEDUAL is significant at the 5% 
level in model (3) and model (6), either in Table 36 or in Table 37. 
Notably, Table 37 reports that board composition (BORCOMP) has a weak and 
negative impact on firm value in model (3). This result suggests that NEDs’ dominance 
is perceived as a signal of a non-efficient board. Investors may be of the opinion that 
firm performance might be influenced by NEDs’ lack of experience.   
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The rest of the results add to the robustness of the findings presented in  4.5.1. They also 
highlight the relative importance of firm characteristics in terms of affecting its 
valuation. In particular, firm size (SIZE), profitability (PROFITAB), and cash to assets 
ratio (CASH_ASSETS) are positively and significantly associated with firm value.42 
4.5.2.2 Firm value and non-financial KPI reporting 
Table 38 and Table 39 illustrate the relationship between non-financial KPIs - disclosed 
in the KPI section - and firm value (measured by Tobin’s Q). It is obvious that neither 
the quantity (QNNFKSEC) nor the quality (QLNFKSEC) of non-financial KPI 
reporting has a significant effect on firm value. It was expected that non-financial KPI 
information would affect investors’ perceptions, as usually this information is not 
clearly presented in the financial statement. Thus, this non-significant effect of non-
financial KPI reporting can be explained by companies’ focus on providing more 
financial KPIs with a higher degree of reporting quality rather than on non-financial 
ones.43  In fact, these results indicate that the key findings discussed in 4.5.1 are derived 
from the impact of financial KPI reporting.  
With respect to the impact of CG variables, Table 38 and Table 39 show that the board 
size (BORSIZE), board composition (BORCOMP) and role duality (ROLEDUAL) 
variables continue to show the same influence on firm value illustrated in  4.5.2.1. 
Similarly, for control variables, only firm size (SIZE), profitability (PROFITAB), and 
cash to assets ratio (CASH_ASSETS) have a positive and significant association with 
                                                 
42
 It is worth mentioning that the models in Table 36 and Table 37 are re-estimated using Tobin’s Q after 
six months from the year end, as well as the market-to-book ratio (three and six months from the year 
end) as measures for firm value. It is found that the results are not substantially different from those 
reported in  4.5.2.1. 
43
 For more detail, please see their statistical results at Table 33. 
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firm value.44 
 
Table 38 Firm value (TQ) and quantity of non-financial KPIs reported in the KPI 
section 
Variables Mo1 Mo2 Mo3 Mo4 Mo5 Mo6 
QNNFKSEC -0.011 
0.015 
-0.011 
0.015 
-0.007 
0.014 
-0.01 
0.015 
-0.011 
0.015 
-0.007 
0.012 
EXCOMP 0.049 
0.063 
    0.045 
0.061 
NOEXCOMP  0.035 
0.076 
   0.053 
0.055 
BORSIZE   -0.012 
0.008 
  -0.016** 
0.007 
BORCOMP   -0.053 
0.124 
  -0.225* 
0.13 
BORMEET   -0.007 
0.008 
  -0.008 
0.007 
ROLEDUAL   0.153** 
0.048 
  0.172** 
0.059 
ACSIZE    0.014 
0.017 
 0.027 
0.02 
ACMEET    0.007 
0.017 
 0.013 
0.012 
MANGOWN     -0.141 
0.182 
-0.215 
0.143 
MAJORSHAR     0.129 
0.124 
0.122 
0.115 
SIZE 0.043 
0.028 
0.060** 
0.022 
0.099*** 
0.026 
0.052** 
0.025 
0.075** 
0.026 
0.073** 
0.032 
PROFITAB 0.915** 
0.299 
0.928** 
0.311 
0.867** 
0.306 
0.951*** 
0.284 
0.916** 
0.303 
0.921** 
0.286 
LEVERAGE 0.08 
0.08 
0.077 
0.086 
0.081 
0.061 
0.078 
0.072 
0.078 
0.08 
0.061 
0.064 
CROSSLIST -0.007 
0.041 
-0.01 
0.043 
-0.009 
0.044 
-0.003 
0.047 
-0.008 
0.042 
0.004 
0.044 
CASH_ASSETS 
 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
CAPEX_ASSETS 
 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.004 
0.003 
0.004 
0.003 
0.003 
0.004 
PRPLEQ_SALES 0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
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 The majority of these results are confirmed when using Tobin’s Q after six months from the year end 
as well as the market-to-book ratio (three and six months from the year end) as measures for firm value in 
the analyses. 
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Constant -0.604** 
0.255 
-0.634* 
0.337 
-0.637** 
0.216 
-0.490** 
0.199 
-0.643** 
0.276 
-0.982*** 
0.267 
F 11.5*** 11.4*** 11.3*** 10.9*** 11.1*** 9.6*** 
Adj R-squared 0.27 0.268 0.297 0.27 0.274 0.316 
Mean VIF 2.06 1.9 1.92 1.86 1.88 2.16 
Max VIF 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.91 4.1 5.52 
N 485 485 485 485 485 485 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level. 
 Dependent variable: TQ +3: is Tobin’s Q three months after the year end. Explanatory variables: : Q NNFKSEC: the quantity of 
non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section  in addition to executives’ compensation in Mo1; non-executives’ compensation in 
Mo2; board characteristics in  Mo3; audit committee characteristics in  Mo4; Ownership structure variables  in Mo5;  and all 
explanatory variables used in the analyses in  Mo6. All variables are defined in Table 31.  All regressions include industries 
dummies.  Standard errors in the second line for each variable are corrected for firm and time clusterin g. 
 
 
Table 39 Firm value (TQ) & quality of non-financial KPIs reported in KPI section 
 
Mo1 Mo2 Mo3 Mo4 Mo5 Mo6    
QLNFKSEC -0.053 
0.042 
-0.05 
0.043 
-0.03 
0.044 
-0.053 
0.047 
-0.053 
0.044 
-0.046 
0.037 
EXCOMP 0.06 
0.06 
    0.051 
0.059 
NOEXCOMP  0.04 
0.075 
   0.057 
0.054 
BORSIZE   -0.012 
0.008 
  -0.015**  
0.007 
BORCOMP   -0.041 
0.127 
  -0.213*   
0.129 
BORMEET   -0.007 
0.008 
  -0.008 
0.007 
ROLEDUAL   0.151** 
0.048 
  0.169**  
0.059 
ACSIZE    0.015 
0.017 
 0.028 
0.02 
ACMEET    0.009 
0.018 
 0.014 
0.013 
MANGOWN     -0.155 
0.178 
-0.222 
0.143 
MAJORSHAR     0.131 
0.124 
0.124 
0.114 
SIZE 0.041 
0.027 
0.061** 
0.022 
0.09*** 
0.026 
0.053** 
0.024 
0.077** 
0.027 
0.069**  
0.03 
PROFITAB 0.900** 
0.299 
0.917** 
0.311 
0.862** 
0.308 
0.941*** 
0.284 
0.904** 
0.302 
0.911**  
0.288 
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LEVERAGE 0.071 
0.076 
0.069 
0.083 
0.076 
0.058 
0.069 
0.067 
0.069 
0.075 
0.053 
0.06 
CROSSLIST -0.004 
0.041 
-0.009 
0.043 
-0.008 
0.044 
-0.0004 
0.047 
-0.006 
0.041 
0.006 
0.044 
CASH_ASSETS 
 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006**  
0.002 
CAPEX_ASSETS 
 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.004 
0.003 
0.004 
0.003 
0.003 
0.004 
PRPLEQ_SALES 0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
Constant -0.638** 
0.255 
-0.663** 
0.332 
-0.638** 
0.217 
-0.502** 
0.199 
-0.654** 
0.28 
-1.001*** 
0.269 
F 11.7*** 11.6*** 11.3*** 11.1*** 11.3*** 9.7*** 
Adj R-squared 0.273 0.271 0.298 0.274 0.277 0.319 
Mean VIF 2.05 1.88 1.91 1.84 1.87 2.16  
Max VIF 3.89 3.9 3.89 3.91 4.09 5.57 
N 485 485 485 485 485 485 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.  
 Dependent variable: TQ +3: is TobinsQ three months after the year end. Explanatory variables: : Q LNFKSEC: the aggregated 
quality of non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section in addition to executives’ compensation in Mo1; non-executives’ 
compensation in Mo2; board characteristics in  Mo3; audit committee characteristics in  Mo4; Ownership structure variables  
in Mo5;  and all explanatory variables used in the analyses in  Mo6. All variables are defined in Table 31.  All regressions include 
industries dummies.  Standard errors in the second line for each variable are corrected for firm and time clustering. 
 
4.6 Further analyses 
This section would examine whether the KPIs reported outside the KPI section could 
affect the findings discussed above. Section 4.6.1 illustrates the results with regard to 
reporting on non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report, and section 4.6.2 that 
displays the results with regard to KPI reporting over the whole report after considering 
KPIs disclosed outside the KPI section. These analyses provide an overall picture about 
the value relevance of KPI reporting.  
4.6.1 Firm value and total non-financial KPI reporting  
These analyses aim at investigating whether considering non-financial KPIs disclosed 
outside the KPI section could affect the findings in  4.5.2.2.  Table 67 and Table 68 in 
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Appendix (3) indicate that regression models are significant at the 1% level, with high 
R2, and with no multicollinearity concerns. In general, the results reported in Table 67 
confirm the finings discussed above with regard to the impact of non-financial KPI 
reporting quantity (QNNFKREP) upon firm value. However, Table 68 shows that the 
quality of non-financial KPI reporting (QLNFKREP) has a negative and statically 
significant relationship with firm value in all models except in models (3) and (4). 
Hence, this indicates that the impact of the quality of non-financial KPI reporting 
becomes stronger when the scores of these KPIs are aggregated with those reported 
outside the KPI section.  
As mentioned earlier, financial performance is one of the key drivers to improving firm 
valuation. Non-financial KPIs that are reported outside the KPI section are generally 
related to social and environmental aspects. Therefore, this result can be explained by 
investors’ negative expectations with regard to the financial consequences of those 
issues. By following the ASB (2006) guidance, firms with high QLNFKREP shall 
provide additional information which is not included in financial statements. This 
information covers operational, social and environmental aspects, including their targets 
and management commentary on these targets. In accordance with the efficient market 
hypothesis, investors may reflect this information on the financial commitments in the 
future, and hence they can incorporate this information in share prices, and hence lower 
their valuation of these firms. Indeed, this explanation might need to be confirmed by 
analysing the content of these KPI disclosures. 
It is worth mentioning that the results presented in Table 67 and Table 68 indicate that, 
from CG attributes, only board size (BORSIZE) and role duality (ROLEDUAL) 
variables continue to show the same influence on firm value as illustrated in  4.5.2.1. 
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Likewise, firm size (SIZE), profitability (PROFITAB) and cash to assets ratio 
(CASH_ASSETS) from the control variables show a positive and significant 
association with firm value.45 
4.6.2 Firm value and total KPI reporting 
These analyses aim at investigating whether considering non-financial KPIs disclosed 
outside the KPI section could affect the findings of the main analyses which are 
reported in section  4.5.1. In general, it observed that KPIs reported outside the KPI 
section do not affect the results discussed earlier in section  4.5.1. Table 69 and Table 70 
in Appendix (3) document that the results, with regard to the effect of quantity 
QNTKREP and quality QLTKREP of KPI reporting on firm value, are still as same as 
reported in Table 34 and Table 35. However, it seems that the effect of KPI reporting 
quantity on firm value has been maximised. Hence, Table 69 illustrates that the quantity 
of KPIs reported in the whole report (QNTKREP) has a negative and statistically 
significant association with firm value in all models except model (3). This association 
becomes significant at the level of 5% - as reported in model (1) and (2) - instead of the 
level of 10% which is reported in Table 34 .  
On the other hand, Table 70 shows that the quality of KPIs reported in the whole report 
(QLTKREP) does not have a significant association with firm value. This finding is the 
same as the finding reported in Table 35 without considering KPIs reported outside the 
KPI section. Arguably, these findings are important as they show different relationships 
between KPI reporting quantity and KPI reporting quality on the one hand, and firm 
                                                 
45
 The models in Table 67 and Table 68  are re-estimated using Tobin’s Q after six months from the year 
end as well as market-to-book ratio (three and six months from the year end) as measures for firm value. 
It is found that the results are not substantially different from those reported in  4.6.1. 
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value on the other. These findings could contribute to answering Q4. Hence, it indicates 
that reporting quantity and its quality should not be used interchangeably.  
Similarly, when looking at the impact of CG and other variables upon firm value, it is 
clear that the results have not been changed at all from those reported in Table 34 and 
Table 35. 
To conclude with regard to the results of the main and further analyses conducted in 
this chapter, it can be claimed that firm value measured by Tobin’s Q is negatively 
associated with the quantity of KPI reporting. Panel (A) of Table 40  indicates that this 
finding becomes more significant after including KPIs reported outside the KPI section 
in the analyses. Panel (B) shows that, whereas the effect of KPI reporting quality on 
firm value is not significant, this effect is statistically significant for the quality of non-
financial KPI reporting if KPIs reported outside the KPI section are considered in the 
tests. Finally, one can argue that the relationship between KPI reporting and firm value 
seems to be derived from the effect of financial KPI reporting. 
Table 40 Firm value (TQ) and quantity and quality of KPI reporting 
Panel (A) Firm value (TQ) & quantity of KPI reporting  
Variables Mo1 Mo2 Mo3 Mo4 Mo5 Mo6 
QNFKS (-)**  (-)** (-)* (-)** (-)** (-)** 
QNNFKSEC       
QNNFKREP       
QNTKSEC (-)* 
 
(-)* 
 
   (-)* 
 
QNTKREP (-)** 
 
(-)**  (-)* (-)* (-)* 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.  (+) positive relationship; ( -) Negative 
relationship. QNFKS is the number of financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; Q NNFKSEC  is the number of non-financial 
KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; QNNFKREP is the number of non financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report; Q NTKSEC  is 
the total number of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section. QNTKREP is the total number of financial and 
non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report in addition to executives’ compensation in Mo1; non-executives’ compensation 
in Mo2; board characteristics in  Mo3; audit committee characteristics in  Mo4; Ownership structure variables in Mo5;  
and all explanatory variables used in the analyses in Mo6. All variables are defined in Table 31.   
Panel (B) Firm value (TQ) and quality of KPI reporting  
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Variables Mo1 Mo2 Mo3 Mo4 Mo5 Mo6 
QLFKS       
QLNFKSEC       
QLNFKREP (-)** (-)*   (-)* (-)* 
QLTKSEC       
QLTKREP       
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.  (+) positive relationship; (-) Negative 
relationship. QLFKS  is the quality score of financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; Q LNFKSEC  the quality score of non- 
financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section; QLNFKREP the quality score of non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report; 
Q LTKSEC  the aggregated quality score of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI section. Q LTKREP the 
aggregated quality score of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report in addition to executives’ compensation 
in  Mo1; non-executives’ compensation in Mo2; board characteristics in Mo3; audit committee characteristics in Mo4; 
O wnership structure variables in Mo5;  and all explanatory variables used in the analyses in Mo6. All variables are defined in 
Table 31.  .  
4.7 Conclusion  
Generally, there is a limited empirical literature on corporate disclosure impact on firm 
value. Furthermore, most of the previous studies focused only on disclosure quantity 
rather than its quality. KPI reporting offers good tools for evaluating the current and 
future performance of a firm. Thus, KPI disclosure would mitigate the information 
asymmetry problem, so that it might have effects on firm valuation. The current study 
provides answers to Q3 and Q4 of the research questions; it investigates KPI reporting 
(quantity and quality) effect on firm valuation in the UK (Q3). The analyses findings 
contribute also in providing some evidence with regard to using quantity of disclosure 
as a proxy for quality in accounting studies (Q4). 
The study mainly draws upon agency theory to explain how KPI reporting could affect 
firm value. It is also in line with the view that investors would incorporate KPI 
information in their share prices’ valuation in accordance with the efficient market 
hypothesis. The study sample is identified as 103 firms of the FTSE 350 non-financial 
UK firms over a five year period (2006-2010). Panel data regressions are conducted to 
test the hypotheses of the study. After controlling for firm characteristics as well as 
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growth opportunities, the results show that the quantity of KPIs disclosed in the KPI 
section has a negative and significant association with firm value. Moreover, the results 
indicate that the quality of KPIs disclosed in the KPI section has no impact upon firm 
value.  
The findings indicate that investors may perceive that higher amounts of KPI disclosed 
is a signal of noise caused by the management to hide some threats or problems. In 
addition, KPI information disclosed might raise their concerns about firm performance, 
or lead them to correct their overvaluation of share prices based on KPI disclosures.  
The above findings suggest that the quantity and quality of KPI reporting have different 
relationships with firm value. This evidence questions again the validity of using 
quantity of disclosure as a proxy for its quality in accounting research. Therefore, it can 
be argued that quantity of disclosure and its quality should not be considered as 
substitutes. 
The analyses are extended in order to investigate the impact of KPI subcategories’ 
reporting upon firm value. These analyses provide evidence of the influence of financial 
KPIs disclosed on the findings gained from the main analyses. It is indicated that the 
association between firm value and KPI reporting is greatly derived from the effects of 
financial KPI reporting. Furthermore, the study finds a negative effect of non-financial 
KPIs disclosed when considering non-financial KPIs that are disclosed outside the KPI 
section. This suggests that firm value might be lowered due to investors’ negative 
expectations with regard to the financial consequences of social and environmental 
aspects. 
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The findings of the current study agree with Hassan et al.’s (2009) assertion that the 
relationship between corporate disclosure and firm value is complex and varied, based 
upon disclosure type which makes it more complex to study.  
It is noteworthy that those CG mechanisms proposed in the literature do not have a 
significant effect on firm value. The findings with respect to CG attributes can be 
explained by signalling theory rather than agency theory. These findings suggest that 
clear leadership and effective control are essential factors for investors. Accordingly, 
firms with smaller number of members serving on board, as well as firms chaired by 
CEOs, are conveying good signals to investors that they have effective leadership. 
Consequently, investors improve their valuations for these firms. Furthermore, it is 
reported that there is a weak - and in some models statically significant - negative effect 
of board composition on firm value. This result suggests that investors might have 
concerns about NEDs’ potential lack of experience.  
On the other hand, it is apparent that firm size, profitability, and cash to assets ratios 
have positive and significant impact on firm value. This may indicate that investors 
might place more emphasis on such attributes to act a role in board monitoring. 
The study findings are important for UK firms, suggesting that investors pay more 
attention to financial KPIs disclosed in the annual report than to non-financial ones. In 
sum, these firms have to study carefully the cost-benefit trade off before increasing the 
number of KPIs disclosed.  
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Chapter 5 - Concluding remarks 
5.1 Overview 
Directors of UK firms are asked to analyse business performance from the point of view 
of different aspects using KPIs (CA, 2006; ASB, 2006). However, these regulations in 
reality allow those directors to control the number of KPIs disclosed and the reporting 
quality. This situation has resulted in a variation between firms in practice. Firms could 
use reporting on KPIs to affect the perceptions of different stakeholders. Moreover, it 
could be anticipated that the valuation of UK firms could be influenced by the level of 
KPI disclosure and/or its quality. Therefore, the present research has explored the 
practices of UK firms with regard to KPI reporting. In addition, it has investigated the 
potential drivers of KPI reporting in terms of quantity and quality. Finally, the research 
has been extended to examine whether or not KPI reporting quantity and quality could 
have an impact on UK firms’ values. 
This chapter provides the concluding remarks of this thesis. The remainder of this 
chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2 provides a summary of the research 
questions, objectives and approach. Section 5.3 presents a summary of the key findings 
of the research and discusses their implications. Section 5.4 shows the contributions and 
implications of the study. Section 5.5 illustrates the limitations of this research. Section 
5.6 highlights several opportunities for future research.  
5.2 Summary of research questions, objectives and approach 
To contribute to the literature, this research has adopted different approaches which 
have provided answers to the research questions.  Hence it has achieved its objectives.  
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5.2.1 Research questions 
This research has provided answers to the following four research questions: 
Q1. What are the main features of KPI reporting in the UK? 
Q2. What are the factors affecting the level of quantity and quality of KPI reporting in 
the UK? 
Q3. What is the impact of KPI reporting quantity and quality on firm value? 
Q4. Can KPI reporting quantity be used as a proxy for KPI reporting quality? 
5.2.2 Research objectives 
Taking into consideration the limited literature that addresses KPI reporting (Hussainey 
and Walker, 2006; Boesso and Kumar, 2007; Giunta et al., 2008; Tauringana and 
Mangena, 2009), the present study has provided answers to the above research 
questions by pursuing the following objectives  
1. Providing a proper measure for KPI reporting quality and quantity. 
2. Exploring the main features of KPI reporting in the UK. 
3. Identifying the determinants of KPI reporting in terms of quantity and quality. 
4. Investigating the impact of KPI reporting in terms of quantity and quality upon 
firm value. 
5. Examining the extent to which KPI reporting quantity can be used as a proxy for 
KPI reporting quality. 
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5.2.3 Research approach 
The following subsections shows the approaches followed in order to provide answers 
to the research questions.  
5.2.3.1 Research question 1 
To provide an answer to Q1, first an index has been developed to measure KPI 
reporting in terms of quantity and quality in the annual reports. The quantity of KPI 
disclosure has been measured by counting the number of KPIs disclosed in the annual 
reports. With regard to KPI reporting quality, a review of the previous attempts to 
assess disclosure quality in general has been conducted. Then, the research instrument 
has been constructed based upon the ASB (2006) guidance for best practice that 
enhances information quality through eight dimensions. Manual content analysis has 
been used to code the text and to classify the KPIs disclosed into financial KPIs and 
non-financial KPIs. The research instrument was employed to obtain the KPI reporting 
quantity and quality scores for a sample of FTSE 350 non-financial UK firms. The 
study sample was identified as 103 firms with 515 annual reports published between 
2006 and 2010. Descriptive statistics have been used to explore the variation between 
firms in KPI reporting, including its subcategories. In addition, descriptive results were 
presented to show changes in KPI reporting in terms of quantity and quality among 
different industries and to illustrate this variation across the period 2006-2010. 
5.2.3.2 Research question 2 
To provide an answer to Q2, the study has reviewed the relevant theories that explain 
directors’ motivations with regard to controlling corporate disclosure. Consequently, 
the determinants of KPI reporting in terms of quantity and quality have been proposed, 
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drawing on agency theory, signalling theory, capital need theory, political need theory, 
stakeholder theory and information cost theory. In addition to firm characteristics 
variables, the main variables tested are directors’ compensation, board size, board 
composition, board meetings, role duality, audit committee (AC) size, AC meetings, 
managerial ownership, major shareholding, and the issuance of shares, bonds and loans. 
 In addition to the Pearson correlation matrix, panel data regressions have been 
conducted to assess the significance of the association between determinants, variables 
and KPI reporting quantity and quality scores. The study has employed clustering by 
firm and time effects to determine any unobserved cross sectional and time series 
dependence within the panel data set.  
5.2.3.3 Research question 3 
To provide an answer to Q3, the relevant literature has been reviewed. Agency theory 
as well as the efficient market hypothesis is used to explain how KPI reporting could 
affect firm value. Following previous studies, the study has controlled for firm 
characteristics as well as growth opportunities. Additionally, the following variables 
have been included in the analyses: KPI reporting quantity and quality scores, directors’ 
compensation, board size, board composition, board meetings, role duality, audit 
committee (AC) size, AC meetings, managerial ownership, and major shareholding. 
Following previous studies (e.g. Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Hassan et al., 2009; 
Aggarwal, 2009), Tobin’s Q ratio has been used in the main and further analyses as a 
measure of firm value. Moreover, tests have been re-estimated using the market-to-
book ratio as a proxy for firm value, in order to check the robustness of the results.  
Panel data regressions have also been conducted to test the hypotheses of the study. The 
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study has applied clustering by both firm and year in order to address firm and time 
effects within the panel data set. 
5.2.3.4 Research question 4 
This thesis consists of three studies which are integrated to provide an answer to Q4. 
First, the research approach is to make a distinction between disclosure quantity and its 
quality. Therefore, the research instrument has been developed to measure the quantity 
of KPI reporting separate from the quality of KPI disclosure. To test the reliability of 
the measure, a pilot study was conducted on a sample of 10 annual reports for the year 
2009-2010. Then, the measure has been used to come up with KPI reporting quantity 
and quality scores. Regression results in the second study have been employed to 
indicate whether each of the quantity and quality of KPI reporting is identically derived 
from the same factors. Finally, the findings of the third study have used the sign and the 
significance of the relationship between KPI reporting quantity and quality and firm 
value, in order to examine whether the quantity and quality of KPI reporting have 
different effects on firm valuation. 
5.3 Research findings 
This section includes a summary of the findings of the studies that were conducted to 
achieve the research objectives. These findings will be linked with the key research 
questions. 
5.3.1  The attributes of KPI reporting in the UK (Q1) 
The analyses in chapter (2) have revealed that the majority of firms introduce their KPIs 
within the business review. However, it is apparent that directors take advantage of 
allowing them to report on KPIs if they consider them as necessary and appropriate to 
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analysing the firm’s performance, and to avoid reporting on KPIs when they consider 
such disclosure against the firm’s competitive position. As a result, many companies do 
not disclose KPIs at all, while, a large number of companies limit their disclosure to 
providing financial KPIs.  
The most popular financial KPIs disclosed by UK firms were: revenues followed by 
underlying earnings per share, and free cash flow. In contrast, the most popular non- 
financial KPIs disclosed were: accident incident rate, employee turnover\ retention, and 
accident numbers. Despite the increasing trend in the KPI reporting quantity and quality 
levels across the sample period (2006-2010), descriptive statistics have documented the 
low number of non-financial KPIs disclosed, as well as the low quality of KPI reporting 
in general. The number of non-financial KPIs disclosed is not enough to analyse 
environmental and people aspects. The overall quality level of KPIs reported is slightly 
improved if KPIs disclosed outside the KPI section are considered. Furthermore, it has 
been noted that the quality of non-financial KPI reporting is usually lower than the 
corresponding value for financial ones during the sample period. The study has found 
that firms do not comply with most of the qualitative attributes included in the ASB 
(2006) guidance for best practice with regard to KPI reporting. 
The analyses have revealed that the industries with the highest quantity of KPI 
disclosure do not appear to be the highest in terms of quality of KPI disclosure. While, 
Utilities firms were the highest in KPI reporting quantity, the highest level of KPI 
reporting quality was provided by Basic Materials industry. In contrast, Healthcare 
firms showed the lowest level of KPI reporting quantity, but Oil & Gas and Technology 
firms provided the lowest level of total KPI reporting quality.  
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5.3.2 Factors explaining the variation in KPI reporting (Q2) 
The analyses in chapter (3) have revealed that board size, board composition, non-
executives’ compensation, and firm’s plans to acquire loans have significant and 
positive relationships with KPI reporting quantity as well as its quality. In contrast, role 
duality has a negative influence on both of them. However, it has been observed that 
other variables have different effects on the two main dimensions in terms of disclosure 
(i.e. quantity and quality). Whereas, executive compensation and audit committee 
meetings have a positive influence on the quality of KPI disclosures rather than its 
quantity, those firms intent to issue bonds have been found to have a positive influence 
on the quantity of KPI rather than on its quality. Moreover, board meetings show a 
negative association only with KPI reporting quantity.  
These findings are important for many reasons. First, with regard to directors’ 
compensation, there are a few previous studies that have examined the directors’ 
compensation effect on corporate disclosures (e.g. Aboody and Kasznic, 2000; Nagar et 
al., 2003; Grey et al., 2012). The findings of this study add to the literature by providing 
strong evidence that highly compensated directors tend to publish more information 
with a higher level of quality. Therefore, it can be argued that shareholders could use 
managerial remunerations to increase the quantity and quality of KPI information which 
is disseminated by the directors. These findings are in line with disclosure agency and 
signalling theories. Highly compensated directors tend to disclose high levels of KPI 
information quantity and quality that might include their private information, and hence 
mitigate information asymmetry between directors and shareholders. Accordingly, it 
can be argued that highly compensated directors - especially non-executive ones - are 
keen to improve KPI reporting in order to signal their competence in the employment 
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market. Second, with regard to board characteristics variables, it has been found that the 
larger the board size and the higher the percentage of NEDs on the board, the higher the 
possibility of providing high quantity and quality KPI reporting. In contrast, combining 
the CEO and the chairman roles results in a negative effect on the number of KPIs 
disclosed and its quality.  
These results can be interpreted in terms of the propositions of agency and signalling 
theories. The results illustrate that an effective board monitoring role leads to the 
disclosure of more KPIs and improved reporting quality. Arguably, the results might 
also indicate that board directors - especially NEDs - have the incentive to attract 
different employers through reporting on more KPIs with a higher quality. These 
findings are in line with the previous literature that examines the relationship between 
disclosure quantity and board size (e.g. Laksamana, 2008; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 
2011), board composition (e.g. Li et al., 2008; Wang and Hussainey, 2013), and role 
duality (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Abdelsalam and Street, 2007).  
Additionally, the study has shown that audit committee meetings have a positive 
influence on the quality of KPIs. The results suggest that active ACs are of great 
importance when it comes to oversight and the control of financial reporting. Therefore, 
UK firms should be encouraged to follow the FRC (2012) recommendation that asks for 
many AC meetings, with a minimum of three meetings per year.  
The findings of the study have documented a positive and statistically significant 
association between corporate tendency to issue bonds or get loans, and the number of 
KPIs reported in the KPI section. These findings are interpreted as being in line with the 
premises of capital need theory.  Directors are driven by the need to obtain finance to 
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increase the volume of KPI disclosure. Meanwhile, those directors do not show the 
same concern with reporting quality.  
However, the study has found no significant relationship between the plans to issue 
equity and KPI reporting. This result can be interpreted in line with Lang and 
Lundholm’s (2000) findings that there is a trade-off between managers’ incentives to 
mitigate information asymmetry through increasing KPI quantity and quality, and the 
motivation to maintain a steady level of disclosure so that they avoid any major decline 
or correction in the share price after the announcement date. The results with regard to 
capital need variables show that directors affect KPI reporting based upon the source of 
finance. 
Finally, the analyses findings have shown that KPI reporting is not associated with the 
majority of firm characteristics. These results highlight the importance of CG 
mechanisms as drivers of financial reporting. However, similar findings have been 
provided by previous studies with respect to profitability (e.g. Mangena and Pike, 
2005), liquidity (e.g. Anis et al., 2012), leverage (e.g. Ho and Wong, 2001; Abraham 
and Cox, 2007), dividend yield (Naser et al., 2006), and cross listing (e.g. Oyelere et al., 
2003).  
5.3.3 KPI reporting and firm value (Q3) 
The analyses in chapter (4) have revealed the following. While the number of KPIs 
disclosed in the KPI section has a negative and significant association with firm value, 
KPI reporting quality has no statistical and significant relationship with firm value. 
Notably, when considering the quantity of KPIs disclosed outside the KPI section in the 
analyses, the negative association between KPI reporting quantity and firm value 
becomes more significant. The analyses have indicated that the association between 
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firm value and KPI reporting is largely derived from the effects of financial KPI 
reporting. In contrast, neither the quantity nor the quality of non-financial KPI reporting 
has a significant association with firm value.  
These results are consistent with Hassan et al.’s (2009) assertion that the association 
between corporate disclosure and firm value is as complex as it is varied, based upon 
disclosure type. The findings with regard to KPI quantity suggest that market 
participants might perceive that directors in firms with extra amounts of KPIs disclosure 
are causing such noise in order to hide some potential threats or problems.  
The findings could also be related to the content of the KPI information disclosed. This 
content might reflect the real position of the business, which raises concerns about the 
firm’s prospects. In line with the efficient market hypothesis, market participants’ 
incorporate this information and correct their overvaluation of share prices. 
On the other hand, it has been concluded that investors could not assign higher values 
for firms with a higher quality of KPI reporting. This finding might be explained by the 
low level of quality scores for the majority of UK companies. Therefore, investors 
could not perceive any differences between these companies in terms of disclosure 
quality. Hence, these differences have not been reflected on their valuation of UK firms. 
In addition, the analyses illustrated that the majority of corporate governance (CG) 
mechanisms do not have a significant effect on firm value. Whereas, board size has a 
significant and negative association with firm valuation, a positive and highly 
significant effect of role duality on firm value is documented. These findings can be 
explained by signalling theory, suggesting that firms with smaller board size, and firms 
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chaired by CEOs, are conveying good signals to investors that they have an effective 
type of leadership and control.  
5.3.4 Quantity and quality of financial reporting (Q4) 
The answers to Q1, Q2 and Q3 are integrated to give an answer to Q4. More 
specifically, the analyses in chapter (2) regarding Q1 (i.e. the attributes of KPI reporting 
in the UK) have indicated that industries with the highest quantity of KPI disclosure did 
not appear to be the highest in terms of quality of KPI disclosure.  
In addition, the analyses in chapter (3) regarding Q2 (i.e. the factors affecting KPI 
reporting quantity and quality) have revealed that there is a positive correlation between 
KPI reporting quantity and its quality. This suggests that the larger the quantity of KPIs 
disclosed, the higher the quality of KPI reporting.  
However, the empirical analyses have revealed the following. The quantity and quality 
of KPI reporting are not identically influenced by the same factors. The study results 
indicated in 5.3.2, question the proposition of using quantity of disclosure as a proxy for 
its quality in accounting studies that examine the determinants of accounting disclosure. 
Furthermore, the findings regarding Q3 (i.e. the impact of KPI reporting on firm value) 
in chapter (4) facilitate answering Q4. The findings suggest that the quantity of KPI 
reporting and its quality have different associations with firm value. The evidence 
indicates that, whereas the quantity of KPIs has a significant and negative effect on firm 
value, KPI reporting quality has no impact upon firm value. Even when quantity and 
quality of KPIs reported outside the KPI section were considered in the analyses, the 
above findings hold.  
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These findings are important as they provide evidence suggesting that it is not 
appropriate to use the quantity of disclosure as a proxy for its quality in accounting 
research while investigating the value relevance of accounting information. Overall, the 
present study findings are in line with the recent literature (Anis et al., 2012) suggesting 
that disclosure quantity and disclosure quality should not be used as substitutes for one 
another.  
5.4 Contributions and implications 
This section indicates how this thesis contributes to the extant literature. Then, the 
implications of the present study are provided.  
5.4.1 Contributions 
This thesis makes a contribution to the literature by answering the four research 
questions. Furthermore, the thesis could add to the methodologies applied in the 
literature. 
5.4.1.1 Contributions to the literature 
The answer to Q1 extends the limited literature that explores KPI reporting in practice: 
Giunta et al. (2008) (Italy) and Tauringana and Mangena (2009) (UK). However, the 
present study is distinguished by investigating the level of quantity as well as quality of 
KPI reporting for a relatively large sample of UK listed companies from different 
sectors over a five year period.  
The answer to Q2 contributes to the academic studies testing the role of CG 
mechanisms and firm characteristics as determinants of corporate disclosure (e.g. 
Forker, 1992; Cooke, 1992; Ho and Wong, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ajinkya et 
al., 2005; Li et al., 2008; Tauringana and Mangena, 2009; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 
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2011; Wang and Hussainey, 2013).  
The answer builds on, and contributes to, the literature suggesting that the quantity and 
quality of disclosure are not derived from the same factors. Furthermore, the study 
highlights the importance of directors’ compensation as a driver of financial reporting. 
The findings provide strong support for the proposition of agency, signalling, and 
capital need theories, when testing the effect of different factors on KPI reporting in 
terms of quantity and quality. 
The answer to Q3 contributes to the previous literature examining the impact of 
financial reporting on market participants (e.g. Hussainey and Walker, 2009; Hassan et 
al., 2009; Mouselli et al., 2012). To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first 
study which illustrates that the quantity and quality of reporting have different 
relationships with firm value. Moreover, the study also builds on, and contributes to, the 
literature investigating the relationship between CG mechanisms and firm value (e.g. 
Klein, 1998; Dalton et al., 1999; Laporta et al., 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; 
Aggarwal et al., 2009; Ammann et al., 2011). As investors do not assign higher value to 
firms with most of the CG variables, the findings are in favour of allowing UK firms to 
select a CG structure which is appropriate to their own characteristics.   
To provide an answer to Q4, the study has to address a number of issues. First, the call 
for financial reporting quality measures which are directly derived from a proper 
definition of disclosure quality (Beyer et al., 2010). Second, the call for solving the 
difficulty in measuring disclosure quality, by using a comprehensive measure rather 
than earning quality (Berger, 2011). The study builds on, and contributes to, the 
literature focusing on the qualitative attributes of the information disclosed (e.g. Beattie 
et al., 2004; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Botosan, 1997; Boesso and Kumar, 2007; 
Giunta et al., 2008; Beest and Braam, 2011; Anis et al., 2012). The study introduces 
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reporting quality measures based on the ASB (2006) framework. Employing this 
measure in accounting research would also contribute to knowledge. For instance, it 
might lead to different inferences with regard to the drivers and impacts of either 
narrative disclosure in general, or specific types of disclosure (e.g. risk reporting, social 
responsibility reporting).  
5.4.1.2 Methodological contributions  
The study introduces a valid and reliable measure of disclosure quality. Hence, it 
enables researchers to distinguish between disclosure quantity and quality when 
exploring firms’ practices. In addition, the results of applying this measure provide 
strong evidence that using the quantity of disclosure as a proxy for its quality in 
accounting studies might lead to misleading inferences with regard to factors affecting 
financial reporting. This might also have implications with respect to the economic 
consequences of accounting disclosure.  
In addition, the study employs clustering by both firm and time in order to consider any 
unobserved firms and times within the data set. Compared with other methods applied 
in accounting research, Gow et al. (2010) found that clustering by firm and time (CL-2) 
would produce well specified tests statistics if compared with OLS standard errors, 
White standard errors, Newey-West standard errors, Fama-MacBeth, Z2, as well as 
robust standard errors clustered by time, firm and both.  
5.4.2  Implications 
The findings of this thesis should be relevant to the regulatory bodies. As the UK 
Minister for Employment Relations, Consumer and Postal Affairs stated, companies 
have to disclose relevant information of a high quality within their narratives. The 
findings of the study inform policy makers about the relatively low level of KPI 
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reporting quality in the annual report narratives (especially for firms in some sectors 
such as Oil & Gas). The weak performance with regard to several attributes of KPI 
reporting quality confirms the concerns regarding the role of enforcement mechanisms. 
This suggests that firms might need clear guidance that indicates best practice in detail. 
More specifically, this guidance should show firms how to indicate the link between 
firms’ KPIs and their strategies, quantify their KPI targets, provide commentary on 
these targets, and disclose any changes in KPIs.  
Accordingly, the present study has revealed that there is a variation between companies 
from different industries in terms of the amount of KPIs disclosed. Furthermore, it has 
shown that disclosure on KPIs - especially non-financial ones - was absent in many 
annual reports. Therefore, regulatory bodies should identify a minimum number of 
KPIs to be issued by each firm in accordance with its sector. The definition and the 
assumptions used to drive each of these KPIs should be unified and generalised for each 
sector to enhance comparability between firms in the same sector.   
This thesis has provided evidence that disclosure quality can be assessed based upon the 
qualitative characteristics that are provided by the ASB (2006). This measure is reliable 
and valid and can be used to evaluate disclosure quality for any type of narrative 
disclosure. This measure of disclosure quality can be adopted by policy makers to 
detect those areas of narrative disclosure which need more focus. Subsequently, 
regulators could identify whether or not low disclosure quality is due to non-compliance 
with the existing rules, or because of the absence of explicit guidance.  
The empirical results have shown the weak impact of CG mechanisms upon firm value, 
suggesting that investors might look at other firm attributes and board monitoring 
mechanisms as substitutes. The results support the argument that firms with a 
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concentration of power could achieve better performance.  The positive impact of role 
duality upon firm value suggests that a firm’s performance could be improved when it 
is controlled by a CEO who has enough experience and knowledge about operating and 
financial activities. The findings support the view that boards that are dominated by 
NEDs might suffer from a lack of strategic decision making ability (Goodstein et al., 
1994), in addition to a lack of local experience and training in contrast to insider 
directors (Dalton et al., 1999). These findings are in line with Laing and Weir (1999) 
and Weir et al.’s (2002) studies that recommend to the regulators not to impose certain 
CG structures on UK firms. Each firm would have a CG structure that is adapted to its 
own characteristics and its surrounding environment. This also is in line with the 
orientation of the CG code in the UK, which is dominated by comply or explain rule.  
In line with this argument, this thesis provides strong evidence that particular CG 
mechanisms affect the quantity and quality of KPI reporting. More specifically, it 
informs regulatory bodies as well as information users, that firms with larger board size, 
NED dominance, and higher NED compensation are more likely to report larger 
numbers of KPIs with a higher level of quality. The results confirm that UK boards 
perform a strong monitoring role, supporting the view that soft regulations in the UK do 
not lead to a weakness in performing this role.  
Moreover, firms which intend to issue bonds or loans tend to increase the quantity of 
KPIs disclosed. Therefore, users should consider these attributes before taking any 
decisions based on KPI analyses. This should be of interest to regulators as they could 
encourage firms to improve these dominant mechanisms in particular, in order to 
enhance KPI reporting.  
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Rather, the findings might be important for shareholders and UK firms. The study 
provides strong evidence that shareholders could improve KPI reporting and get better 
firm value at the same time by offering higher compensation to non-executive directors 
on the board. 
KPI reporting quality has no statistical and significant relationship with firm value. 
Notably, when considering the quantity of KPIs disclosed outside the KPI section in the 
analyses, the negative association between KPI reporting quantity and firm value 
becomes more significant 
Moreover, the findings have potential managerial implications with regard to the 
negative effect of the quantity of KPI reported upon firm value. In particular, the results 
suggest that market participants should pay more attention to financial KPIs disclosed 
in the annual report rather than non-financial ones. Hence, managers should be careful 
about disclosing the basic KPIs. In other words, managers have to study carefully the 
cost-benefit trade-off before increasing the number of KPIs disclosed.  
5.5 Limitations of the study 
The present study is one of the first to investigate the determinants as well as the value 
and relevance of corporate reporting, distinguishing between disclosure quantity and its 
quality. However, this thesis suffers from a number of limitations which represent good 
avenues for future research. 
One potential limitation is the relatively small sample size. This is a common limitation 
of labour-intensive studies which employ manual content analysis to code the text. In 
addition, CG data is collected by the researcher by reading firms’ annual reports. This 
has reduced the ability to increase sample size due to time and effort considerations. In 
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this regard, any firm without complete data time series was excluded following several 
previous studies (e.g. Elshandidy et al., 2013). However, this may have caused survival-
ship bias because firms with missing data for more than one year were not allowed to 
enter the sample. Data collection has led to another constraint with regard to the 
variables included in the analyses. For instance, it was planned to examine the impact of 
equity linked compensation on KPI reporting, but this variable has been excluded 
during the analyses because of missing data problem.  
In addition, small sample size has led to the selection of a very few firms with a low 
number of observations in several sectors. Similarly, the sample period could not be 
extended to longer than five years. As a result, the researcher could not draw 
conclusions about industry effects based on empirical tests. In particular, this has 
limited his ability to study in detail the impact of industry on KPI reporting quantity and 
quality. This also has not enabled the researcher to conduct extensive analyses, testing 
to what extent industry could affect firm value. Furthermore, the number of 
observations has restricted the opportunity to obtain reliable results that could be 
generalised with regard to the impact of financial crises periods on the results. 
Furthermore, the descriptive statistics in chapter two showed that sample firms did not 
consider most of the qualitative attributes recommended by the ASB (2006). Hence, the 
resultant quality scores were heavily driven by two dimensions of the eight dimensions 
suggested to measure reporting quality (providing the definition of each KPI and 
quantifying the data). Therefore, caution should be exercised with regard to the 
conclusions of KPI reporting quality. In particular, one might argue that UK firms do 
not provide annual report users with useful information that could be incorporated in his 
evaluation of a firm’s value. On the other hand, the descriptive statistics in chapter two 
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showed that sample firms provided a limited number of non-financial KPIs with a 
relatively low degree of reporting quality.  Therefore, caution should be exercised with 
regard to the conclusions with regard to non-financial KPI reporting determinants or 
impacts. 
Despite following different procedures to avoid multicollinearity among the dependent 
variables, there is a high possibility that there is a circular causality between the 
independent and dependent variables of the models. Therefore, the models employed 
might suffer from the endogeneity problem.  
The study focused on two types of KPI reporting (i.e. financial and non-financial KPI 
information). One might argue that firms will not provide KPI information unless they 
represent good news. In contrast, firms with disagreeable performance indicators will 
not provide such information. The study has indirectly considered such news by 
controlling for the impact of the main drivers for good and bad news, such as 
profitability, liquidity and leverage. However, it might be helpful to study the tone of 
KPI disclosures. It is expected that KPIs with good or bad news could have an influence 
on investors’ valuation of the firm. More specifically, the analyses of the tone of KPI 
disclosures could provide an extra explanation to the negative effect of KPI reporting 
quantity on firm value.  
Finally, there is another common limitation in studies that investigate the market 
participants’ perceptions of information disclosed in the annual report. Market 
participants could get similar information from other sources (e.g. online reporting, 
analysts’ reports) before reading the annual report. That makes for a difficulty in 
capturing the individual impact of that information as disclosed in the annual report.  
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5.6 Suggestions for future research 
The present study can provide good avenues for potential research. These opportunities 
can be highlighted as follows: 
Previous literature showed that the different indices used to measure disclosure quality 
might lead to different results. Therefore, future studies could employ the instrument 
used in this thesis to measure disclosure quality for other parts of narrative reporting 
(e.g. risk disclosures). Then they could test whether the quantity and quality of such 
disclosures are driven by the same factors. Future studies can also explore the separate 
impact of each dimension on stock market participants. 
In this regard, future research could improve disclosure measure used in this study. It is 
suggested that future researchers consider the extent or richness of the KPI information 
provided. Therefore, KPI quantity measures could be enhanced by considering the level 
and range of relevant topics covered by KPI reporting. In addition, the study has 
avoided any subjectivity that may be caused by weighting the type of KPI disclosed (i.e. 
non-financial KPIs) or one attribute of those used to measure disclosure quality. 
However, future studies could calculate weighted scores and compare the results with 
the results produced using un-weighted scores. Arguably, quality measures might be 
improved if weighting was given to particular dimensions such as quantifying KPI 
targets and providing management commentary on it. As a result, KPI quality measures 
could consider the depth of the KPI information disclosed, as it reflects the importance 
of forward-looking (outlook) in this information.  
Future research could explore firms’ practices with respect to other types of KPI 
disclosures (e.g. KPI disclosures that include good news and ones that contain bad 
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news, changes in KPI used from one year to another). This research opportunity will 
show how firms could use KPI reporting content to send specific signals to investors. 
On that basis, research could be extended to examine the determinants and impacts of 
the tone of KPI disclosures. 
Current research could be extended by many means. New variables could be introduced 
to examine the extent to which these variables could affect KPI reporting. For example, 
as audit committee meetings display their influence on KPI reporting quality, further 
study could examine the effect of other audit committee characteristics such as the 
financial expertise of the audit committee members. Moreover, some industries show a 
remarkably low/high level of KPI reporting. Thus, a study could be conducted into such 
sectors as Utilities, Basic Materials, Healthcare, Technology or Oil and Gas, to examine 
the factors affecting the low/high level of quantity/quality in such sectors. In this 
regard, sample size could be increased and the sample period can be extended, both of 
which would add to the richness of the analysis.  
Similarly, the impact of KPI reporting could be investigated from other perspectives. 
More specifically, future research could study whether or not the quantity and quality of 
KPI information have different effects on stock returns, cost of capital or on analyst 
report accuracy. As mentioned above, the research could be extended by focusing on 
some sectors in order to study the impact of KPI reporting by firms in these sectors 
upon firms’ values. 
Using qualitative research tools in measuring KPI disclosure quality represents another 
direction for research. For example, undertaking interviews with investors might reveal 
great insights into their perceptions with regard to the variation between firms in terms 
of KPI quantity and quality.  
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Finally, this research can be conducted in different contexts. There are new narrative 
regulations that apply for periods ending on or after the end of September 2013. The 
new regulations ask all UK firms with the exception of small ones, to replace the 
business review with a strategic report. Therefore, future studies could address the same 
research questions for periods beyond September 2013. Additionally, a comparative 
study could be conducted among different European countries, to explore the variations 
between EU countries in terms of KPI reporting quantity and quality after introducing 
the business review regulation in 2003. It would be interesting to compare these 
countries in terms of KPI reporting drivers and also their consequences. This would 
confirm whether or not the findings of the present study are applicable to other 
countries. 
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Appendix 1 
 Table 41 Anova test to compare financial KPI reporting quantity across sample 
period 
 
 
 
 
QNFKS: is the numberof financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI’ section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                0.000      0.382      1.000      1.000
    2010      .606977    .277262    .121886    .068075
          
                0.001      1.000      1.000
    2009      .538903    .209188    .053812
          
                0.004      1.000
    2008      .485091    .155376
          
                0.153
    2007      .329715
                                                      
Col Mean         2006       2007       2008       2009
Row Mean- 
                                (Bonferroni)
                         Comparison of QNFKS by year
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(4) =  14.5021  Prob>chi2 = 0.006
    Total           472.548176    502   .941331027
                                                                        
 Within groups      449.617798    498   .902846985
Between groups      22.9303773      4   5.73259432      6.35     0.0001
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
      Total     2.0979776   .97022215         503
                                                 
       2010      2.308016   .81160632         102
       2009     2.2399414   .85659085         102
       2008     2.1861296   .90325218         102
       2007     2.0307538   1.0312948         101
       2006     1.7010386   1.1249368          96
                                                 
       year          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                       Summary of QNFKS
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Table 42 Anova test to compare non-financial KPI reporting quantity across 
sample period 
 
 
 
QNNFKSEC: is the numberof non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI’ section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                0.002      0.292      1.000      1.000
    2010      .532508    .307766    .152718    .063843
          
                0.011      0.836      1.000
    2009      .468665    .243923    .088875
          
                0.080      1.000
    2008       .37979    .155048
          
                1.000
    2007      .224742
                                                      
Col Mean         2006       2007       2008       2009
Row Mean- 
                                (Bonferroni)
                        Comparison of QNNFKSEC by year
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(4) =   1.1714  Prob>chi2 = 0.883
    Total           518.249114    502   1.03236875
                                                                        
 Within groups      500.290372    498   1.00459914
Between groups      17.9587417      4   4.48968541      4.47     0.0015
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
      Total     1.0652193   1.0160555         503
                                                 
       2010      1.272564   .99910395         102
       2009      1.208721   1.0291649         102
       2008     1.1198459   1.0344857         102
       2007     .96479811   1.0049152         101
       2006     .74005562    .9370861          96
                                                 
       year          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                      Summary of QNNFKSEC
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Table 43 Anova test to compare total non-financial KPI reporting quantity across 
sample period 
 
 
 
 
QNNFKREP: is the numberof non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                0.000      0.002      0.237      1.000
    2010      .790697    .546945    .335523    .164574
          
                0.000      0.102      1.000
    2009      .626124    .382371    .170949
          
                0.026      1.000
    2008      .455174    .211422
          
                1.000
    2007      .243752
                                                      
Col Mean         2006       2007       2008       2009
Row Mean- 
                                (Bonferroni)
                        Comparison of QNNFKREP by year
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(4) =   0.8134  Prob>chi2 = 0.937
    Total            593.95955    502   1.18318635
                                                                        
 Within groups      555.448221    498   1.11535787
Between groups      38.5113285      4   9.62783214      8.63     0.0000
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
      Total     1.2982137   1.0877437         503
                                                 
       2010     1.6603572   1.0751321         102
       2009     1.4957837   1.0890472         102
       2008     1.3248344   1.0712718         102
       2007     1.1134123   1.0328102         101
       2006     .86966009   1.0069933          96
                                                 
       year          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                      Summary of QNNFKREP
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Table 44 Anova test to compare total KPI reporting quantity across sample period 
 
 
 
QNTKREP: is the total number of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                0.000      0.004      0.610      1.000
    2010      .935704    .555817    .291154    .140025
          
                0.000      0.077      1.000
    2009      .795678    .415792    .151129
          
                0.000      0.893
    2008       .64455    .264663
          
                0.165
    2007      .379886
                                                      
Col Mean         2006       2007       2008       2009
Row Mean- 
                                (Bonferroni)
                        Comparison of QNTKREP by year
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(4) =  10.7514  Prob>chi2 = 0.030
    Total           665.017942    502   1.32473694
                                                                        
 Within groups      610.845357    498    1.2265971
Between groups      54.1725846      4   13.5431461     11.04     0.0000
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
      Total     2.6180589   1.1509722         503
                                                 
       2010     2.9956839    .9625605         102
       2009     2.8556587   1.0105928         102
       2008     2.7045298   1.0710509         102
       2007     2.4398667   1.2070279         101
       2006     2.0599803    1.267246          96
                                                 
       year          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                      Summary of QNTKREP
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Table 45 Anova test to compare financial KPI reporting quality across sample 
period 
 
 
 
 
QLFKS: is the quality of financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI’ section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                0.000      0.030      1.000      1.000
    2010      .176605    .092419     .04632    .032043
          
                0.000      0.516      1.000
    2009      .144561    .060376    .014276
          
                0.000      1.000
    2008      .130285      .0461
          
                0.076
    2007      .084185
                                                      
Col Mean         2006       2007       2008       2009
Row Mean- 
                                (Bonferroni)
                         Comparison of QLFKS by year
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(4) =  27.6755  Prob>chi2 = 0.000
    Total           26.0389385    502   .051870395
                                                                        
 Within groups      24.1949419    498   .048584221
Between groups      1.84399654      4   .460999135      9.49     0.0000
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
      Total     .54299186   .22775073         503
                                                 
       2010     .61114569    .1685289         102
       2009     .57910255   .19790911         102
       2008     .56482616   .20792088         102
       2007     .51872639   .24069706         101
       2006     .43454118       .2755          96
                                                 
       year          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                       Summary of QLFKS
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Table 46 Anova test to compare non-financial KPI reporting quality across sample 
period 
 
 
 
QLNFKS EC: is the quality of non- financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI’ section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                0.002      0.457      1.000      1.000
    2010      .175096    .093202    .056601    .034686
          
                0.030      1.000      1.000
    2009       .14041    .058516    .021915
          
                0.123      1.000
    2008      .118495    .036601
          
                0.837
    2007      .081894
                                                      
Col Mean         2006       2007       2008       2009
Row Mean- 
                                (Bonferroni)
                        Comparison of QLNFKSEC by year
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(4) =   0.2889  Prob>chi2 = 0.991
    Total            56.476032    502   .112502056
                                                                        
 Within groups      54.7162259    498    .10987194
Between groups      1.75980614      4   .439951536      4.00     0.0033
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
      Total     .39406279   .33541326         503
                                                 
       2010     .46470652   .32394336         102
       2009     .43002065   .32808533         102
       2008     .40810578   .33626389         102
       2007      .3715047   .33941936         101
       2006     .28961094    .3293495          96
                                                 
       year          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                      Summary of QLNFKSEC
Appendices  
 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ic
es 
VII 
Table 47 Anova test to compare total non-financial KPI reporting quality across 
sample period 
 
 
 
QLNFKREP: is the quality of non financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                0.000      0.065      0.822      1.000
    2010      .214053    .123866    .078804    .043222
          
                0.002      0.761      1.000
    2009      .170831    .080644    .035582
          
                0.034      1.000
    2008      .135249    .045062
          
                0.508
    2007      .090187
                                                      
Col Mean         2006       2007       2008       2009
Row Mean- 
                                (Bonferroni)
                        Comparison of QLNFKREP by year
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(4) =   1.4644  Prob>chi2 = 0.833
    Total           54.6628087    502   .108890057
                                                                        
 Within groups      52.0075469    498   .104432825
Between groups      2.65526187      4   .663815467      6.36     0.0001
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
      Total     .44796885   .32998493         503
                                                 
       2010     .53843836   .30214305         102
       2009     .49521657   .31681598         102
       2008     .45963429   .32755073         102
       2007     .41457245    .3360613         101
       2006     .32438554    .3327659          96
                                                 
       year          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                      Summary of QLNFKREP
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Table 48 Anova test to compare total KPI reporting quality across sample period 
 
 
 
QLTKREP: is the aggregated quality of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                0.000      0.016      1.000      1.000
    2010      .167191    .092168    .040172    .026949
          
                0.000      0.254      1.000
    2009      .140242    .065219    .013223
          
                0.000      0.745
    2008      .127019    .051996
          
                0.114
    2007      .075023
                                                      
Col Mean         2006       2007       2008       2009
Row Mean- 
                                (Bonferroni)
                        Comparison of QLTKREP by year
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(4) =  37.5015  Prob>chi2 = 0.000
    Total           23.1058065    502   .046027503
                                                                        
 Within groups       21.387698    498   .042947185
Between groups      1.71810846      4   .429527115     10.00     0.0000
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
      Total     .57008805   .21454021         503
                                                 
       2010     .63411513   .15538007         102
       2009     .60716629   .17814543         102
       2008     .59394324   .18671721         102
       2007     .54194692   .23430768         101
       2006     .46692433   .26621597          96
                                                 
       year          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                      Summary of QLTKREP
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Table 49 Anova test to compare financial KPI reporting quantity across industries 
 
 
 
QNFKS: is the numberof financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI’ section. 
Rows: Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & Gas, Technology, 
Telecommunications, Utilities. 
Columns: Basic materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & 
Gas, Technology, Telecommunications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                1.000      1.000
Utilitie      .344898     .23108
          
                1.000
Telecomm      .113818
                                
Col Mean     Technolo   Telecomm
Row Mean- 
                1.000      1.000      1.000      0.024      1.000      0.099
Utilitie      .532714    .230799    .332246    .989271    .372007    .752786
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000
Telecomm      .301634   -.000282    .101165    .758191    .140926    .521706
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      0.333      1.000      1.000
Technolo      .187816   -.114099   -.012653    .644373    .027109    .407888
          
                1.000      0.113      0.310      1.000      0.464
Oil & Ga     -.220072   -.521987   -.420541    .236485   -.380779
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      0.128
Industri      .160708   -.141208   -.039761    .617264
          
                1.000      0.034      0.088
Health C     -.456557   -.758473   -.657026
          
                1.000      1.000
Consumer      .200469   -.101447
          
                1.000
Consumer      .301916
                                                                            
Col Mean     Basic Ma   Consumer   Consumer   Health C   Industri   Oil & Ga
Row Mean- 
                                (Bonferroni)
                       Comparison of QNFKS by Industry
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(8) =  14.4654  Prob>chi2 = 0.070
    Total           472.548176    502   .941331027
                                                                        
 Within groups      450.755958    494   .912461453
Between groups       21.792218      8   2.72402725      2.99     0.0028
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
            Total     2.0979776   .97022215         503
                                                       
        Utilities     2.5066405   .83776523          20
Telecommunication       2.27556   .95558252          10
       Technology     2.1617423   .90688077          40
        Oil & Gas     1.7538544   1.1565705          54
      Industrials     2.1346336   .90537442         143
      Health Care     1.5173691   .74431542          24
Consumer Services      2.174395   1.0755071         107
   Consumer Goods     2.2758417   .87798965          65
  Basic Materials      1.973926    .8029555          40
                                                       
         Industry          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                             Summary of QNFKS
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Table 50 Anova test to compare non-financial KPI reporting quantity across 
industries 
 
 
 
QNNFKSEC: is the numberof non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI’ section. 
Rows: Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & Gas, Technology, 
Telecommunications, Utilities. 
Columns: Basic materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & 
Gas, Technology, Telecommunications. 
 
 
 
 
 
                0.000      0.000
Utilitie       2.3836    1.81194
          
                1.000
Telecomm      .571659
                                
Col Mean     Technolo   Telecomm
Row Mean- 
                0.000      0.000      0.000      0.000      0.000      0.000
Utilitie      1.48739    2.01011    1.68641    2.26013    1.73378    1.64355
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000
Telecomm     -.324547    .198178   -.125525    .448193   -.078158   -.168391
          
                0.001      1.000      0.002      1.000      0.004      0.005
Technolo     -.896206   -.373481   -.697184   -.123466   -.649817    -.74005
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      0.254      1.000
Oil & Ga     -.156156    .366569    .042866    .616584    .090233
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      0.379
Industri     -.246389    .276336   -.047367    .526351
          
                0.049      1.000      0.233
Health C      -.77274   -.250015   -.573717
          
                1.000      0.979
Consumer     -.199022    .323702
          
                0.191
Consumer     -.522725
                                                                            
Col Mean     Basic Ma   Consumer   Consumer   Health C   Industri   Oil & Ga
Row Mean- 
                                (Bonferroni)
                      Comparison of QNNFKSEC by Industry
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(8) =  17.2452  Prob>chi2 = 0.028
    Total           518.249114    502   1.03236875
                                                                        
 Within groups      426.473831    494    .86330735
Between groups      91.7752828      8   11.4719103     13.29     0.0000
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
            Total     1.0652193   1.0160555         503
                                                       
        Utilities     2.8047565   1.0429371          20
Telecommunication     .99281998   .89088426          10
       Technology     .42116074   .69623409          40
        Oil & Gas     1.1612109   .89216394          54
      Industrials     1.0709777   .93815756         143
      Health Care     .54462708   .74836347          24
Consumer Services     1.1183446   .92234103         107
   Consumer Goods     .79464214   .86562251          65
  Basic Materials      1.317367   1.2565892          40
                                                       
         Industry          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                            Summary of QNNFKSEC
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Table 51 Anova test to compare total non-financial KPI reporting quantity across 
industries  
 
 
 
 
QNNFKREP: is the numberof non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report. 
Rows: Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & Gas, Technology, 
Telecommunications, Utilities. 
Columns: Basic materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & 
Gas, Technology, Telecommunications. 
 
 
 
 
                0.000      0.010
Utilitie      2.17482    1.45594
          
                1.000
Telecomm      .718872
                                
Col Mean     Technolo   Telecomm
Row Mean- 
                0.000      0.000      0.000      0.000      0.000      0.000
Utilitie      1.58005    1.96102    1.68304    1.75446    1.65404     1.7811
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000
Telecomm      .124104    .505077      .2271    .298512    .198094    .325151
          
                0.355      1.000      0.362      1.000      0.172      1.000
Technolo     -.594768   -.213795   -.491771   -.420359   -.520778   -.393721
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000
Oil & Ga     -.201047    .179926    -.09805   -.026639   -.127057
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000
Industri      -.07399    .306984    .029007    .100419
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000
Health C     -.174408    .206565   -.071412
          
                1.000      1.000
Consumer     -.102996    .277977
          
                1.000
Consumer     -.380973
                                                                            
Col Mean     Basic Ma   Consumer   Consumer   Health C   Industri   Oil & Ga
Row Mean- 
                                (Bonferroni)
                      Comparison of QNNFKREP by Industry
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(8) =  13.3216  Prob>chi2 = 0.101
    Total            593.95955    502   1.18318635
                                                                        
 Within groups      520.909224    494   1.05447211
Between groups      73.0503259      8   9.13129074      8.66     0.0000
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
            Total     1.2982137   1.0877437         503
                                                       
        Utilities     2.9823485   .85621959          20
Telecommunication      1.526404   1.5881824          10
       Technology     .80753223   1.0242654          40
        Oil & Gas     1.2012531   .93240813          54
      Industrials     1.3283105    1.005718         143
      Health Care     1.2278917   1.1761164          24
Consumer Services     1.2993035   .94351609         107
   Consumer Goods     1.0213269   1.0015459          65
  Basic Materials        1.4023   1.2738112          40
                                                       
         Industry          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                            Summary of QNNFKREP
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Table 52 Anova test to compare KPI reporting quantity across industries 
 
 
 
QNTKSEC: is the number of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the the KPI’section.  
Rows: Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & Gas, Technology, 
Telecommunications, Utilities. 
Columns: Basic materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & 
Gas, Technology, Telecommunications. 
 
 
 
 
 
                0.000      0.161
Utilitie      1.40348    1.19196
          
                1.000
Telecomm      .211529
                                
Col Mean     Technolo   Telecomm
Row Mean- 
                0.003      0.000      0.000      0.000      0.000      0.000
Utilitie      1.16945    1.22505    1.17476    2.00503    1.20018    1.61642
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000
Telecomm     -.022508     .03309   -.017196    .813075    .008222     .42446
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000
Technolo     -.234036   -.178438   -.228725    .601546   -.203306    .212932
          
                1.000      1.000      0.520      1.000      0.575
Oil & Ga     -.446968    -.39137   -.441656    .388614   -.416238
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      0.028
Industri      -.03073    .024868   -.025418    .804852
          
                0.101      0.093      0.025
Health C     -.835582   -.779985   -.830271
          
                1.000      1.000
Consumer     -.005311    .050286
          
                1.000
Consumer     -.055598
                                                                            
Col Mean     Basic Ma   Consumer   Consumer   Health C   Industri   Oil & Ga
Row Mean- 
                                (Bonferroni)
                      Comparison of QNTKSEC by Industry
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(8) =  24.0947  Prob>chi2 = 0.002
    Total           628.344774    502   1.25168282
                                                                        
 Within groups      573.931049    494   1.16180374
Between groups      54.4137255      8   6.80171569      5.85     0.0000
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
            Total     2.4966587   1.1187863         503
                                                       
        Utilities     3.7435715   1.1376884          20
Telecommunication      2.551615   1.1495194          10
       Technology     2.3400865   .81586733          40
        Oil & Gas     2.1271547   1.4252527          54
      Industrials     2.5433927   .96398247         143
      Health Care     1.7385404   .81984871          24
Consumer Services     2.5688111   1.1848418         107
   Consumer Goods     2.5185249   .98984638          65
  Basic Materials     2.5741225   1.0729199          40
                                                       
         Industry          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                            Summary of QNTKSEC
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Table 53 Anova test to compare total KPI reporting quantity across industries 
 
 
 
 
QNTKREP: is the numberof financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report.  
Rows: Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & Gas, Technology, 
Telecommunications, Utilities. 
Columns: Basic materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & 
Gas, Technology, Telecommunications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                0.000      0.863
Utilitie      1.39493    .976399
          
                1.000
Telecomm      .418531
                                
Col Mean     Technolo   Telecomm
Row Mean- 
                0.001      0.000      0.000      0.000      0.000      0.000
Utilitie      1.27683    1.27341    1.22748    1.78562    1.20184    1.73669
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000
Telecomm      .300434    .297008    .251082    .809223     .22544    .760293
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000
Technolo     -.118097   -.121523   -.167449    .390693   -.193091    .341762
          
                1.000      0.873      0.229      1.000      0.100
Oil & Ga     -.459859   -.463285   -.509211    .048931   -.534853
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      0.642
Industri      .074994    .071568    .025642    .583784
          
                1.000      1.000      0.968
Health C     -.508789   -.512216   -.558142
          
                1.000      1.000
Consumer      .049352    .045926
          
                1.000
Consumer      .003426
                                                                            
Col Mean     Basic Ma   Consumer   Consumer   Health C   Industri   Oil & Ga
Row Mean- 
                                (Bonferroni)
                      Comparison of QNTKREP by Industry
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(8) =  21.0081  Prob>chi2 = 0.007
    Total           665.017942    502   1.32473694
                                                                        
 Within groups      612.271542    494   1.23941608
Between groups      52.7463998      8   6.59329997      5.32     0.0000
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
            Total     2.6180589   1.1509722         503
                                                       
        Utilities     3.8889245   .83993432          20
Telecommunication      2.912526   1.5337671          10
       Technology     2.4939952    .9766443          40
        Oil & Gas     2.1522334   1.4463092          54
      Industrials     2.6870862   .96223914         143
      Health Care     2.1033025   1.1387787          24
Consumer Services      2.661444   1.1814895         107
   Consumer Goods     2.6155183    1.070477          65
  Basic Materials      2.612092   1.0979982          40
                                                       
         Industry          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                            Summary of QNTKREP
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Table 54 Anova test to compare financial KPI reporting quality across industries 
 
 
 
 
QLFKS: is the quality of financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI’ section. 
Rows: Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & Gas, Technology, 
Telecommunications, Utilities. 
Columns: Basic materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & 
Gas, Technology, Telecommunications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                1.000      1.000
Utilitie       .06391    .005222
          
                1.000
Telecomm      .058688
                                
Col Mean     Technolo   Telecomm
Row Mean- 
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      0.681
Utilitie     -.041115    .024423    .064563    .045206    .026331    .138878
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000
Telecomm     -.046338    .019201    .059341    .039983    .021109    .133655
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000
Technolo     -.105026   -.039487    .000653   -.018704   -.037579    .074967
          
                0.005      0.217      1.000      1.000      0.067
Oil & Ga     -.179993   -.114455   -.074314   -.093672   -.112547
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000
Industri     -.067446   -.001908    .038232    .018875
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000
Health C     -.086321   -.020783    .019357
          
                0.421      1.000
Consumer     -.105678    -.04014
          
                1.000
Consumer     -.065538
                                                                            
Col Mean     Basic Ma   Consumer   Consumer   Health C   Industri   Oil & Ga
Row Mean- 
                                (Bonferroni)
                       Comparison of QLFKS by Industry
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(8) =  18.6024  Prob>chi2 = 0.017
    Total           26.0389385    502   .051870395
                                                                        
 Within groups      25.0788179    494   .050766838
Between groups      .960120561      8    .12001507      2.36     0.0167
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
            Total     .54299186   .22775073         503
                                                       
        Utilities     .58635065   .16717525          20
Telecommunication      .5811282   .26060354          10
       Technology     .52244032   .21905217          40
        Oil & Gas     .44747301   .29989981          54
      Industrials     .56001952   .20450029         143
      Health Care     .54114475   .26520962          24
Consumer Services     .52178751   .22027122         107
   Consumer Goods     .56192752   .21609557          65
  Basic Materials     .62746595   .20321097          40
                                                       
         Industry          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                             Summary of QLFKS
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Table 55 Anova test to compare non-financial KPI reporting quality across 
industries 
 
 
 
QLNFKS EC: is the quality of non- financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI’ section. 
Rows: Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & Gas, Technology, 
Telecommunications, Utilities. 
Columns: Basic materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & 
Gas, Technology, Telecommunications. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 56 Anova test to compare total non-financial KPI reporting quality 
                0.000      1.000
Utilitie      .451798    .274918
          
                1.000
Telecomm       .17688
                                
Col Mean     Technolo   Telecomm
Row Mean- 
                1.000      0.012      0.249      0.001      0.206      1.000
Utilitie      .178198    .300295    .214431    .422329    .214998     .18454
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000
Telecomm      -.09672    .025377   -.060487    .147411    -.05992   -.090378
          
                0.007      0.740      0.003      1.000      0.002      0.003
Technolo       -.2736   -.151504   -.237368    -.02947     -.2368   -.267258
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      0.106      1.000
Oil & Ga     -.006342    .115755    .029891    .237789    .030458
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      0.142
Industri       -.0368    .085297   -.000567    .207331
          
                0.134      1.000      0.171
Health C     -.244131   -.122034   -.207898
          
                1.000      1.000
Consumer     -.036233    .085864
          
                1.000
Consumer     -.122097
                                                                            
Col Mean     Basic Ma   Consumer   Consumer   Health C   Industri   Oil & Ga
Row Mean- 
                                (Bonferroni)
                      Comparison of QLNFKSEC by Industry
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(8) =  15.4184  Prob>chi2 = 0.052
    Total            56.476032    502   .112502056
                                                                        
 Within groups      52.0057002    494   .105274697
Between groups      4.47033182      8   .558791478      5.31     0.0000
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
            Total     .39406279   .33541326         503
                                                       
        Utilities     .63513256   .18565513          20
Telecommunication      .3602144   .38041737          10
       Technology     .18333413   .28765049          40
        Oil & Gas     .45059245     .308087          54
      Industrials     .42013434     .341711         143
      Health Care     .21280383   .28297486          24
Consumer Services     .42070183   .30735701         107
   Consumer Goods     .33483771   .34206707          65
  Basic Materials      .4569346   .38782524          40
                                                       
         Industry          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                            Summary of QLNFKSEC
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QLNFKREP: is the quality of non financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report. 
Rows: Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & Gas, Technology, 
Telecommunications, Utilities. 
Columns: Basic materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & 
Gas, Technology, Telecommunications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 57 Anova test to compare KPI reporting quality across industries 
                0.001      0.664
Utilitie      .378855    .297119
          
                1.000
Telecomm      .081736
                                
Col Mean     Technolo   Telecomm
Row Mean- 
                1.000      0.032      0.507      0.049      0.437      0.378
Utilitie       .19209    .277171    .194731     .31655    .195004    .218195
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000
Telecomm     -.105029   -.019947   -.102388    .019432   -.102115   -.078924
          
                0.372      1.000      0.083      1.000      0.059      0.648
Technolo     -.186765   -.101684   -.184124   -.062305   -.183851    -.16066
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000
Oil & Ga     -.026105    .058976   -.023464    .098355   -.023192
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000
Industri     -.002914    .082168   -.000272    .121547
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000
Health C      -.12446   -.039379   -.121819
          
                1.000      1.000
Consumer     -.002641     .08244
          
                1.000
Consumer     -.085081
                                                                            
Col Mean     Basic Ma   Consumer   Consumer   Health C   Industri   Oil & Ga
Row Mean- 
                                (Bonferroni)
                      Comparison of QLNFKREP by Industry
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(8) =  31.0898  Prob>chi2 = 0.000
    Total           54.6628087    502   .108890057
                                                                        
 Within groups      52.0039393    494   .105271132
Between groups      2.65886943      8   .332358679      3.16     0.0017
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
            Total     .44796885   .32998493         503
                                                       
        Utilities       .670487   .10975838          20
Telecommunication      .3733682   .39457427          10
       Technology       .291632    .3508671          40
        Oil & Gas     .45229182   .30948373          54
      Industrials     .47548339   .33356834         143
      Health Care     .35393666   .31060165          24
Consumer Services     .47575582   .29229158         107
   Consumer Goods     .39331554   .34491248          65
  Basic Materials     .47839703   .38589218          40
                                                       
         Industry          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                            Summary of QLNFKREP
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QLTKSEC: is the aggregated quality of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI’ section 
Rows: Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & Gas, Technology, 
Telecommunications, Utilities. 
Columns: Basic materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & 
Gas, Technology, Telecommunications. 
 
 
 
 
Table 58 Anova test to compare total KPI reporting quality across industries 
                1.000      1.000
Utilitie      .057265    .036931
          
                1.000
Telecomm      .020333
                                
Col Mean     Technolo   Telecomm
Row Mean- 
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      0.149
Utilitie     -.031333    .043534     .08038     .07206    .020649    .161965
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000
Telecomm     -.068264    .006603    .043449    .035129   -.016282    .125034
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      0.713
Technolo     -.088597    -.01373    .023116    .014796   -.036616    .104701
          
                0.001      0.104      0.837      1.000      0.002
Oil & Ga     -.193298   -.118431   -.081585   -.089905   -.141316
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000
Industri     -.051982    .022885    .059731    .051411
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000
Health C     -.103393   -.028526     .00832
          
                0.187      1.000
Consumer     -.111713   -.036846
          
                1.000
Consumer     -.074867
                                                                            
Col Mean     Basic Ma   Consumer   Consumer   Health C   Industri   Oil & Ga
Row Mean- 
                                (Bonferroni)
                      Comparison of QLTKSEC by Industry
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(8) =  28.4288  Prob>chi2 = 0.000
    Total           24.0038219    502   .047816378
                                                                        
 Within groups      22.7745743    494   .046102377
Between groups      1.22924756      8   .153655945      3.33     0.0010
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
            Total     .56171643   .21866956         503
                                                       
        Utilities       .613934   .17850628          20
Telecommunication      .5770025   .25635769          10
       Technology     .55666935   .18279447          40
        Oil & Gas     .45196858   .29774119          54
      Industrials     .59328489   .17844292         143
      Health Care     .54187358   .26200302          24
Consumer Services     .53355371   .21027657         107
   Consumer Goods      .5703995   .21945245          65
  Basic Materials     .64526657   .20918528          40
                                                       
         Industry          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                            Summary of QLTKSEC
. oneway  QLTKSEC  Industry, t bon
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QLTKREP: is the aggregated quality of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report. 
Rows: Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & Gas, Technology, 
Telecommunications, Utilities. 
Columns: Basic materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & 
Gas, Technology, Telecommunications. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
                1.000      1.000
Utilitie       .07732    .073321
          
                1.000
Telecomm      .003999
                                
Col Mean     Technolo   Telecomm
Row Mean- 
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      0.020
Utilitie     -.001403    .076806    .093885    .115056    .040646    .191258
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000
Telecomm     -.074724    .003485    .020564    .041735   -.032675    .117936
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000      0.345
Technolo     -.078723   -.000514    .016565    .037736   -.036674    .113938
          
                0.000      0.116      0.204      1.000      0.000
Oil & Ga     -.192661   -.114451   -.097373   -.076202   -.150612
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000      1.000
Industri     -.042049     .03616    .053239     .07441
          
                1.000      1.000      1.000
Health C     -.116459    -.03825   -.021171
          
                0.529      1.000
Consumer     -.095288   -.017079
          
                1.000
Consumer     -.078209
                                                                            
Col Mean     Basic Ma   Consumer   Consumer   Health C   Industri   Oil & Ga
Row Mean- 
                                (Bonferroni)
                      Comparison of QLTKREP by Industry
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(8) =  39.5008  Prob>chi2 = 0.000
    Total           23.1058065    502   .046027503
                                                                        
 Within groups      21.7840628    494   .044097293
Between groups      1.32174367      8   .165217959      3.75     0.0003
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
            Total     .57008805   .21454021         503
                                                       
        Utilities      .6450576   .10519763          20
Telecommunication     .57173629   .25095208          10
       Technology     .56773741    .1867596          40
        Oil & Gas     .45379989   .29890189          54
      Industrials     .60441149   .17808972         143
      Health Care     .53000158   .25248115          24
Consumer Services     .55117247   .19955523         107
   Consumer Goods     .56825123   .21693682          65
  Basic Materials     .64646052   .20931095          40
                                                       
         Industry          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                            Summary of QLTKREP
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Table 59 Determinants of financial KPI reporting quantity 
Variable Mo1 Mo2 Mo3 Mo4 Mo5 Mo6 Mo7 
EXCOMP 0.51** 
0.233 
     0.44** 
0.206 
NOEXCOMP  0.462* 
0.26 
    0.271 
0.2 
BORSIZE   0.06** 
0.033 
   0.08** 
0.038 
BORCOMP   1.36** 
0.534 
   0.973 
0.61 
BORMEET   -0.022 
0.021 
   -0.032 
0.022 
ROLEDUAL   -0.362 
0.221 
   -0.417 
0.263 
ACSIZE    -0.024 
0.084 
  -0.116 
0.103 
ACMEET    0.106 
0.066 
  0.108 
0.072 
MAJORSHAR     0.013 
0.31 
 -0.183 
0.338 
MANGOWN     0.068 
0.568 
 0.506 
0.46 
FUT_EQUITY      0.144 
0.189 
0.111 
0.199 
FUT_BONDS      0.111 
0.117 
0.075 
0.076 
FUT_LOANS      0.268** 
0.109 
0.22** 
0.107 
SIZE 0.225 
0.138 
0.37*** 
0.109 
0.165 
0.121 
0.38*** 
0.105 
0.46*** 
0.118 
0.37*** 
0.099 
-0.194 
0.183 
PROFITAB -1.35** 
0.559 
-1.17** 
0.58 
-1.16* 
0.642 
-1.122* 
0.624 
-1.30** 
0.575 
-1.077* 
0.552 
-0.881 
0.617 
LIQUIDITY 0.079 
0.06 
0.067 
0.058 
0.089* 
0.052 
0.069 
0.056 
0.07 
0.059 
0.073 
0.058 
0.084 
0.057 
LEVERAGE -0.289 
0.273 
-0.31 
0.268 
-0.233 
0.244 
-0.356 
0.27 
-0.27 
0.263 
-0.274 
0.248 
-0.318 
0.254 
DIVYIELD 1.805 
2.143 
1.687 
2.203 
1.526 
1.96 
1.828 
2.256 
2.1 
2.184 
1.73 
2.192 
0.524 
2.151 
CROSSLIST 0.279 
0.234 
0.245 
0.241 
0.23 
0.228 
0.347 
0.237 
0.273 
0.233 
0.223 
0.233 
0.266 
0.264 
Constant -3.60** 
1.208 
-4.07** 
1.341 
-1.224 
0.9 
-2.36** 
0.98 
-2.66** 
1.123 
-1.93** 
0.933 
-1.753 
1.364 
F 8.4*** 7.3*** 6.8*** 6.7*** 6.0*** 6.4*** 4.9*** 
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Adj R-squared 0.125 0.117 0.144 0.123 0.109 0.126 0.172 
Mean VIF 1.59 1.31 1.42 1.27 1.29 1.29 1.79 
Max VIF 2.61 1.64 2.62 1.55 1.49 1.73 5.18 
N 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.        
Dependent variables: QNFKS is the total number of financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI’ section. 
Explanatory variables: executives’ compensations in Mo1; non-executives’ compensations in Mo2; 
board characteristics in  Mo3; audit committee characteristics in  Mo4; Ownership structure variables  
in Mo5;  capital need variables in Mo6; and all explanatory variables used in the analyses in  Mo7. All 
variables are defined in Table 5 and Table 18.  All regressions include industries dummies. Standard errors in the 
second line for each variable and are corrected for firm and time clustering. 
 
Table 60 Determinants of financial KPI reporting quality 
Variable Mo1 Mo2 Mo3 Mo4 Mo5 Mo6 Mo7 
EXCOMP 0.14** 
0.067 
     0.108** 
0.048 
NOEXCOMP  0.127* 
0.067 
    0.090* 
0.054 
BORSIZE   0.021** 
0.007 
   0.024** 
0.01 
BORCOMP   0.42*** 
0.121 
   0.286** 
0.121 
BORMEET   -0.002 
0.003 
   -0.004 
0.004 
ROLEDUAL   -0.16*** 
0.036 
   -0.2*** 
0.056 
ACSIZE    0.01 
0.021 
  -0.011 
0.028 
ACMEET    0.037** 
0.014 
  0.036** 
0.015 
MAJORSHAR     0.058 
0.069 
 0.03 
0.073 
MANGOWN     0.037 
0.151 
 0.222** 
0.111 
FUT_EQUITY      -0.006 
0.045 
-0.018 
0.042 
FUT_BONDS      -0.005 
0.021 
-0.021 
0.015 
FUT_LOANS      0.05*** 
0.015 
0.032* 
0.018 
SIZE 0.041 
0.032 
0.1*** 
0.016 
0.012 
0.026 
0.06*** 
0.019 
0.11*** 
0.022 
0.09*** 
0.02 
-0.066* 
0.038 
PROFITAB -0.21* 
0.114 
-0.164 
0.118 
-0.143 
0.13 
-0.113 
0.133 
-0.208* 
0.115 
-0.170* 
0.099 
-0.081 
0.122 
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LIQUIDITY -0.002 
0.015 
-0.005 
0.014 
0.003 
0.013 
-0.004 
0.014 
-0.004 
0.015 
-0.003 
0.015 
0.001 
0.012 
LEVERAGE -0.098 
0.075 
-0.104 
0.07 
-0.086 
0.06 
-0.118 
0.075 
-0.091 
0.072 
-0.088 
0.067 
-0.098 
0.067 
DIVYIELD 0.589 
0.643 
0.553 
0.682 
0.456 
0.643 
0.537 
0.693 
0.715 
0.694 
0.638 
0.654 
0.278 
0.692 
CROSSLIST 0.037 
0.067 
0.027 
0.069 
0.021 
0.064 
0.06 
0.065 
0.034 
0.066 
0.027 
0.067 
0.04 
0.067 
Constant -0.6** 
0.263 
-0.72** 
0.36 
0.067 
0.172 
-0.206 
0.182 
-0.440** 
0.216 
-0.248 
0.21 
-0.394 
0.345 
F 8.8*** 8.4*** 9.6*** 9.5*** 6.5*** 6.0*** 6.6*** 
Adj R-squared 0.119 0.11 0.169 0.135 0.101 0.104 0.208 
Mean VIF 1.59 1.31 1.42 1.27 1.29 1.29 1.79 
Max VIF 2.61 1.64 2.62 1.55 1.49 1.73 5.18 
N 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.        
Dependent variables: QLFKS is the quality score of KPIs disclosed in the KPI’ section. Explanatory 
variables: executives’’ compensations in Mo1; non-executives’ compensations in Mo2; board 
characteristics in  Mo3; audit committee characteristics in  Mo4; Ownership structure variables  in Mo5;  
capital need variables in Mo6; and all explanatory variables used in the analyses in  Mo7. All variables are 
defined in Table 5 and Table 18.  All regressions include industries dummies. Standard errors in the second line 
for each variable and are corrected for firm and time clustering. 
 
Table 61 Determinants of non-financial KPI reporting quantity 
Variable Mo1 Mo2 Mo3 Mo4 Mo5 Mo6 Mo7 
EXCOMP 0.091 
0.311 
     -0.071 
0.337 
NOEXCOMP  0.666** 
0.274 
    0.672** 
0.282 
BORSIZE   0.07** 
0.026 
   0.10*** 
0.025 
BORCOMP   0.86** 
0.436 
   1.059** 
0.431 
BORMEET   -0.04** 
0.022 
   -0.038 
0.025 
ROLEDUAL   -0.47** 
0.221 
   -0.375 
0.282 
ACSIZE    -0.021 
0.08 
  -0.114 
0.084 
ACMEET    -0.003 
0.061 
  0.004 
0.067 
MAJORSHAR     0.268 
0.388 
 0.193 
0.38 
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MANGOWN     -0.168 
0.809 
 -0.018 
0.885 
FUT_EQUITY      -0.126 
0.077 
-0.17*** 
0.05 
FUT_BONDS      0.119 
0.107 
0.084 
0.089 
FUT_LOANS      0.233* 
0.12 
0.193* 
0.11 
SIZE 0.203 
0.175 
0.124 
0.116 
-0.035 
0.152 
0.258* 
0.145 
0.27** 
0.124 
0.149 
0.114 
-0.191 
0.162 
PROFITAB -0.442 
0.99 
-0.257 
0.977 
-0.31 
0.913 
-0.465 
1.033 
-0.449 
0.974 
-0.245 
0.992 
-0.039 
0.923 
LIQUIDITY -0.008 
0.066 
-0.014 
0.063 
0.006 
0.058 
-0.009 
0.066 
-0.007 
0.066 
-0.007 
0.068 
0 
0.055 
LEVERAGE 0.067 
0.232 
0.017 
0.236 
0.161 
0.207 
0.067 
0.233 
0.066 
0.235 
0.08 
0.205 
0.091 
0.201 
DIVYIELD 2.304* 
1.379 
1.783 
1.433 
1.908 
1.257 
2.403 
1.479 
2.58** 
1.262 
2.376* 
1.315 
1.623* 
0.957 
CROSSLIST 0.185 
0.193 
0.144 
0.203 
0.153 
0.186 
0.182 
0.206 
0.181 
0.189 
0.155 
0.197 
0.087 
0.216 
Constant -1.326 
1.375 
-3.24** 
1.563 
0.609 
1.278 
-1.189 
1.194 
-1.558 
1.238 
-0.333 
1.106 
-0.878 
1.819 
F 7.3*** 7.5*** 6.5*** 6.0*** 5.8*** 6.2*** 4.8*** 
Adj R-squared 0.196 0.207 0.228 0.194 0.195 0.203 0.24 
Mean VIF 1.59 1.31 1.42 1.27 1.29 1.29 1.79 
Max VIF 2.61 1.64 2.62 1.55 1.49 1.73 5.18 
N 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.   Dependent 
variable: QNNFKSEC is the total number of non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI’ section. Explanatory 
variables: executives’’ compensations in Mo1; non-executives’ compensations in Mo2; board 
characteristics in  Mo3; audit committee characteristics in  Mo4; Ownership structure variables  in 
Mo5;  capital need variables in Mo6; and all explanatory variables used in the analyses in  Mo7. All 
variables are defined in Table 5 and Table 18.  All regressions include industries dummies. Standard errors in the 
second line for each variable and are corrected for firm and time clus tering. 
 
Table 62 Determinants of non-financial KPI reporting quality 
Variable Mo1 Mo2 Mo3 Mo4 Mo5 Mo6 Mo7 
EXCOMP 0.20** 
0.079 
     0.125* 
0.068 
NOEXCOMP  0.24** 
0.084 
    0.194** 
0.062 
BORSIZE   0.03** 
0.01 
   0.037*** 
0.01 
Appendices  
 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ic
es 
XXIII 
BORCOMP   0.56** 
0.179 
   0.427** 
0.174 
BORMEET   -0.007 
0.009 
   -0.008 
0.01 
ROLEDUAL   -0.24** 
0.072 
   -0.209** 
0.092 
ACSIZE    0.026 
0.033 
  -0.014 
0.035 
ACMEET    0.027 
0.021 
  0.026 
0.022 
MAJORSHAR     0.097 
0.133 
 0.071 
0.118 
MANGOWN     -0.274 
0.239 
 -0.072 
0.261 
FUT_EQUITY      -0.022 
0.045 
-0.04 
0.036 
FUT_BONDS      0.026 
0.038 
-0.002 
0.031 
FUT_LOANS      0.055* 
0.033 
0.035 
0.03 
SIZE -0.002 
0.051 
0.043 
0.033 
-0.043 
0.047 
0.049 
0.042 
0.09** 
0.04 
0.065* 
0.035 
-0.15*** 
0.045 
PROFITAB -0.186 
0.237 
-0.102 
0.235 
-0.092 
0.21 
-0.081 
0.249 
-0.149 
0.23 
-0.121 
0.234 
0.019 
0.208 
LIQUIDITY -0.012 
0.019 
-0.017 
0.018 
-0.006 
0.016 
-0.015 
0.019 
-0.012 
0.018 
-0.014 
0.019 
-0.006 
0.015 
LEVERAGE -0.082 
0.086 
-0.095 
0.082 
-0.058 
0.077 
-0.09 
0.081 
-0.087 
0.081 
-0.074 
0.077 
-0.09 
0.08 
DIVYIELD 0.89** 
0.423 
0.795* 
0.441 
0.721* 
0.436 
0.874 
0.531 
1.07** 
0.422 
0.99** 
0.448 
0.509 
0.33 
CROSSLIST 0.072 
0.083 
0.056 
0.087 
0.051 
0.07 
0.088 
0.079 
0.069 
0.081 
0.063 
0.082 
0.058 
0.078 
Constant -0.75* 
0.384 
-1.11** 
0.488 
0.253 
0.367 
-0.256 
0.361 
-0.429 
0.405 
-0.184 
0.351 
-0.476 
0.501 
F 5.1*** 6.0*** 6.4*** 4.6*** 4.8*** 4.3*** 4.1*** 
Adj R-squared 0.128 0.124 0.174 0.122 0.115 0.111 0.18 
Mean VIF 1.59 1.31 1.42 1.27 1.29 1.29 1.79 
Max VIF 2.61 1.64 2.62 1.55 1.49 1.73 5.18 
N 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.   Dependent 
variable: QLNFKSEC is the quality score of non-financial KPIs disclosed in the KPI’ section. Explanatory 
variables: executives’’ compensations in Mo1; non-executives’ compensations in Mo2; board 
characteristics in  Mo3; audit committee characteristics in Mo4; Ownership structure variables  in Mo5;  
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capital need variables in Mo6; and all explanatory variables used in the analyses in  Mo7. All variables 
are defined in Table 5 and Table 18. All regressions include industries dummies. Standard errors in the second 
line for each variable and are corrected for firm and time clustering. 
 
Table 63 The determinants of total non-financial KPI reporting quantity 
Variable Mo1 Mo2 Mo3 Mo4 Mo5 Mo6 Mo7 
EXCOMP 0.472* 
0.281 
     0.154 
0.333 
NOEXCOMP  1.1*** 
0.288 
    0.91*** 
0.256 
BORSIZE   0.039 
0.026 
   0.066** 
0.026 
BORCOMP   1.1** 
0.551 
   1.396** 
0.507 
BORMEET   -0.024 
0.024 
   -0.02 
0.025 
ROLEDUAL   -0.69** 
0.25 
   -0.507* 
0.258 
ACSIZE    0.002 
0.078 
  -0.084 
0.088 
ACMEET    0.005 
0.061 
  0.004 
0.067 
MAJORSHAR     -0.552 
0.395 
 -0.646* 
0.386 
MANGOWN     -0.071 
0.726 
 0.381 
0.787 
FUT_EQUITY      -0.221 
0.154 
-0.241* 
0.129 
FUT_BONDS      0.092 
0.08 
0.048 
0.069 
FUT_LOANS      0.321* 
0.17 
0.269 
0.165 
SIZE 0.219 
0.181 
0.232* 
0.131 
0.217 
0.159 
0.42** 
0.147 
0.35** 
0.138 
0.32** 
0.136 
-0.216 
0.17 
PROFITAB -0.799 
0.941 
-0.459 
0.924 
-0.687 
0.858 
-0.736 
0.979 
-0.671 
0.966 
-0.523 
0.949 
-0.26 
0.944 
LIQUIDITY -0.013 
0.067 
-0.028 
0.063 
0.003 
0.061 
-0.02 
0.065 
-0.02 
0.062 
-0.015 
0.067 
-0.005 
0.057 
LEVERAGE -0.05 
0.251 
-0.123 
0.245 
0.014 
0.239 
-0.039 
0.222 
-0.048 
0.231 
-0.008 
0.219 
-0.057 
0.204 
DIVYIELD 1.913 
1.349 
1.228 
1.476 
1.763 
1.224 
2.152 
1.431 
1.685 
1.384 
2.257 
1.466 
0.448 
1.202 
CROSSLIST -0.069 
0.215 
-0.141 
0.21 
-0.109 
0.225 
-0.071 
0.234 
-0.069 
0.213 
-0.112 
0.222 
-0.19 
0.235 
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Constant -3.4** 
1.514 
-5.95*** 
1.634 
-1.376 
1.356 
-2.489* 
1.31 
-1.497 
1.394 
-1.554 
1.297 
-2.61 
1.805 
F 8.3*** 10.9*** 7.0*** 7.3*** 8.2*** 7.7*** 5.5*** 
Adj R-squared 0.184 0.202 0.201 0.173 0.178 0.187 0.233 
Mean VIF 1.59 1.31 1.42 1.27 1.29 1.29 1.79 
Max VIF 2.61 1.64 2.62 1.55 1.49 1.73 5.18 
N 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.   Dependent 
variable: QNNFKREP is the number of non financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report. Explanatory 
variables: executives’’ compensations in Mo1; non-executives’ compensations in Mo2; board 
characteristics in  Mo3; audit committee characteristics in  Mo4; Ownership structure variables  in 
Mo5;  capital need variables in Mo6; and all explanatory variables used in the analyses in  Mo7. All 
variables are defined in Table 5 and Table 18.  All regressions include industries dummies. Standard errors in the 
second line for each variable and are corrected for firm and time clustering. 
 
Table 64 The determinants of total non-financial KPI reporting quality 
Variable Mo1 Mo2 Mo3 Mo4 Mo5 Mo6 Mo7 
EXCOMP 0.304*** 
0.063 
     0.180** 
0.061 
NOEXCOMP  0.33*** 
0.075 
    0.24*** 
0.044 
BORSIZE   0.019** 
0.009 
   0.026** 
0.009 
BORCOMP   0.711*** 
0.171 
   0.623*** 
0.168 
BORMEET   -0.002 
0.009 
   -0.004 
0.009 
ROLEDUAL   -0.26*** 
0.07 
   -0.204** 
0.074 
ACSIZE    0.025 
0.029 
  -0.015 
0.031 
ACMEET    0.030* 
0.017 
  0.025 
0.018 
MAJORSHAR     -0.096 
0.124 
 -0.157 
0.113 
MANGOWN     -0.243 
0.223 
 0.024 
0.235 
FUT_EQUITY      -0.034 
0.06 
-0.05 
0.054 
FUT_BONDS      0.018 
0.026 
-0.011 
0.02 
FUT_LOANS      0.078* 
0.046 
0.054 
0.043 
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SIZE -0.004 
0.049 
0.071* 
0.037 
0.022 
0.049 
0.09** 
0.042 
0.11** 
0.042 
0.11** 
0.042 
-0.155** 
0.047 
PROFITAB -0.261 
0.226 
-0.14 
0.224 
-0.186 
0.19 
-0.14 
0.235 
-0.191 
0.228 
-0.175 
0.218 
-0.049 
0.188 
LIQUIDITY -0.009 
0.02 
-0.016 
0.019 
-0.002 
0.016 
-0.013 
0.019 
-0.011 
0.018 
-0.013 
0.02 
-0.003 
0.016 
LEVERAGE -0.087 
0.089 
-0.104 
0.085 
-0.075 
0.086 
-0.094 
0.077 
-0.09 
0.08 
-0.071 
0.079 
-0.106 
0.073 
DIVYIELD 0.635 
0.485 
0.515 
0.527 
0.552 
0.473 
0.67 
0.564 
0.702 
0.508 
0.796 
0.534 
0.084 
0.443 
CROSSLIST -0.008 
0.066 
-0.032 
0.07 
-0.033 
0.057 
0.008 
0.069 
-0.01 
0.071 
-0.022 
0.07 
-0.03 
0.058 
Constant -1.272** 
0.419 
-1.73*** 
0.48 
-0.276 
0.395 
-0.573 
0.38 
-0.422 
0.432 
-0.483 
0.406 
-0.851* 
0.501 
F 7.8*** 8.6*** 7.9*** 6.0*** 6.3*** 5.3*** 5.7*** 
Adj R-squared 0.146 0.131 0.178 0.116 0.11 0.108 0.216 
Mean VIF 1.59 1.31 1.42 1.27 1.29 1.29 1.79 
Max VIF 2.61 1.64 2.62 1.55 1.49 1.73 5.18 
N 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.   Dependent 
variable: QLNFKREP is the quality score of non financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report. Explanatory 
variables: executives’’ compensations in Mo1; non-executives’ compensations in Mo2; board 
characteristics in  Mo3; audit committee characteristics in  Mo4; Ownership structure variables  in 
Mo5;  capital need variables in Mo6; and all explanatory variables used in the analyses in  Mo7. All 
variables are defined in Table 5 and Table 18.  All regressions include industries dummies. Standard errors in the 
second line for each variable and are corrected for firm and time clustering. 
 
Table 65 The determinants of total KPI reporting quantity 
Variable Mo1 Mo2 Mo3 Mo4 Mo5 Mo6 Mo7 
EXCOMP 0.74** 
0.305 
     0.52** 
0.258 
NOEXCOMP  1.023** 
0.324 
    0.75** 
0.276 
BORSIZE   0.08** 
0.034 
   0.11** 
0.038 
BORCOMP   1.66** 
0.604 
   1.42** 
0.548 
BORMEET   -0.029 
0.02 
   -0.03* 
0.021 
ROLEDUAL   -0.7** 
0.242 
   -0.7** 
0.269 
ACSIZE    -0.009 
0.096 
  -0.13 
0.113 
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ACMEET    0.091 
0.069 
  0.094 
0.076 
MAJORSHAR     -0.294 
0.336 
 -0.458 
0.315 
MANGOWN     0.034 
0.73 
 0.692 
0.605 
FUT_EQUITY      -0.019 
0.238 
-0.051 
0.225 
FUT_BONDS      0.167** 
0.082 
0.113 
. 
FUT_LOANS      0.383** 
0.159 
0.311* 
0.159 
SIZE 0.277 
0.175 
0.420** 
0.137 
0.252* 
0.14 
0.53*** 
0.128 
0.56*** 
0.135 
0.47*** 
0.125 
-0.32* 
0.18 
PROFITAB -1.25* 
0.708 
-0.904 
0.693 
-1.02* 
0.602 
-1.011 
0.752 
-1.141 
0.71 
-0.87 
0.648 
-0.542 
0.581 
LIQUIDITY 0.069 
0.075 
0.05 
0.073 
0.086 
0.062 
0.057 
0.07 
0.057 
0.071 
0.062 
0.071 
0.076 
0.065 
LEVERAGE -0.222 
0.298 
-0.281 
0.293 
-0.139 
0.241 
-0.268 
0.261 
-0.203 
0.272 
-0.189 
0.245 
-0.251 
0.222 
DIVYIELD 2.55 
2.464 
2.073 
2.639 
2.246 
2.201 
2.708 
2.576 
2.697 
2.579 
2.738 
2.429 
0.688 
2.136 
CROSSLIST 0.11 
0.25 
0.04 
0.261 
0.049 
0.257 
0.166 
0.261 
0.105 
0.254 
0.043 
0.256 
0.039 
0.297 
Constant -4.7** 
1.549 
-6.5*** 
1.571 
-1.509 
1.138 
-3.03** 
1.179 
-2.76** 
1.22 
-2.13* 
1.136 
-2.9** 
1.468 
F 10.9*** 11.7*** 9.2*** 9.0*** 8.8*** 9.1*** 6.8*** 
Adj R-squared 0.177 0.178 0.201 0.161 0.155 0.172 0.241 
Mean VIF 1.59 1.31 1.42 1.27 1.29 1.29 1.79 
Max VIF 2.61 1.64 2.62 1.55 1.49 1.73 5.18 
N 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.   Dependent 
variables: QNTKREP is the total number of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report. All 
variables are defined in  
 
Table 20. Explanatory variables: executives’’ compensations in Mo1; non-executives’ compensations in Mo2; 
board characteristics in  Mo3; audit committee characteristics in  Mo4; Ownership structure variables  in 
Mo5;  capital need variables in Mo6; and all explanatory variables used in the analyses in  Mo7.  All 
variables are defined in Table 5 and Table 18. All regressions include industries dummies. Standard errors in the 
second line for each variable and are corrected for firm and time clustering. 
Table 66 The determinants of total KPI reporting quality 
Variable Mo1 Mo2 Mo3 Mo4 Mo5 Mo6 Mo7 
EXCOMP 0.2*** 
0.046 
     0.16*** 
0.034 
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NOEXCOMP  0.2*** 
0.05 
    0.15*** 
0.038 
BORSIZE   0.019** 
0.006 
   0.023** 
0.009 
BORCOMP   0.48*** 
0.106 
   0.308** 
0.109 
BORMEET   0.0001 
0.003 
   -0.001 
0.004 
ROLEDUAL   -0.2*** 
0.037 
   -0.12*** 
0.055 
ACSIZE    0.023 
0.021 
  -0.001 
0.027 
ACMEET    0.035*** 
0.01 
  0.033** 
0.011 
MAJORSHAR     0.038 
0.062 
 0.022 
0.057 
MANGOWN     -0.034 
0.151 
 0.186* 
0.101 
FUT_EQUITY      -0.018 
0.047 
-0.03 
0.044 
FUT_BONDS      0.01 
0.007 
-0.01 
0.011 
FUT_LOANS      0.038** 
0.013 
0.019 
0.016 
SIZE 0.013 
0.026 
0.07*** 
0.017 
0.016 
0.022 
0.06*** 
0.017 
0.1*** 
0.021 
0.1*** 
0.021 
-0.1** 
0.036 
PROFITAB -0.146 
0.14 
-0.072 
0.141 
-0.071 
0.114 
-0.028 
0.147 
-0.125 
0.137 
-0.097 
0.129 
0.011 
0.102 
LIQUIDITY 0.004 
0.014 
-0.001 
0.014 
0.008 
0.011 
0.001 
0.012 
0.001 
0.014 
0.001 
0.014 
0.006 
0.011 
LEVERAGE -0.07 
0.063 
-0.079 
0.059 
-0.061 
0.045 
-0.084 
0.06 
-0.065 
0.058 
-0.061 
0.054 
-0.079 
0.056 
DIVYIELD 0.591 
0.634 
0.534 
0.673 
0.487 
0.593 
0.561 
0.664 
0.734 
0.673 
0.704 
0.644 
0.242 
0.578 
CROSSLIST -0.007 
0.054 
-0.021 
0.058 
-0.025 
0.052 
0.014 
0.051 
-0.01 
0.056 
-0.014 
0.056 
-0.007 
0.051 
Constant -0.7** 
0.226 
-0.95** 
0.298 
0.018 
0.149 
-0.201 
0.17 
-0.38* 
0.211 
-0.223 
0.21 
-0.68** 
0.263 
F 10.5*** 9.4*** 10.6*** 10.0*** 6.0*** 5.6*** 8.1*** 
Adj R-squared 0.169 0.145 0.211 0.164 0.121 0.123 0.273 
Mean VIF 1.59 1.31 1.42 1.27 1.29 1.29 1.79 
Max VIF 2.61 1.64 2.62 1.55 1.49 1.73 5.18 
Appendices  
 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ic
es 
XXIX 
N 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.   Dependent 
variable: QLTKREP is the aggregated quality score of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole 
report. Explanatory variables: executives’’ compensations in Mo1; non-executives’ compensations in Mo2; 
board characteristics in  Mo3; audit committee characteristics in  Mo4; Ownership structure variables  in 
Mo5;  capital need variables in Mo6; and all explanatory variables used in the analyses in  Mo7. All 
variables are defined in Table 5 and Table 18.  All regressions include industries dummies. Standard errors in 
the second line for each variable and are corrected for firm and time clustering. 
 
Appendix 3 
Table 67  Firm value (TQ) & total non-financial KPI reporting quantity 
Variables Mo1 Mo2 Mo3 Mo4 Mo5 Mo6 
QNNFKREP -0.017 
0.012 
-0.017 
0.013 
-0.012 
0.012 
-0.016 
0.013 
-0.015 
0.012 
-0.012 
0.011 
EXCOMP 0.056 
0.061 
    0.047 
0.06 
NOEXCOMP  0.046 
0.078 
   0.059 
0.058 
BORSIZE   -0.012 
0.008 
  -0.016** 
0.007 
BORCOMP   -0.046 
0.125 
  -0.217 
0.132 
BORMEET   -0.007 
0.008 
  -0.008 
0.007 
ROLEDUAL   0.149** 
0.048 
  0.170** 
0.059 
ACSIZE    0.014 
0.017 
 0.027 
0.02 
ACMEET    0.007 
0.017 
 0.013 
0.012 
MANGOWN     -0.14 
0.181 
-0.212 
0.145 
MAJORSHAR     0.116 
0.122 
0.111 
0.116 
SIZE 0.045 
0.029 
0.063** 
0.022 
0.103*** 
0.026 
0.057** 
0.024 
0.077** 
0.026 
0.074** 
0.033 
PROFITAB 0.896** 
0.299 
0.912** 
0.31 
0.853** 
0.309 
0.934** 
0.284 
0.904** 
0.3 
0.909** 
0.286 
LEVERAGE 0.077 
0.079 
0.073 
0.086 
0.079 
0.06 
0.076 
0.071 
0.076 
0.079 
0.059 
0.064 
CROSSLIST -0.011 
0.041 
-0.015 
0.042 
-0.012 
0.044 
-0.007 
0.046 
-0.012 
0.041 
0.001 
0.043 
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XXX 
CASH_ASSETS 
 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
CAPEX_ASSETS 
 
0.003 
0.003 
 
0.003 
0.003 
 
0.002 
0.003 
 
0.004 
0.003 
 
0.003 
0.003 
 
0.003 
0.004 
 
PRPLEQ_SALES 0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
Constant -0.65** 
0.25 
-0.71** 
0.342 
-0.661** 
0.223 
-0.52** 
0.198 
-0.65** 
0.273 
-1.01*** 
0.268 
F 11.7*** 11.6*** 11.3*** 11.1*** 11.2*** 9.67*** 
Adj R-squared 0.273 0.272 0.299 0.273 0.276 0.318 
Mean VIF 2.05 1.9 1.91 1.86 1.88 2.16 
Max VIF 3.89 3.9 3.89 3.9 4.09 5.52 
N 485 485 485 485 485 485 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.  
 Dependent variable: TQ +3: is TobinsQ three months after the year end. Explanatory variables: : Q NNFKREP is  the quantity of non-
financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report  in addition to executives’’ compensations in Mo1; non-executives’ compensations in Mo2; 
board characteristics in  Mo3; audit committee characteristics in  Mo4; Ownership structure variables  in Mo5;  and all explanatory 
variables used in the analyses in  Mo6. All variables are defined in Table 31.  All regressions include industries dummies.  Standard errors 
in the second line for each variable are corrected for firm and time clustering. 
 
Table 68 Firm value (TQ) & total non-financial KPI reporting quality 
Variables Mo1 Mo2 Mo3 Mo4 Mo5 Mo6    
QLNFKREP -0.082** 
0.041 
-0.075* 
0.044 
-0.053 
0.047 
-0.076 
0.048 
-0.072* 
0.043 
-0.068* 
0.038 
EXCOMP 0.074 
0.059 
    0.057 
0.058 
NOEXCOMP  0.053 
0.076 
   0.064 
0.056 
BORSIZE   -0.012 
0.008 
  -0.015** 
0.007 
BORCOMP   -0.019 
0.13 
  -0.19 
0.132 
BORMEET   -0.006 
0.008 
  -0.008 
0.007 
ROLEDUAL   0.146** 
0.047 
  0.167** 
0.058 
ACSIZE    0.016 
0.017 
 0.027 
0.019 
ACMEET    0.009 
0.018 
 0.014 
0.012 
MANGOWN     -0.159 
0.177 
-0.22 
0.144 
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MAJORSHAR     0.118 
0.12 
0.109 
0.111 
SIZE 0.041 
0.028 
0.065** 
0.023 
0.101*** 
0.027 
0.058** 
0.024 
0.081** 
0.027 
0.067** 
0.031 
PROFITAB 0.875** 
0.298 
0.899** 
0.309 
0.844** 
0.311 
0.922** 
0.284 
0.888** 
0.299 
0.894** 
0.288 
LEVERAGE 0.066 
0.076 
0.062 
0.083 
0.071 
0.058 
0.064 
0.068 
0.065 
0.076 
0.046 
0.061 
CROSSLIST -0.009 
0.04 
-0.015 
0.042 
-0.012 
0.043 
-0.005 
0.046 
-0.011 
0.041 
0.002 
0.043 
CASH_ASSETS 
 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
CAPEX_ASSETS 
 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.004 
0.003 
0.003 
0.004 
0.003 
0.004 
PRPLEQ_SALES 0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
Constant -0.704** 
0.255 
-0.745** 
0.334 
-0.663** 
0.224 
-0.537** 
0.2 
-0.664** 
0.281 
-1.045*** 
0.274 
F 12.1*** 11.9*** 11.4*** 11.4*** 11.5*** 9.9*** 
Adj R-squared 0.28 0.276 0.301 0.279 0.281 0.323 
Mean VIF 2.05 1.89 1.91 1.84 1.87 2.16 
Max VIF 3.9 3.92 3.9 3.92 4.09 5.57 
N 485 485 485 485 485 485 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.  
 Dependent variable: TQ +3: is TobinsQ three months after the year end. Explanatory variables:  Q LNFKREP is the aggregated 
quality of non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report  in addition to executives’ compensations in Mo1; non-executives’ 
compensations in Mo2; board characteristics in  Mo3; audit committee characteristics in  Mo4; Ownership structure variables  in 
Mo5;  and all explanatory variables used in the analyses in  Mo6. All variables are defined in Table 31.  All regressions include 
industries dummies.  Standard errors in the second line for each variable are corrected for firm and time clustering. 
 
Table 69 Firm value (TQ) & total KPI reporting quantity 
 Mo1 Mo2 Mo3 Mo4 Mo5 Mo6    
QNTKREP -0.024** 
0.011 
-0.024** 
0.011 
-0.018 
0.012 
-0.022* 
0.012 
-0.021* 
0.012 
-0.019* 
0.01 
EXCOMP 0.065 
0.06 
    0.054 
0.059 
NOEXCOMP  0.056 
0.074 
   0.067 
0.058 
BORSIZE   -0.011 
0.008 
  -0.015* 
0.008 
BORCOMP   -0.036 
0.127 
  -0.21 
0.133 
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BORMEET   -0.007 
0.008 
  -0.009 
0.007 
ROLEDUAL   0.145** 
0.047 
  0.166** 
0.059 
ACSIZE    0.013 
0.017 
 0.025 
0.019 
ACMEET    0.009 
0.018 
 0.014 
0.013 
MANGOWN     -0.138 
0.181 
-0.206 
0.147 
MAJORSHAR     0.118 
0.121 
0.112 
0.114 
SIZE 0.046* 
0.028 
0.067** 
0.021 
0.104*** 
0.026 
0.061** 
0.024 
0.083** 
0.026 
0.071** 
0.033 
PROFITAB 0.876** 
0.294 
0.897** 
0.306 
0.841** 
0.301 
0.918** 
0.281 
0.886** 
0.298 
0.895** 
0.279 
LEVERAGE 0.067 
0.078 
0.062 
0.084 
0.072 
0.059 
0.065 
0.069 
0.067 
0.078 
0.05 
0.064 
CROSSLIST -0.006 
0.041 
-0.012 
0.042 
-0.009 
0.043 
-0.002 
0.046 
-0.009 
0.041 
0.004 
0.043 
CASH_ASSETS 
 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
CAPEX_ASSETS 
 
0.003 
0.003 
0.002 
0.003 
0.002 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.002 
0.004 
PRPLEQ_SALES 0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
Constant -0.674** 
0.251 
-0.747** 
0.333 
-0.650** 
0.213 
-0.528** 
0.197 
-0.665** 
0.267 
-1.040*** 
0.248 
F 12.0*** 11.9*** 11.5*** 11.4*** 11.5*** 9.9*** 
Adj R-squared 0.279 0.277 0.303 0.278 0.281 0.322 
Mean VIF 2.05 1.9 1.91 1.86 1.88 2.16 
Max VIF 3.9 3.92 3.90 3.92 4.1 5.53 
N 485 485 485 485 485 485 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.  
 Dependent variable: TQ +3: TobinsQ three months after the year end. Explanatory variables: Q NTKREP is the quantity of 
financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report in addition to executives’ compensations in Mo1; non-executives’ 
compensations in Mo2; board characteristics in  Mo3; audit committee characteristics in  Mo4; O wnership structure 
variables  in Mo5;  and all explanatory variables used in the analyses in  Mo6. All variables are defined in Table 31.  All 
regressions include industries dummies.  Standard errors in the second line for each variable are corrected for firm and time 
clustering. 
Table 70 Firm value (TQ) & total KPI reporting quality 
 Mo1 Mo2 Mo3 Mo4 Mo5 Mo6    
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QLTKREP -0.066 
0.056 
-0.057 
0.063 
-0.006 
0.074 
-0.066 
0.071 
-0.052 
0.066 
-0.036 
0.065 
EXCOMP 0.062 
0.059 
    0.051 
0.055 
NOEXCOMP  0.041 
0.078 
   0.055 
0.059 
BORSIZE   -0.012 
0.008 
  -0.016** 
0.008 
BORCOMP   -0.056 
0.134 
  -0.224 
0.137 
BORMEET   -0.006 
0.008 
  -0.008 
0.007 
ROLEDUAL   0.154** 
0.048 
  0.169** 
0.058 
ACSIZE    0.015 
0.017 
 0.028 
0.02 
ACMEET    0.009 
0.019 
 0.014 
0.013 
MANGOWN     -0.141 
0.181 
-0.209 
0.145 
MAJORSHAR     0.128 
0.125 
0.122 
0.116 
SIZE 0.041 
0.026 
0.062** 
0.022 
0.099*** 
0.026 
0.054** 
0.025 
0.077** 
0.027 
0.071** 
0.032 
PROFITAB 0.907** 
0.286 
0.927** 
0.299 
0.874** 
0.295 
0.950*** 
0.273 
0.915** 
0.292 
0.921*** 
0.277 
LEVERAGE 0.071 
0.077 
0.069 
0.084 
0.079 
0.058 
0.068 
0.066 
0.072 
0.076 
0.056 
0.062 
CROSSLIST -0.01 
0.04 
-0.014 
0.042 
-0.01 
0.043 
-0.005 
0.045 
-0.011 
0.041 
0.003 
0.043 
CASH_ASSETS 
 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
0.006** 
0.002 
CAPEX_ASSETS 
 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
PRPLEQ_SALES 0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
0.0001 
0 
Constant -0.628** 
0.262 
-0.652* 
0.359 
-0.639** 
0.218 
-0.487** 
0.202 
-0.639** 
0.268 
-0.997*** 
0.26 
F 11.6*** 11.5*** 11.2*** 11.0*** 11.1*** 9.6*** 
Adj R-squared 0.271 0.268 0.297 0.271 0.274 0.316 
Mean VIF 2.06 1.89 1.92 1.85 1.88 2.17 
Max VIF 3.89 3.9 3.89 3.91 4.09 5.6 
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N 485 485 485 485 485 485 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.  
 Dependent variable: TQ +3: TobinsQ three months after the year end. Explanatory variables: Q LTKREP is the aggregated 
quality of financial and non-financial KPIs disclosed in the whole report  in addition to executives’ compensations in Mo1; non-
executives’ compensations in Mo2; board characteristics in  Mo3; audit committee characteristics in  Mo4; O wnership 
structure variables  in Mo5;  and all explanatory variables used in the analyses in  Mo6. All variables are defined in Table 31.  
All regressions include industries dummies.  Standard errors in the second line for each variable are corrected for firm and time 
clustering. 
 
 
 
